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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This is the 5
th edition of the Commission’s Report on the European Competitiveness since the
1994 Industry Council Resolution that established the basis for the Competitiveness Report.
Competitiveness in this Report is understood to mean a sustained rise in the standards of
living of a nation and as low a level of involuntary unemployment as possible. The special
theme of this Report is an analysis of the contribution of information and communications
technologies (ICT) and of innovation to productivity and to economic growth. In addition, the
Report contains a chapter on the innovative capacity of European biotechnology.
- Economic growth and the standards of living in the EU
Though for the EU the second half of the 1990s proved to be a better period in terms
of employment and GDP growth than the first half, the gap in GDP per capita
relative to the US widened throughout the decade. Moreover, in terms of labour
productivity the EU catch-up with the US came to a halt in the middle of the decade
and the gap has since then widened. Naturally, the overall EU performance hides a
mix of good and disappointing performances among Member States. In the second
half of the 1990s, Ireland, Luxembourg and Finland recorded the highest rates of
GDP growth while scoring very high both in terms of employment growth and labour
productivity growth. At the other end of the spectrum, Germany recorded the lowest
GDP growth rate resulting from below average growth of employment and of labour
productivity.
Empirical evidence indicates that roughly two-thirds of the gap in EU GDP per
capita relative to the US can be attributed to a lower labour utilisation while a lower
average labour productivity accounts for the remaining third.
1 During the second half
of the 1990s, employment performance varied across the Member States with
Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland recording employment
growth significantly higher than the EU average and the US while in all the
remaining Member States employment growth fell short of the US performance.
Productivity growth in Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland and Greece was
higher than in the US and considerably above the EU average.
Growth in labour productivity can in turn be attributed to capital deepening (changes
in the capital/labour ratio) and technical progress, as measured by total factor
productivity. In the second half of the 1990s, both components of labour productivity
growth improved more in the US than in the EU. Furthermore, while historically the
contribution of capital deepening to labour productivity growth has been
substantially greater in the EU than in the US, in the second half of the 1990s this
relationship was reversed.
A sustained improvement in standards of living, the ultimate goal of economic
policy, requires substantive progress in production efficiency brought about by
improvements in the stock of capital, in the form of new investment, and by
technological progress. In other words, the economy must realise high growth in
productivity. For this reason, understanding the forces supporting technological
                                                
1 Estimates for 1998, see European Commission (2000): “Economic Growth in the EU: Is a “New”
Pattern Emerging?” Chapter 3 in the EU Economy 2000 Review, European Economy, n° 71.6
progress and productivity growth is crucial for guiding policy towards achieving the
ultimate objective of economic policy.
- ICT and their contribution to productivity and economic growth
An important common characteristic across the US economy and the EU nations
whose economic performance compares favourably with that of the US is the
pervasive use of information and communication technologies (ICT).
The resurgence of productivity growth in the US in recent years has been attributed
to the adoption and diffusion of new technologies and to the accelerating pace of
product and process innovations. In particular, the diffusion of ICT has been
fundamental. These technologies now permeate a wide and ever-increasing set of
activities in economic life. ICT can be seen both as innovation per se and – due to
their general purpose character – as vehicles in the diffusion and the achievement of
further innovation in other sectors and fields. As an example, many of the recent
advances in the field of biotechnology and telecommunications would not have been
possible were it not for the remarkable developments in computational speed and
capacity.
The importance of ICT in the recent economic growth and productivity performance
in the US and in some EU Member States has two aspects. First, the ICT–producing
sectors, where spectacular technological advances have taken place, have directly
contributed to increases in productivity and economic growth.
Clearly, if this was the only route through which ICT benefits economic
performance, then only those countries with important ICT–producing sectors could
be expected to reap the associated benefits.
However, the evidence suggests that the impact of ICT is not limited to the
producing sectors alone but, as ICT is diffused throughout the economy, its impact
becomes particularly evident in ICT–using sectors. The latter are, of course, present
in virtually all facets of economic life. It is the general–purpose character of these
technologies that makes it possible for other sectors using them to experience and
benefit from significant improvements in productivity. As a result, the magnitude of
ICT expenditure and investment in a nation may be more important for growth
performance than the size of the corresponding ICT–producing sector. This is
undoubtedly an important message since it implies that a low level of technology
production in a nation may not necessarily inhibit productivity growth as long as the
diffusion of new technologies is widespread and their take–up is efficient. In other
words, nations that have virtually no production of ICT goods could still benefit
substantially by adopting ICT innovations.
The growing consensus that the strong growth and productivity performance in the
US is related to increased investment and diffusion of ICT goods and services has
raised concerns that the weaker economic performance of EU Member States is
caused by sluggishness in the adoption of these new technologies.
Recent empirical studies have estimated the contribution of ICT to aggregate
economic growth. In the US, ICT investment accounts for 0.8 to 1 percentage point
of output growth in the second half of the 1990s. Estimates for European countries
generally indicate a lower contribution of ICT to output growth. On average, about7
0.4 to 0.5 percentage points of output growth in Europe can be attributed to ICT.
Compared to the US, Europe would appear to forego 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points of
economic growth due to lower levels of investment in ICT.
The ICT spending gap between the EU and the US persisted throughout the 1990s,
even though in both regions ICT expenditure increased. With regard to ICT
investment in the business sector, the gap vis-à-vis the US is even larger. In 1999,
US business investment in ICT as a percentage of GDP was almost twice the
European level of 2.4 percent. Nevertheless, it should be noted that ICT spending in
the EU Member States varies considerably. The UK and Sweden have already
surpassed the US, and the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland have drawn close to it,
but some of the larger countries have performed less well.
The experience of the US but also of the smaller European nations that have
successfully adopted ICT across economic activities suggests that a variety of
complementary policies are necessary in order to reap the benefits of these
technologies. The role of government policies has been important: these countries
appreciated early the importance of ICT and acted decisively to remove obstacles
that could inhibit their introduction and use.
An overriding priority in these countries appears to have been a commitment to a
comprehensive strategy to facilitate the adoption of new technologies. They tackled
issues such as upgrading labour force skills, encouraging the mobility of scientific
and technical personnel across sectors and the modernisation of the regulatory
framework, strengthening the interdependencies characterising the technology and
innovation systems and also an explicit commitment to do things better. The early
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector undoubtedly contributed to this
process. Such measures made it easier for firms to adjust and adopt new
organisational models and to modify their strategies to take advantage of the new
technologies.
Finally, it is possible that the completion of the single market, with the intensification
of competition, contributed to the understanding that smaller EU Member States had
more to gain from economies of scale in a wider European market, and this could
well have strengthened the commitment to develop strategies aimed at taking full
advantage of ICT technologies in the Internal Market – for example though
electronic commerce. It is possible that country size matters substantially more than
many economists and policy makers would a priori assume, a possibility that has
implications for the design of policies at regional level. Growth in biotechnology, as
shown in the Report, also provides examples consistent with this possibility.
One of the critical findings of the OECD Growth Project is that improvements in the
quality of labour are essential ingredients of medium–term economic growth. Yet, in
recent years skill shortages in important technology areas have been reported in
several European countries. At the root of this development has been the diffusion of
ICT technologies coinciding with the liberalisation of telecommunication sectors and
the expansion of the Internet and of new media. It appears that, unlike in previous
years, when the long–term trend increase in the demand for skills was met by the
supply of technology professionals from the educational system, the surge in demand
for ICT–related skills in the 1990s found no corresponding supply forthcoming.8
While the recent crisis in the valuation of Internet stocks may be taken to imply that
the demand for ICT skills is falling off, this may be misleading. The medium–term
demand for ICT skills will continue to be high as the European Union moves towards
its goal, set at the Lisbon summit in March 2000, of becoming the world’s most
dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy by 2010. It is essential,
therefore, to ensure that skill shortages do not become obstacles to European growth.
- Innovation and productivity in the manufacturing sector
Modern theories of economic growth point to innovation as a critical determinant of
productivity growth. Innovation is a complex process intertwined with factors such
as the strength of the knowledge base, institutional arrangements, qualifications of
the labour force, openness of the economy and an overall ability to take on board
improvements achieved in other countries or sectors. Other than through own
innovation, an economy may also improve its performance as a result of innovation
diffusion or through technology embodied in inputs and new capital goods, which in
turn may magnify the benefits of own research efforts. Indicators from the
manufacturing sector that proxy different characteristics presumed to facilitate
innovation and growth are indeed shown to be related to productivity and economic
performance. Advances in ICT technologies belong to such innovation-fostering
characteristics, and have played a crucial role in enhancing productivity.
A first step in understanding and identifying possible determinants of innovation
performance is to study the relationship between one crucial input to innovation,
research and development (R&D) expenditure, and performance indicators such as
production and productivity growth. The Report finds evidence of such a relationship
on data for the manufacturing sector.
During the 1990s, growth in production and in labour productivity in manufacturing
in the EU was far below the rates recorded in the US, marking a reversal of the
situation compared to the second half of the 1980s. Nevertheless, four countries –
Ireland, Finland, Austria and Sweden – recorded both production and productivity
growth rates in manufacturing above those in the US. During the 1990s, technology–
driven industries experienced the highest productivity growth in the EU, followed by
capital–intensive industries (in the latter group, the high growth took place mainly in
the first half of the decade). In the US, technology–driven industries were likewise
leading in terms of productivity growth throughout the 1990s. The good production
and productivity performance of capital–intensive industries in the EU during the
first half of the 1990s was most probably the result of the restructuring that took
place in these industries.
Evidence from the 1990s suggests that research intensity and productivity growth are
significantly related across sectors, both in the US and within the EU, though not in
each Member State. This relationship suggests that research efforts play a role in
fostering innovation and economic performance. At the same time, the absence of
such a relationship at country level may be a sign that international spillovers are at
work. Moreover, firm–level data for the EU and the US from the 1990s confirm
these findings. This evidence is consistent with the importance that policy-makers
attach to R&D.
If productivity performance depends significantly on technological advances
resulting from innovation, and given that innovations are diffused internationally at a9
rather fast pace, the patterns of productivity growth should have become more
similar across regions. Indeed, data indicate an increasing convergence between the
US and the EU in terms of patterns of productivity growth. While in the 1980s US
productivity growth across industries was significantly different from the EU, in the
1990s these patterns became more similar.
Productivity growth in technology–driven industries (for example, chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, radio, TV and telephony equipment, motor
vehicles, aircraft manufacturing, spacecraft, optical equipment), in both the US and
the EU was faster in the second half of the 1990s than in the first. The impact of
technology–intensive industries on overall productivity growth is greater in the US
than in the EU, reflecting in part the larger share of these industries in the US
economy.
When research intensity (R&D expenditure over production) and productivity growth
are brought together across sectors in the US and the EU, the evidence is that high
research intensity is never associated with low productivity growth, and low research
intensity is usually associated with low productivity growth. Nevertheless, in the US
certain sectors of low research intensity (tobacco products, apparel) have recorded
high productivity growth whereas this has not been the case for the EU.
The manufacturing sector has benefited substantially from productivity advances
associated with innovation during the 1990s. However, other factors have also
contributed to production and productivity growth, such as the capabilities of firms,
the stock of knowledge and ICT. Accumulation of these assets, many of which are
intangible, often reflects strategic decisions on the part of businesses and constitutes
the basis on which assets are built up in the future. This Report, in finding that these
variables are important, provides some support for recent theories of economic
growth that emphasise the role of institutions and strategic behaviour on the part of
firms in economic growth.
The slump in the ICT sector in recent months has caused severe disruption to
investment plans and to the diffusion of IC technologies in domestic economies as
well as the international economy. Although these short-term developments are
clearly disquieting, they should be considered in a medium-term perspective. The
underlying factors that have contributed to the ICT expansion remain in place and
hold the firm promise for further growth. In particular, prospects are good for
continuous price declines of ICT goods, associated with the development of new,
more advanced and more powerful semiconductors. These suggest that the process of
ICT diffusion and ICT capital deepening will also continue for some considerable
time. Furthermore, as a new generation of IC technologies comes into economic use,
further reorganisation of the mode of production and exchange of goods and services
will be necessary. And, finally, the structural reforms under way in Europe will
undoubtedly play a supportive role in the adoption and diffusion of IC technologies.It
is, therefore, virtually certain that substantial gains from information technologies
and the associated innovations will be possible in the future.
- Innovation and biotechnology
Biotechnology is an industry where innovation has been at work at an impressive
pace and with remarkable results. It is also an industry where some core issues of the
innovative process are prominently present (small versus large firms, where the latter10
have often been instrumental in supporting the growth of the small ones, yet it is the
former that are especially innovative; clusters of activity, where networking is an
essential condition for dynamism and knowledge exchange; and inadequate
financing). Thus, biotechnology offers a very good ground for analysis of
comparative strengths in innovation and allows for the specific linking of innovation
inputs such as research effort, human capital, institutional framework, firms’
capabilities and collaborative arrangements, and innovation output such as patents,
publications and new products or processes. In biotechnology as in other industries,
innovative capacity and competitiveness coincide.
The distinctive features of innovation in this industry are the collaborative basis of
research and the importance of small firms. Biotechnology highlights the importance
of firms’ “capabilities” – the ability to mobilise and exploit new knowledge and to
reach out and exploit collaboration among agents and across stages of product
development, scientific disciplines and industry frontiers. The sector is characterised
by a new breed of agents, small specialised firms – Dedicated Biotechnology Firms
(DBFs) – that have been developed with the explicit aim of exploiting the new
technologies of life sciences for various industrial purposes. Although it took some
time, the work of these firms is having a remarkable and radical impact, particularly
in the health care sector.
Patent and collaborative project data indicate that the US has accumulated and
maintains a dominant advantage in innovative activities in biotechnology compared
to Europe.. There is now agreement that this leadership originates essentially in the
strength of its DBFs and, more generally, in the development of a deep market for
technology. Nevertheless, some of the smaller European countries (Ireland, the
Netherlands and the Nordic countries) appear to specialise successfully in
biotechnology niche markets. Also a spectacular increase has been observed recently
in the number of new firms’– from 1996 to 2000 the population of independent
European DBFs almost doubled to close to 2 000 – and in the clustering of research
and production in Europe.
The distribution of biotechnology DBFs in Europe is dominated by a relatively small
number of clusters that are located mainly in parts of Germany, the UK, France and
in some areas of the Baltic coast.
Biotechnology involves the exploration of an enormous area of imprecisely defined
opportunities. Consequently, for a successful biotechnology sector it is necessary to
have both a decentralisation of efforts and a diversity of approaches, as well as an
ability to co-ordinate these elements.
It may be argued that Europe’s lag behind the US in biotechnology is partly a
reflection of its late entry. Innovative activities are generally characterised by
increasing returns, and being first confers long-lasting leadership. But this may not
be the only factor. A fundamental precondition for a successful development of
biotechnology is the availability of leading edge scientific capabilities – without a
strong and diversified scientific research base, no technological take–off is possible.
Moreover, success in this industry depends on a delicate blend of competencies and
incentives and requires the integration and co-ordination of several differentiated
agents, capabilities and functions. In particular, new European DBFs are generally
smaller than their US counterparts, less active in global networks and collaborative
relationships and less present in markets for these technologies. Access to an11
international scientific community requires direct and active participation in
networks of scientists. One finding of the Report concerning European biotechnology
is that whilst Europeans carry out a level of biotechnology research in the US that is
comparable to that in other sectors, comparatively little US research is done in
Europe. The apparent unattractiveness of Europe to US research appears to be
particular to biotechnology.
US research in life sciences has undoubtedly benefited from massive public support,
while European efforts in this area have remained fragmented. Moreover, the
European research system in the area of biotechnology appears to be weak in terms
of organisational diversity; specialised in rather narrow fields and insufficiently
interconnected across different research areas, types of organisations, stages of the
research process and national borders. European DBFs are still far too small to make
maximum use of networks of collaborative research. Thus, their ability to grow
appears severely constrained. Finally, DBFs exist in a relationship of strong
complementarity with the large corporations. The latter are not only the fundamental
source of demand for the products and services of DBFs but, equally importantly,
they also provide the integrative capabilities that transform fragments of knowledge
into products and constitute precious reservoirs of technological and managerial
competencies. Especially in Europe, DBFs have been, and may increasingly become,
spin–offs of large incumbents, rather than of universities, as in the US. Supporting
the creation of DBFs may raise the competitiveness of the “downstream” industries,
mainly pharmaceuticals.
Several Member States have had policies to promote biotechnology in place for
several years. Although there has been some success, notably in the promotion of
biotechnology start-ups, the growth of DBFs in Europe appears to be hindered. To a
considerable extent, this may be due to regulatory, entrepreneurial, fiscal or financial
factors. However, in addition to these factors, the supply of cutting edge scientific
research may be inadequate. If so, this problem could be addressed not only through
higher levels of research funding but also through more pluralism in funding sources,
lower dependence on closed national systems and higher integration of research with
teaching, clinical research and medical practice.12
CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
A prominent objective of the EU in recent years has been to improve the environment in
which firms conduct business. This was explicitly set out in the conclusions of the Lisbon
European Council of March 2000 where it was stressed that the “competitiveness and
dynamism of businesses are directly dependent on a regulatory climate conducive to
investment, innovation and entrepreneurship”
2. Entrepreneurial dynamism is a pre-condition
of economic and employment growth, wealth creation and raising standards of living. The
ultimate objective set out in the Lisbon European Council (that the EU becomes the most
competitive and dynamic knowledge–based economy in the world over the decade, capable of
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion) can only
be reached through a set of policies central to which is the flourishing of entrepreneurship.
The European Commission contributes to this goal through various policy instruments falling
under its responsibility. However, the principal areas where changes are necessary are the
responsibility of the Member States. In recognition of this, and in order to implement the
strategy, the Lisbon Council introduced a new open method of coordination among the
Member States. Central to this method in the area of enterprise policy is the study of best
practices, the possibility of learning, exchanging information and adopting such best practices
between the Member States, and arriving at policy decisions according to the specific
circumstances of each Member State.
Responding to the demands addressed to the Commission by the Lisbon European Council,
the Directorate General for Enterprise has structured its work around three main activities:
–  Production of Scoreboards. Scoreboards provide systematic comparisons of the
performance of the Member States among themselves and with the best performers
in the world – the Enterprise Scoreboard and the Innovation Scoreboard. Scoreboards
pose rather than answer questions concerning various aspects of entrepreneurship,
innovation and market access.
–  The Best Procedure. This procedure revolves around the joint analysis with the
administration of each Member State of a select number of practical issues of
particular concern to enterprise policy.
–  The Competitiveness Report, the Observatory of European SMEs, and other studies
of similar importance and orientation in the area of Innovation. These constitute in-
depth analyses of themes of particular interest to the performance of European
industry, European SMEs and European innovation systems. These studies tend to be
analytical in nature and their purpose is to build a body of diagnosis and knowledge
about European enterprise and innovation performance, and to provide formal
arguments that support the Commission’s policy approaches.
In addition, a fourth activity centred on using quantitative targets and aimed at focusing better
in the implementation of enterprise policy was launched in autumn 2001.
                                                
2 See Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000. The message of the
Lisbon Council was reiterated in the Conclusion of the Stockholm European Council; see Presidency
Conclusions, Stockholm European Council, 23 and 24 March 2001.13
–  Quantitative targets in enterprise policy. Following the Stockholm Council
Conclusions, the Member States have been invited to set quantitative targets in the
area of enterprise policy with a view to strengthening the momentum towards the
Lisbon objectives. To this effect, the Commission has already initiated the first steps
in developing this voluntary and non-legislative method of coordination.
The present Competitiveness Report, which has been produced in accordance with the
Council Resolution of 21 November 1994 on strengthening the competitiveness of the
European industry, reviews the performance of the EU in terms of the ultimate goals of
economic policy, the growth of incomes and the creation of employment. The Report will be
released in time for examination and debate by Industry Ministers in December 2001. The
2001 Report is devoted to issues that are crucial for the attainment of the ultimate goals of
economic policy, that is, issues of innovation in the EU and, more precisely, innovation in the
manufacturing sector. While its share in economic activity and employment has been
declining, the manufacturing sector has nevertheless seen impressive productivity gains,
reflecting partly the impact of competition that has necessitated fundamental restructuring, a
process that is still unfolding.
The resurgence of output and productivity growth in the US in the second half of the 1990s,
and the failure of several Member States to measure up to this, has raised concerns across the
EU about the sources and implications of these developments. This productivity resurgence
does not reflect innovations implemented on the shop floor but rather new methods of
organisation and work and of using technology among white–collar staff. Analysis of these
developments has underlined the importance of innovation, especially in the information and
communications (ICT) sector, for the acceleration in productivity growth.
ICT innovations are having a pervasive impact on economic performance. Technical progress
in the semi-conductors industry since the 1960s has been such that there has been a steady
decline in the price of ICT products throughout the past half-century. This decline has been
transmitted to the rest of the economy through the decline in the price of ICT products –
computers, computer software and telecommunications equipment. In turn, the wide
application of ICT, especially in the areas of computing and telecommunications, has led to a
rapid decline in the price and cost of these and of a variety of other products.
The consequent decline in the cost of ICT capital has provided powerful incentives for
substitution away from other forms of capital and from some labour services. Indeed, a
capital–deepening process, which has characterised European growth throughout the post-war
period, has accelerated in several countries. The increasing use of ICT in various sectors of
the economy is contributing not only to further substitution in favour of newer types of capital
but also to capital for labour and to cost reductions across all sectors. Evidence already
suggests that layers of management and support staff have been replaced by new
technological initiatives and organisational changes in the US and to a lesser extent in Europe.
One area of concern for European policy makers is currently the area of biotechnology.
Biotechnology is a sector characterised by rapid innovation undertaken to a large extent by
innovative SMEs. As in other areas of technology and innovation, the US is currently leading
commercial biotechnology research and applications. However, European research is also
strong and promises to develop and compete internationally if structural, institutional,
financial and legal problems are addressed appropriately. The Report reviews the complex
circumstances that determine Europe’s performance in biotechnology and identifies possible
reasons for its weakness compared to the US.14
The Report centres around three broad questions:
–  Is innovation an important element for economic growth and productivity?
–  Can innovation account for differences in economic growth and productivity across
the EU and across the Member States within the EU and for the growth and
productivity gap between Europe and the US?
–  Is Europe making sufficient progress towards the pace of innovation and commercial
use observed in the corresponding US performance?
The Report is laid out as follows.
Chapter II reviews evidence on developments in economic growth and standards of living in
the EU and the Member States, especially in comparison with the US. Chapter III examines
the sources of productivity growth and its relation to ICT. This chapter examines data and
evidence from both the US and Europe on the importance of ICT in productivity growth
especially in the 1990s.
Chapter IV reviews the impact of innovation in manufacturing performance again drawing
comparisons between the experience of the EU and the US. Clearly, the role of R&D is
crucial here. While Europe’s overall productivity performance worsened when compared to
the US in the second half of the 1990s, less divergence is recorded in the manufacturing
sector. This chapter also reviews the factors contributing to growth across the individual EU
Member States.
The final Chapter V is an extensive case study of the innovative capacity of the European
biotechnology industry. This sector has been characterised by rapid innovations, most of
which have been initiated in the US and often by European firms. Europe is encountering a
variety of problems in realising the potential of this sector, and there is ample evidence that
European researchers patent their innovations and set up their companies in the US. There are
signs that in recent years activity has strengthened in Europe and it is possible that European
biotechnology will be in a position to compare favourably with the corresponding US sector
in coming years. The chapter explores some of the major factors behind the so far timid but
fundamentally worrying trends in European biotechnology and concludes with a diagnosis of
major problems and a discussion of possible responses.15
CHAPTER II:
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STANDARDS OF LIVING
2.1. Introduction
A nation’s economic growth is determined by the rate of utilisation of the factors of
production – capital and labour – and the efficiency of their use. Traditionally,
economic growth in Europe has been characterised by increased use of capital
relative to labour and by high productivity growth 
3. Productivity growth in particular
has been notably higher than in the US throughout the past quarter century, reflecting
a convergence process. However, in recent years new trends have emerged with
output and productivity growth in the US outstripping that in the EU. This has raised
important questions about the underlying determinants of these developments and
their implications for growth and standards of living in the EU. It has also been
recognised that, to reverse these developments, structural reforms and policies that
support competitiveness and innovation are essential
4. Competitiveness in the sense
used in this report refers to the ability of an economy to provide its population with
high and rising standards of living and high rates of employment on a sustainable
basis
5. These ambitions could be thwarted should productivity growth in the EU fail
to accelerate in a sustainable manner.
Until recently, economic growth was analysed in a framework that essentially linked
output to factor inputs (a production function). However, recent research on the
determinants of growth has not only refined this framework but has also extended it
and has considered a broader set of factors seen as contributing to growth. It has now
become clear that, apart from the quantity and quality of factor inputs, other factors
also play a crucial role in a process where economic dynamism and innovation
flourish. Such factors include organisational characteristics, interactions between
economic policies and economic agents, as well as relationships between economic
agents. The analysis also points to a role that policy makers can play in creating an
institutional framework that is conducive to innovative activity and enhanced human
skills.
This chapter reviews evidence about recent EU performance with regard to various
indicators reflecting competitiveness and standards of living, and compares the EU
with the US and Japan. Annex 1 provides an overview of the various theories which
examine the causes of economic growth. Annex 2 summarises the conclusions of the
OECD’s recent Growth Project.
                                                
3 See Crafts and Toniolo (1996) and van Ark and Crafts (1996).
4 See point 5 of Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council on 23-24 March 2000, available
on the website of the Council at: http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm.
5 The European Commission (1996 and 1998) adopted a concept of competitiveness along these lines.
Clearly, this concept differs from what is conventionally regareded as constituting competitiveness, that
is, the relative price of a specific product or industry output originating in different nations in world
markets. While important, the latter concept finds no counterpart where national competitiveness is
concerned. Moreover, it implies that losses of competitiveness correspond to losses of output. While
this may be correct for specific industries, it is not meaningful when a nation’s competitiveness as a
whole is under review.16
2.2. GDP per capita as indicator of living standards
Over the past decade the EU has seen a sustained deterioration of its standards of
living compared to the US, as measured by per capita gross domestic product (GDP).
Graph II.1 shows that in 2000, the EU’s relative standard of living compared to the
US was lower than ever in the preceding quarter century. This undoubtedly reflects
the exceptional growth performance of the US during the 1990s. Japan has also
experienced a similar performance, but its relative position has deteriorated more
sharply than that of the EU, and from a higher peak of around 85 percent of the US
level in the early 1990s.














































































































































































The EU–15 aggregate conceals significant differences in the performance of
individual Member States. Luxembourg has a per capita GDP nearly 20 percent
above the US level (Table II.1). In three Member States (Greece, Portugal and
Spain), GDP per capita is between 45-55 percent of the US level, while in the
remaining eleven Member States, GDP per capita ranges from 60 % to 80 % of the
US level.
During the 1990s, Ireland and Portugal converged further towards the EU average. In
particular, Ireland has caught up in a spectacular manner. In the late 1980s, per capita
GDP in Ireland was less than half that of the US. As a result of average annual GDP
growth of over 7 percent, Ireland now has the second highest per capita GDP in EU-
15, second only to Luxembourg and at 80 percent of the US level.17






















The second half of the 1990s was a period of solid growth in the EU. After declining
in the first half of the 1990s, employment growth rebounded and the growth of GDP
accelerated in all the Member States except Germany (see Table II.2). Yet, the US
did even better in terms of both GDP growth and employment creation; similarly,
labour productivity growth in the US was significantly higher than in the EU. A key
question is why the EU has been unable to match the strong performance of the US.
In the second half of the 1990s, three Member States stood out with their high GDP
growth: Ireland, Luxembourg and Finland registered annual growth rates of 5 percent
or above. Germany and Italy recorded the lowest annual growth rates, not exceeding
2 percent. The EU average of 2½ percent compares to 4 percent annual growth in the
US.
The following sections will discuss the main components of GDP growth in the EU,
the US and Japan. It should be noted that population growth in the EU has been
slower than in the US, implying that the growth differentials in GDP per capita are
smaller than those in GDP growth. Nonetheless, as the preceding section showed, the
US performance has been superior to that of the EU also in terms of GDP per capita
growth.18
Table II.2: Growth of real GDP in EU Member States, US and Japan in
1975-2001
(average annual growth in percent, ranked according to performance in 1995–2001)
1975-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001
Ireland 3,5 4,6 4,7 9,1
Luxembourg 2,4 6,4 5,4 6,1
Finland 2,9 3,3 - 0,7 4,9
Netherlands 1,9 3,1 2,1 3,7
Spain 1,6 4,5 1,5 3,7
Greece 2,1 1,2 1,2 3,5
Portugal 3,0 5,5 1,8 3,4
Sweden 1,5 2,3 0,6 2,9
United Kingdom 1,9 3,3 1,6 2,8
Belgium 2,1 3,1 1,5 2,8
Denmark 2,1 1,3 2,0 2,6
Austria 2,4 3,2 2,0 2,5
France 2,4 3,3 1,1 2,5
Italy 3,0 2,9 1,3 2,0
Germany 2,2 3,4 2,0 1,8
EU-15 2,3 3,2 1,5 2,6
United States 3,4 3,2 2,4 3,9
Japan 3,8 5,2 1,5 1,1
Source: Commission services.
2.4. Employment growth and labour productivity
GDP growth can be broken down into employment growth and growth in the average
output per employed person. The former is illustrated by trends in the employment
rate, i.e. the proportion of working-age persons who are in employment. The latter,
average labour productivity, implicitly captures the impact on output growth of all
variables other than employment growth, such as capital investment, technological
progress, or increases in human capital.
Graph II.2 shows that Japan has an employment rate above those in the EU and the
US, even though the sustained increase seen in the US in the 1990s brought its
employment rate very close to the Japanese level. While the US and the EU had
similar employment rates in the late 1970s, in subsequent years the US saw an
increase of some 10 percentage points to approximately 75 percent by 2001. The EU,
in contrast, failed to raise its employment rate, which at present is 66 percent.19
EU leaders, at their summit in Lisbon in March 2000, agreed on a target of raising
the employment rate by 9 percentage points by 2010. This would roughly correspond
to closing the actual employment gap with the US.
6, 7




































































































































































Strong employment growth has contributed significantly to US economic growth
over the past decades. EU performance has been more variable. A study by the
European Commission (2000) looked at the contribution of labour inputs to growth,
using a broader definition of labour inputs than just the employment rate.
8 In the first
half of the 1990s, the estimated contribution of labour inputs to growth in GDP per
capita was negative in the EU, due to declining employment rates and reductions in
working time. Although the average hours worked continued to decline, the overall
labour contribution to EU growth turned positive in the second half of the decade,
when employment increased and participation rates rose. Nevertheless, the labour
contribution to per capita GDP growth in the second half of the 1990s was only one
third of that in the US.
                                                
6 This employment rate target is set on the basis of data from the Labour Force Survey, which differ from
the national accounts definitions used elsewhere in this Chapter. The official target is to raise the
employment rate from the 61 per cent in 2000 to as close as possible to 70 per cent by 2010 (both in
terms of Labour Force Survey data).
7 Presidency Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council on 23-24 March 2001 and the Lisbon
European Council on 23-24 March 2000, available on the website of the Council at:
http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm.
8 The European Commission (2000) breaks down the labour contribution to per capita GDP into four
components: i) demography (share of those of working-age in total population); ii) labour force
participation rate (share in working age population of those who work or are actively looking for a job);
iii) extent of unemployment (total employment as proportion of the labour force); and iv) average hours
worked per person in employment. In 1998, all these components except the proportion of working age
persons in total population were more favourable in the US.20
Estimates for 1998 indicate that lower labour utilisation in EU-15 accounted for two
thirds of the gap with the US level of per capita GDP, while the remaining third was
due to lower average labour productivity.
9 A variety of causes are behind the lower
level of labour utilisation. While high unemployment is a major cause for concern,
shorter working hours may instead reflect a social preference for leisure time over
additional income.
Among the Member States, employment rates range from 56 percent in Greece to 77
percent in the Netherlands (Table II.3). The Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark have
employment rates comparable to or higher than the US. Since the mid-1990s,
employment increased at the highest rate in those five Member States which
registered the highest GDP growth rates in the EU (Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland,
the Netherlands and Spain).
Table II.3: Employment growth in EU Member States, US and Japan in
1975-2001, and employment rates in 2001
(average annual growth in percent, ranked according to performance in 1995-2001)
1975-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001 Employment
rate in 2001
Ireland 0,0 1,1 1,9 5,1 68
Spain - 1,6 3,3 - 0,5 2,8 59
Luxembourg 0,0 1,4 0,5 2,6 66
Netherlands 0,5 2,3 1,1 2,6 77
Finland 0,5 0,3 - 3,8 2,0 66
France 0,2 1,0 - 0,2 1,2 63
United Kingdom - 0,2 1,8 - 0,9 1,2 71
Belgium - 0,4 1,0 - 0,2 1,1 60
Italy 0,8 0,8 - 0,7 1,1 59
Denmark 0,5 0,1 - 0,5 1,0 76
Sweden 0,5 1,0 - 2,2 0,9 75
Greece 1,2 0,7 0,6 0,7 56
Germany 0,2 1,4 - 0,3 0,6 69
Austria 0,1 0,7 0,2 0,6 74
Portugal - 0,3 1,1 - 0,5 0,4 73
EU-15 0,1 1,4 - 0,5 1,2 66
United States 2,2 2,0 0,9 1,4 75
Japan 0,9 1,0 0,7 0,0 76
Source: Commission services.
                                                
9 See European Commission (2000).21
The long term trend in the EU towards catching up with the US in labour
productivity came to an end in the mid-1990s, when the productivity gap started to
widen again (Graph II.3). In the second half of the decade, the rapid acceleration of
labour productivity growth in the US and the simultaneous slowdown in the EU led
to a new widening of the productivity gap vis-à-vis the US (see Table II.4). Of the
EU Member States, only Luxembourg has a higher level of labour productivity than
the US. In the majority of the Member States, labour productivity is currently
between 60-80 percent of the US level.
Graph II.3: Labour productivity in the EU falls further






















































































































































































Table II.4: Labour productivity in EU Member States, US and Japan in
1975-2001
(average annual growth of GDP/employed person in percent, ranked according
to performance in 1995-2001)




Ireland 3,5 3,5 2,7 3,9 87
Luxembourg 2,3 5,0 4,9 3,4 145
Portugal 3,3 4,4 2,3 2,9 48
Finland 2,4 3,0 3,2 2,9 76
Greece 1,0 0,5 0,7 2,7 59
Austria 2,3 2,5 1,9 1,9 70
Sweden 1,0 1,2 2,8 1,9 67
Belgium 2,5 2,1 1,7 1,6 92
United Kingdom 2,2 1,5 2,5 1,6 72
Denmark 1,6 1,2 2,5 1,5 76
France 2,3 2,2 1,2 1,3 78
Germany 2,0 2,0 2,3 1,2 71
Netherlands 1,4 0,8 1,0 1,0 72
Italy 2,2 2,0 2,0 0,9 82
Spain 3,2 1,2 2,0 0,9 65
EU-15 2,2 1,8 2,0 1,3 73
United States 1,2 1,2 1,5 2,5 100
Japan 2,9 4,1 0,8 1,1 67
Note: Growth rates were calculated on the basis of GDP at constant 1995 prices and national
currencies, while the 2001productivity levels are based on GDP at current market prices and PPS.
Source: Commission services.
Table II.5 illustrates the breakdown of GDP growth in the Member States into
employment growth and labour productivity growth.
10 Countries are classified in
groups according to whether their performance was above, close to or below the
average. The benchmark for these comparisons is the average EU growth rate of the
respective variable. In Ireland, Luxembourg and Finland, high GDP growth in the
second half of the 1990s was associated with both strong employment growth and
rapidly rising labour productivity. These three Member States registered the highest
GDP growth rates in the EU.
                                                
10 Annex 1 to Chapter IV provides more information on the national developments and strategies of
individual Member States.23
The fourth and fifth in terms of GDP growth were the Netherlands and Spain: growth
in these two countries was based mainly on a solid increase in employment, while
labour productivity increased only moderately. Above-average growth of labour
productivity in Portugal and Greece reflects that they are continuing to catch-up with
the rest of the EU; despite rapid productivity growth, their productivity levels are still
clearly below the EU average (Table II.4). The performance of the five largest
Member States was below, or close to, the EU average.
Table II.5: Employment and labour productivity growth, 1995-2001
Employment growth
< average Close
to average > average












































Note: On both axes, countries are compared to the average annual growth rate in EU-15 in 1995-
2001. Total employment growth in the Member States ranged from 0.4 percent to 5.1
percent p.a. The category ‘close to average’ includes countries with a growth rate of +/-0.4
p.p. around the EU average of 1.2 percent.
Labour productivity growth ranged from 0.9 percent to 3.9 percent p.a. among the Member
States. The category ‘close to average’ includes countries with a growth rate of +/-0.3 p.p.
around the EU average of 1.3 percent.
Source: Commission services.
2.5. Capital deepening and technological progress
Labour productivity growth is determined by capital deepening, i.e. growth in the
stock of capital per employed person, and technological progress, measured by
growth in total factor productivity (TFP).
Capital deepening is a long-term process determined primarily by investment. In the
short run, changes in employment can have a great impact on the capital/labour ratio.
An increasing capital/labour ratio in the EU helped it to catch-up with the US in
terms of labour productivity until the mid-1990s (Graph II.4 and Table II.4). It
should, however, be stressed that declining employment explains a considerable part
of the increase in the capital/labour ratio in the first half of the 1990s.
In the second half of the 1990s, capital deepening was very rapid in the US, whereas
there was a clear slowdown in the EU. The rise in US investment was linked to the
rapid increase in the quality of information and communication technology (ICT)24
products, combined with a steep decline in their relative price, which decisively
boosted ICT investment.
11




























Note: The figures indicate how much (in percentage points) capital deepening, or the substitution of
capital for labour, contributed to overall labour productivity growth. See also footnote 12.
Source: Commission services.
For the EU Member States, changes in the capital/labour-ratio in 1995-2001 were
strongly correlated with changes in employment. Portugal, Greece and Austria,
where capital deepening was most marked, were among the weakest performers in
terms of employment growth (Tables II.2 and II.4). The opposite is true for Ireland,
the Netherlands and Finland, where strong employment growth led to a declining
capital/labour-ratio. In contrast, the US registered rapid growth regarding both
employment and investment; both factors contributed significantly to US economic
growth in the second half of the 1990s.
                                                
11 For more information on ICT investment in the EU and the US, see Chapter III.25
Table II.5: Capital deepening in EU Member States, US and Japan in 1975-2001
(average annual contribution to labour productivity growth in percentage points;
ranked according to performance in 1995-2001)
1975-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001
Portugal 1,5 0,8 1,1 1,1
Greece 1,1 0,7 0,6 0,8
Austria 1,0 0,6 1,0 0,7
Germany 0,8 0,2 1,0 0,5
Belgium 1,1 0,5 0,9 0,4
United Kingdom 0,6 0,2 0,8 0,4
Luxembourg 0,6 0,1 0,8 0,4
Denmark 0,5 0,7 0,5 0,4
Italy 0,7 0,6 0,9 0,3
Spain 1,7 0,2 1,3 0,3
France 1,0 0,7 0,9 0,3
Sweden 0,5 0,4 1,0 0,0
Ireland 1,7 0,5 0,1 - 0,1
Netherlands 0,9 0,1 0,4 - 0,1
Finland 0,9 1,0 1,4 - 0,4
EU-15 0,9 0,4 1,0 0,4
United States 0,2 0,1 0,3 0,7
Japan 1,5 1,3 1,1 1,0
Note: The figures indicate how much (in percentage points) capital deepening, or the substitution of
capital for labour, contributed to overall labour productivity growth. See also footnote 12.
Source: Commission services.
Growth in total factor productivity (TFP) is measured by the difference between
output growth and the growth of inputs (weighted average of labour and capital)
12.
                                                
12 The relationship between output and inputs can be described by a production function for the economy
as a whole. Assuming that the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type, the rate of output
growth (y) depends on: the rate of growth of labour inputs (e) – measured by the growth in total
employment; the rate of the growth of capital input (k) – measured by the growth of the capital stock;
and a residual which is total factor productivity growth (TFP; Graph I.5 and Table 1.5). The equation
reads: y = TFP + α α α αe + (1-α α α α)k
where α denotes the partial elasticity of output with respect to labour. As the rate of growth of labour
productivity corresponds to the difference between the growth of output (y) and of labour (e),
subtracting (e) from both sides of the equation yields the desired division of the rate of growth of labour
productivity: y – e = TFP + (1-α α α α)(k-e)
where (k-e) corresponds to the rate of growth of the capital-labour ratio and measures the speed of
capital deepening. Multiplied by (1-α), this expression measures the effect of the substitution of capital
for labour (Graph I.4 and Table I.4) on labour productivity growth.26
An increase in total factor productivity means that more output can be produced with
a given level of labour and capital inputs. As a residual, TFP growth incorporates the
effects of changes in the degree of factor utilisation, innovation and technological
progress, or measurement errors. Furthermore, as the present method of calculating
labour productivity growth does not take into account changes in the quality of inputs
(such as better capital goods or an improvement in the educational attainment and
skills of the labour force), such changes are also reflected in TFP growth. One of the
key factors enhancing TFP in recent years has been investment in new ICT capital
goods which have a higher marginal product than many other capital goods.
13
Finally, cyclical factors are also likely to have an impact on TFP growth – in periods
of rapid growth, the degree of factor utilisation tends to be higher and vice versa.
Graph II.5 illustrates the growth of total factor productivity in the EU, the US and
Japan. A comparison with Graph II.4 shows that TFP growth was by far more
important than capital deepening in explaining labour productivity growth in both the
EU and the US in the second half of the 1990s. In EU-15, TFP growth slowed
somewhat, while the US registered a strong acceleration. Japan’s TFP growth
collapsed in the 1990s.




























Table II.5 presents total factor productivity growth rates in the Member States, which
are ranked in descending order according to their performance in the period
                                                
13 Chapter III deals with ICT and its impact on productivity, while Chapter IV discusses the role of ICT,
knowledge and innovation for productivity growth in manufacturing.27
1995-2001. The data confirm that European TFP growth exceeded by a considerable
margin the US rate in the period 1975-1995. However, during the past six years the
pattern has been reversed, with the US forging ahead.
Ireland and Finland posted exceptionally high TFP growth rates in the second half of
the 1990s. Greece, Sweden, Portugal, Luxembourg and Austria also registered
average TFP growth at or higher than the US rate during this period. All the best
performers were small Member States, while the large EU countries performed quite
weakly – Germany, Italy and Spain especially poorly.
Table II.6: Total Factor Productivity Growth in EU Member States, US and
Japan in 1975-2001
(average annual growth in percent, ranked according to performance in 1995-2001)
1975-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001
Ireland 1,8 2,9 2,6 4,0
Finland 1,5 2,0 1,8 3,3
Greece - 0,2 - 0,1 0,1 1,9
Sweden 0,5 0,8 1,7 1,9
Portugal 1,8 3,6 1,3 1,8
Luxembourg 1,6 3,1 1,9 1,6
Austria 1,3 1,9 1,5 1,5
Belgium 1,3 1,6 0,8 1,2
United Kingdom 1,6 1,3 1,7 1,2
Denmark 1,2 0,5 2,0 1,2
France 1,4 1,7 0,6 1,1
Netherlands 1,1 1,1 1,0 1,1
Italy 1,3 1,5 1,2 0,7
Germany 1,2 1,7 1,1 0,7
Spain 1,6 1,0 0,6 0,5
EU-15 1,4 1,5 1,1 1,0
United States 1,0 0,9 0,9 1,5
Japan 1,4 2,8 - 0,3 0,2
Source: Commission services.
2.6. Concluding comments
An estimated two-thirds of the EU gap with the US GDP per capita level results from
lower levels of labour utilisation, while the remainder is due to lower labour
productivity in the EU. While part of the lower utilisation of labour reflects shorter
working hours in the EU and may be considered as a matter of social choice, the
higher level of unemployment constitutes a cause for concern. The EU leaders have
set an employment rate target, calling for a 9 percentage point increase in the EU’s28
employment rate between 2000 and 2010. While higher employment is needed in
order to catch up with the US GDP per capita levels, in the longer run productivity
growth will be the key to achieving higher standards of living.
Labour productivity in the EU had converged towards the US level for several
decades. However, the mid-1990s marked a turning point in this process. A rapid
acceleration of productivity growth in the US coincided with a deceleration in the EU
and led to a renewed widening of the productivity gap, thus erasing to some extent
the convergence gains made. EU performance in the second half of the 1990s was
not by itself especially discouraging, with GDP growth accelerating and employment
rising. The central issue is to explain why the US could still do significantly better in
both respects. For an explanation, it is necessary to review the causes behind the
differing productivity performances. This is the task of the following two chapters,
which review the evidence on the impact of ICT investment on productivity and
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ANNEX II.1:
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
- Neo–classical growth models
Early neo-classical growth models emphasised the role of capital accumulation. In
the Solow–Swan model
14, output is produced by capital and labour. Economic
growth is compatible with labour-augmenting technical progress, which acts as if it
were increasing the available amount of labour. In the long-term, output per capita
and labour productivity grow at an exogenously given rate of technical progress.
Technical progress is entirely exogenous to these models so that in reality economic
growth is left unexplained.
The canonical model provides a methodology (growth accounting) for measuring the
rate of technical progress, the so-called Solow residual or total factor productivity
(TFP) growth
15. TFP is defined as the difference between output growth and the
(share-weighted) growth rates of capital and labour inputs. Because of its nature as a
residual, it is in fact a "measure of our ignorance". Clearly, many factors can cause a
shift in the production function, such as technical innovation or organisational and
institutional change. The difficulties with this methodology are revealed by the
contradictory estimates: while in Solow's pioneering study growth in per capita
income was almost entirely (88 percent) attributed to TFP growth, subsequent more
careful measurement of factor inputs led to inputs explaining virtually all of output
growth, thus reducing the residual to zero
16.
Empirical studies in the 1990s, based on the neo-classical tradition, set out to
reconcile the Solow–Swan model with, among other issues, international empirical
evidence on convergence. Mankiw et al. (1992) augmented the aggregate production
function with human capital proxied by educational attainment. They found that the
Solow model performs well in explaining cross-country differences in income levels
and is even more successful when human capital is taken into account, and
concluded that the model is consistent with the international evidence, if one
acknowledges the importance of human, as well as physical, capital. A major
drawback of this work is the assumptions that the level of productivity and the rate of
technical change are the same across nations; these are not empirically verifiable
assumptions.
- Endogenous economic growth and the role of ideas
A group of models that emerged in the course of the 1980s explain long-term
economic growth endogenously, by relaxing the assumption of diminishing returns to
capital and by rendering technological progress endogenous to the model. Output and
productivity growth do not rely on exogenous technical progress.
In a pioneering paper, Romer (1986) postulated that R&D activities are associated
with externalities which affect the stock of knowledge available to all firms. A firm’s
                                                
14 See Solow (1956) and Swan (1956).
15 Growth accounting continues to be used, especially today in the area of measuring the contribution of
ICT to economic growth; see Stiroh (2001).
16 See Jorgenson and Griliches (1967).30
production function is defined by firm–specific variables (capital services, labour and
R&D inputs) and a shift term (index of technology) which is a function of the stock
of knowledge available to all firms; this reflects the public-good characteristics of
knowledge–generating activities such as R&D. Clearly, it is possible to view the shift
term as reflecting a "learning by doing" process, or the influence of the stock of
human capital
17. It is evident that the endogenous growth theory has the potential to
take into account a variety of factors enabling innovation.
R&D– or ideas–based endogenous growth models identify and explicitly model
innovation (in particular, the accumulation and diffusion of technological
knowledge) as the driving force of long-term economic growth. In these models,
"ideas" (in the form of blueprints for new products or new processes) are generated
by investment in R&D. Thus, these models treat R&D as an entrepreneurial activity
performed by profit-maximising firms. "Ideas" generated by R&D lead to new
processes and products that are used as inputs in the production of final goods. As
input goods of superior quality, or as more specialised intermediate or capital goods,
these products raise productivity
18. It is now widely recognised that while R&D–
based innovation is a crucial determinant of the competitiveness of firms, it does not
exclusively affect the performance of those actually undertaking these activities but
gives rise to important external effects ("R&D spillovers"). An important element of
these external effects is "knowledge spillovers", which take place if new knowledge
generated by the R&D activities of one agent, stimulates the development of new
knowledge by others, or enhances their technological capabilities.
The commercial outcome of “ideas” – new processes and products – is very often
characterised by very high fixed costs and low marginal costs. It can be very costly
to produce the first copy of a computer programme, whereas reproducing it can
subsequently be done at virtually zero cost. This implies that the economics of ideas
is typically associated with increasing returns and imperfect competition.
Economic theory also suggests that the international diffusion of knowledge
increases the growth of output and productivity. Eaton and Kortum (1996) find that
more than 50 percent of the productivity growth in each of the 19 OECD countries
included in their sample can be attributed to innovations from just three countries
(US, Germany and Japan). These three countries, together with France and the
United Kingdom, reap more than 10 percent of their growth from domestic research.
The impact of international technology diffusion on productivity growth takes place
through three channels. First, access to a larger pool of knowledge increases the
productivity of R&D activities in the countries involved, thereby enhancing future
productivity growth. As a consequence, a country's productivity growth is positively
correlated with the degree of its openness to flows of information and to its
capability to absorb and utilise knowledge generated abroad. In this process,
domestic R&D may be instrumental in building and maintaining absorptive
capacities. Second, international trade provides opportunities to use the input goods
developed abroad that differ qualitatively from domestic input goods, and thus to
increase productivity. And, third, both international trade and foreign direct
investment are vehicles for cross–border learning about products, production
                                                
17 See Lucas (1988).
18 See, for example, Romer (1990).31
processes, market conditions, etc. and may lead to a reduction in the costs of
innovating and contribute to increases in TFP.
- Evolutionary models of economic growth
The evolutionary approach to growth draws attention to three aspects that are
neglected in both neo-classical and endogenous growth models. First, technological
advancement ought to be conceptualised as a disequilibrium process involving high
ex–ante uncertainty, path dependency and long–lasting adjustment processes.
Secondly, growth theory should be based on a more realistic theory of the firm that
stresses (strategic) firm capabilities in a broad sense, rather than just investment in
human capital and R&D. Thirdly, it must take into account the institutional
framework that presumably contributes strongly to an explanation of cross–country
differences in economic growth
19.
It is clear that, in this approach, measures to enhance firm capabilities and the
development and strengthening of institutions conducive to growth, become core
areas of policy. The relevance of the evolutionary approach is reflected in policy
discussions and design in many countries, as well as implicitly in the European
Union and in the work of the OECD.
Dynamic firm capabilities
The standard approach to explaining productivity (growth) at the firm level is a
production function, a concept that is seen as particularly narrow. To create value
and gain a competitive edge, a firm uses a whole bundle of specific assets, among
which R&D is only one, though an important one. Others are marketing,
organisational and managerial skills, individual and collective learning capabilities,
social capital (trust, etc.), networking (customer links, outsourcing, co-operation with
universities, strategic alliances, etc.), property rights (patents, brand names), etc. This
bundle of firm–specific, mostly intangible assets are considered to be the firm’s
capabilities. They are dynamic in nature, being the result of strategic decisions in the
past, and represent the resources to create additional assets in the future. Strategic
asset accumulation enables a firm to change restrictions with respect to technology
and taste. It is obvious that this accumulation process is path–dependent and gives
rise to important differences among firms
20.
As capabilities are difficult to measure at the aggregate level, it may also be difficult
to use this approach to explain aggregate economic growth. Nevertheless, empirical
work in Peneder (2001) yields a strongly positive cross–country correlation between
various capability indicators and performance measures such as productivity, unit
values and wages. The (aggregate) capability approach, which appears to be useful
for comparing and explaining economic performance among countries, is adopted in
the empirical analysis of manufacturing growth in Chapter IV of the present Report.
National Innovation Systems – the role of interconnected institutions
The evolutionary approach recognises that institutions are crucial in explaining the
performance of firms and of the economy as a whole. The institutional framework is
                                                
19 See Nelson (1998).
20 See Foss (1997).32
shaped to a large extent at the national level, giving rise to important differences
across countries. However, the internationalisation and diffusion of knowledge can
be a mitigating factor in this regard. This aspect of growth theory belongs to the
"National Innovation Systems" (NIS) approach, which can be seen as the
macroeconomic counterpart of the capability view of the firm.
NIS is a set of interconnected institutions (firms, universities, governments, etc.)
which commonly determine a country's performance in the generation and diffusion
of technologies and the development of skills
21. This approach is based on the
hypothesis that the performance of a (national) economy in terms of innovation and
productivity is not only the result of public and private investments in tangibles and
intangibles, but is also strongly influenced by the character and intensity of the
interactions between the elements of the system. As a consequence, country
differences with respect to innovation and growth might reflect not just different
endowments with innovation–related factors of production but also varying degrees
of the "knowledge distribution power" or, more generally, the efficiency of NIS.
However appealing, this approach encounters severe data problems in empirical
work. Important properties like the "quality of public policy", incentive mechanisms
in firms and in "non–market" institutions, etc. are difficult to approximate
empirically with confidence. In view of this, it is not surprising that there is no
overall measure of the efficiency of an NIS which could be used as an explanatory
variable in the empirical analysis of economic growth. What is available at present is
only pieces of evidence showing the importance of several types of interaction for
innovation performance; for a summary of this evidence see, for example, OECD
(1999)
22. Nevertheless, because the evolutionary approach yields insights into the
dynamics of growth processes at the conceptual level, its basic ideas provide a useful
framework for policy design and analysis. Consequently, it is now the dominant
paradigm for innovation policy and a core element in policy–oriented growth
analysis, and plays a crucial role in defining best policy practices in these fields. In
Chapter IV, a set of indicators based on suggestions from the evolutionary model are
used to explain empirically cross-country differences with respect to economic
growth.
While the evolutionary theory shares the basic policy conclusions of the endogenous
growth theory, the former also sees the need for some specific measures. By stressing
the ex-ante uncertainty of technical change, it implies that it would be necessary to
have a mechanism to guarantee technological variety at an early stage of
technological development in order to avoid large-scale investment failures.
Therefore, creating a favourable environment for entrepreneurship and new ventures
is an important policy task (lowering start-up costs, fostering the provision of venture
capital, etc.), while the selection of superior technologies is left for the market to
determine. The capability view of the firm implies that measures facilitating
investment in intangibles are important. While in principle such investments are up
to private business to undertake, there might be at the same time scope for a policy,
for example, to make sure that incentives for training are put right (measures against
poaching, tax incentives, etc.).
                                                
21 See, for example, Freeman (1987) and Nelson (1993).
22 See also Stern et al. (2000) and the material from the OECD Growth Project in OECD (2001).33
The NIS framework also supports the need for specific policies. Here, measures
aimed at improving the interaction between the various elements of the system
(strengthening science/industry relationships and joint research, facilitating
university spin-offs, exchange of highly qualified staff, facilitating R&D co-
operation in the private sector) ought to be encouraged. Policy makers should also
take into consideration the specificity of the policy context. In particular, the best
policies have to be adapted to the specific properties and needs of the NIS.
--------------------
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ANNEX II. 2:
THE OECD GROWTH PROJECT: FOCUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- The objective
The OECD Growth Project (OECD, 2001) explores the causes of differences in
growth performance in the OECD area, with particular emphasis on the acceleration
of trend growth in the US and selected OECD economies over the past decade. It
reviews how growth patterns have changed in recent years and examines the
implications of those shifts for policy makers.
- Divergence in economic growth and contributing factors
Three OECD countries - Australia, Ireland and the Netherlands – have registered
markedly stronger trend growth of GDP per capita over the past decade than in the
1980s, and several other countries have also experienced an improvement. These
include the US, where trend growth of GDP per capita accelerated sharply in the
second half of the decade. In contrast, growth in GDP per capita in many other
OECD countries, including Japan and much of Europe, registered a slow down.
Nevertheless, in several countries – Finland, Canada, Greece, Iceland and Sweden –
trend growth picked up only in the second half of the 1990s.
The OECD analysis shows that the following factors contributed to the growth
patterns of the 1990s:
–  New capital, in particular ICT
–  Increased use of labour
–  Rising quality of labour
–  Greater efficiency in how capital and labour are combined, or total factor
productivity
- Key policy recommendations deriving from the OECD Project
According to the OECD Growth Project, a comprehensive growth strategy should be
based on a combination of actions:
1. Strengthen economic and social fundamentals, by ensuring macroeconomic
stability, encouraging openness, improving the functioning of markets and
institutions and addressing the distributive consequences of change.
2. Facilitate the diffusion of ICT, by increasing competition in
telecommunications and technology, improving skills, building confidence and
making electronic government a priority.
3. Foster innovation, by giving greater priority to fundamental research,
improving the effectiveness of public R&D funding, and promoting the flow of
knowledge between science and industry.36
4. Invest in human capital, by strengthening education and training, making the
teaching profession more attractive, improving the links between education and
the labour market and adapting labour market institutions to the changing
nature of work.
5. Stimulate the creation of firms, by improving access to high-risk finance,
reducing burdensome administrative regulations and instilling positive attitudes
towards entrepreneurship.
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Source: Bassanini et al. (2000); TPF = Total factor productivity (hours-adjusted version).
BERD = Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D.
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CHAPTER III:
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
AND GROWTH OF OUTPUT AND OF PRODUCTIVITY
Information and communication technologies (ICT) are a core element of the knowledge-
based society. ICT expenditure, investment and production shares are rising in the US and in
the EU - albeit at different rates across Member States. Building on the remarkable
performance of the US economy and on research on the growth and productivity impact of
ICT, a consensus is growing that the “new” economy does have a significant economic
impact
23, although the magnitude of this impact is still subject to controversy.
In the 1990s, several causes combined to accelerate ICT diffusion and growth. Technological
change, coupled with large price reductions, led to a surge in the use of digital technologies.
With firms ready to exploit the opportunities offered by ICT, the liberalisation of
telecommunications and the growth of the Internet economy – allowing for economies of
scale and network effects – brought new vigour and eagerness to invest in new technologies.
In the US, business investment in computers and peripheral equipment, measured in real
terms, jumped more than fourfold between 1995 and 1999
24 and a rapid increase is also
detectable in the EU, though not at the same pace as in the US.
Although there are still differing opinions on the importance of ICT for the economy, recent
research supports the view that the impact of ICT goes beyond the ICT-producing sector and
has a positive effect on overall output and productivity growth.
3.1. International trends in ICT expenditure and investment
3.1.1. ICT expenditure
ICT expenditure, production and investment are increasing, though at different rates
in different countries. ICT expenditure measures the diffusion of ICT goods and
services and thus the absorption of ICT by firms, private households and the
government sector (see Box III.1 for definitions and data availability). Expenditure in
the EU is on average lower than in the US, although there are some noteworthy
exceptions; for example, as a percentage of GDP, Sweden and the UK spend as much
on ICT as the US.
                                                
23 See, for example, Bureau of Labour Statistics (2000), European Commission (2000), Daveri (2000,
2001), Gordon (2000), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Kiley (1999), OECD (2001A, 2001B), Oliner and
Sichel (2000) and Whelan (2000). These studies give evidence on the positive impact of ICT on
aggregate output and productivity growth.
24 See Oliner and Sichel (2000).38
Box III.1: Data availability and definitions of ICT expenditure
ICT expenditure measures the diffusion of computer hardware and peripherals,
communications equipment, software and telecommunication services. It should be noted that
ICT expenditure encompasses spending by businesses, private households and the government
sector. For Europe no official data are available, but figures are available from surveys by
private sources. The predominantly used data source is collected by International Data
Corporation (WITSA, 2000). EITO also uses IDC data as a source and publishes its ICT
expenditure data based on some adaptations of IDC data.
The data collected by IDC is gathered both at country level and from corporate headquarters
25.
IDC is the only available source for European countries which allows systematic cross-
sectional comparisons for the 1992–1999 period. As IDC does not publicly release information
as to the size and structure of its sample, the degree of comprehensiveness of the data set
remains hard to gauge.
As the quality of these data sets is difficult to assess, OECD has extracted ICT investment
figures from the System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA 1993). This approach provides
information for a limited number of countries since the SNA 1993 guidelines are not
systematically implemented by all countries (see OECD, 2001B).
The situation in the US is very different. The Bureau of Economic Analysis maintains the
“Tangible Wealth Survey”, which provides information on 57 distinct types of capital goods in
current and chain-weighted dollars for 62 industries from 1947 through 1996. The distinct
types of assets for each industry can be aggregated to calculate capital stocks for computer
hardware and communications equipment. Software investment is not included in this survey,
but BEA started to publish data on aggregate investment in software in its 1999 revision.
Source: Stiroh (2001), European Commission (2000), WITSA (2000), Oliner and Sichel (2000)
and Landefeld and Grimm (2000).
Indicators on ICT expenditure reveal distinct differences across OECD countries.
Sweden and the UK in Europe, and Australia and the US lead, with ICT spending of
about 8  % of GDP in 1999, followed by the Netherlands and Denmark with
expenditures close to 7 %. France, Germany, Italy and Spain are grouped around or
below the EU average (5.6  % in 1999). The situation in the EU is thus very
heterogeneous. Small countries like Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark exhibit
ICT expenditure shares which are above or close to the US share, while Germany,
Italy and Spain – large countries with significant impact on average spending in the
EU – are lagging behind. The overall result is that the expenditure share is 2.5
percentage points, or nearly one third, lower than in the US – see Table III.1.
                                                
25 Each local IDC office conducts interviews with local computer vendors and distributors. These data are
compared with information from multinational vendors, collected and updated at IDC headquarters and
regional research centres, and cross-checked with global vendor census data. Vendor data are then
supplemented by user interviews and surveys (see Daveri, 2001).39
Table III.1 International comparison of ICT expenditure and production








as % of GDP,
1998
ICT expenditure
as % of GDP,
1992-1999
Belgium 4,3 5,8 5,7 5,6
Denmark 5,1 - 6,7 6,6
Germany 3,1 6,1 5,1 5,3
Greece -- 5 , 1 3 , 8
Spain -- 4 , 0 3 , 9
France 4,0 5,3 5,9 5,9
Ireland 4,6 - 6,4 5,9
Italy 3,5 5,8 4,5 4,2
Netherlands 3,8 5,1 6,9 6,7
Austria 4,9 6,8 4,7 4,8
Portugal 2,7 5,6 5,1 4,5
Finland 5,6 8,3 5,7 5,6
Sweden 6,3 9,3 9,5 8,2
United Kingdom 4,8 8,4 9,0 8,1
EU (*) 4,0 6,4 6,0 5,6
Japan 3,4 5,8 6,2 6,0
US 3,9 8,7 8,7 8,1
Switzerland 6,0 - 7,3 7,3
Australia 2,6 4,1 8,5 8,1
Canada 4,6 6,5 8,1 7,6
(*) Weighted average GDP (1990), WIFO calculations.
Source: OECD (2001A), WITSA (2000), WIFO calculations.
The lower level of ICT spending in the EU compared to the US reflects in part the
smaller ICT–producing sector but also less dynamic spending by the government
sector and private households. Australia demonstrates that a large ICT sector is not a
prerequisite for high ICT expenditure. Australia is among the big ICT spenders even
though the ICT-producing sector encompasses only 2.6 % of overall business sector
employment and 4.1 % of value added.
Throughout the 1990s, ICT spending increased both in the EU (4.7 % p.a.) and in the
US (7.8 % p.a.), substantially accelerating in the second half of the decade in the US
(from7.3 % p.a. to 8.1 % p.a., see Table III.2). ICT expenditure increased far more
steadily in the US than in the EU. The annual growth rates in the EU appear to be
related to business cycle fluctuations, rising at above-average rates in periods of
sound economic growth and stagnating or even declining in phases of slow GDP
growth. In the US, both the overall growth and the growth of ICT expenditure have
been smoother during the period under consideration.40







1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Source: WITSA (2000), WIFO calculations.
The difference between the share of ICT expenditure in GDP in the EU and the US
has widened since 1992 (exactly 2.3 percentage points higher in the US in 1992 and
2.7 percentage points in 1999). Measured relative to US expenditure, EU expenditure
in ICT declined from 90 % in 1992 to 75 % in 1999 – see Graph III.1. Overall, the
acceleration of ICT spending between the first and second half of the 1990s in the
EU is not as pronounced as in the US. This can be seen at country level (see Table
III.2), where only the UK, Sweden, Italy, Ireland and Spain recorded an acceleration
during this period.41
Table III.2: Annual growth rates of ICT expenditure (1992-1999, percent)
Annual growth rate Acceleration
Country




6,8 4,6 5,5 - 2,2
Denmark 7,6 4,7 5,9 - 2,9
Germany 5,8 2,6 3,9 - 3,2
Greece 23,7 8,3 14,6 - 15,5
Spain - 1,7 5,2 2,2 6,9
France 5,7 3,2 4,3 - 2,4
Ireland 9,4 10,1 9,8 0,8
Italy 0,3 5,5 3,3 5,2
Netherlands 7,0 5,5 6,1 - 1,5
Austria 5,1 3,5 4,2 - 1,6
Portugal 24,9 6,5 14,0 - 18,4
Finland 12,6 5,2 8,3 - 7,3
Sweden - 1,7 5,1 2,1 6,8
United Kingdom 4,2 8,1 6,4 3,9
EU 4,7 4,8 4,7 0,1
US 7,3 8,1 7,8 0,9
Source: WITSA (2000).
The most dynamic European countries with respect to ICT expenditure growth are
Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Finland (see Graph III.2). All increased their share of
ICT expenditure in GDP in the 1990s and are now close to the EU average (see
Table III.3). In the case of Greece and Portugal, the high growth rates reflect heavy
investment in telecommunications infrastructures, an investment that the majority of
European countries had already made in the first half of the 1990s. In the UK, the
Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium, ICT expenditure grew at a rate slightly below
the EU average, but for the first three countries the share of ICT in GDP in 1999 is
clearly above average (see Graph III.2).
In contrast, countries like Spain, Germany, Austria and France on average registered
growth in ICT expenditure well below the EU average in the 1990s, and a stagnating
share of GDP devoted to ICT leading to below average ICT shares in 1999. Sweden
registered the lowest growth of ICT expenditure, but the share of ICT spending in
GDP grew at rates close to the EU average, and in 1999 its ICT share was the highest
of all the Member States – see Table III.3 and Graph III.2.42

































































Source: WITSA (2000), WIFO calculations.43
Table III.3: ICT expenditure as a percent of GDP








5,5 5,5 5,9 0,4 1,0
Denmark 6,4 6,5 6,9 0,5 1,1
Germany 5,4 5,2 5,3 - 0,1 - 0,3
Greece 2,4 3,9 5,5 3,1 12,6
Spain 3,9 3,9 4,0 0,1 0,4
France 5,8 5,9 6,0 0,2 0,5
Ireland 5,5 5,9 6,5 1,0 2,4
Italy 3,7 4,2 4,7 1,0 3,5
Netherlands 6,7 6,6 7,1 0,4 0,8
Austria 5,0 4,7 4,8 - 0,2 - 0,6
Portugal 2,8 5,0 5,3 2,5 9,5
Finland 4,7 5,7 5,9 1,2 3,3
Sweden 7,6 7,8 9,3 1,7 2,9
United Kingdom 7,2 7,8 9,3 2,1 3,7
EU 5,2 5,6 6,2 1,0 2,9
Japan 5,7 5,4 7,1 1,4 3,2
US 7,5 7,9 8,9 1,4 2,5
Source: WITSA (2000), WIFO calculations.
3.1.2. ICT investment
In the EU, ICT business investment corresponds to about a third of total ICT
expenditure.
26  The main trends for ICT investment are similar to those of ICT
expenditure. US investment as a percentage of GDP is higher than in the EU, where
investment, while growing, is declining relative to the US. However, none of the EU
countries – and this is in contrast to ICT expenditure – reaches the US share of ICT
investment in GDP, which in 1999 was twice the EU share (see Table III.4). This
may be due to the different weighting of the components (hardware, software, and
communications equipment) in the calculation of ICT investment for Europe.
                                                
26 Daveri (2001) calculates investment data for Europe based on a comparison of WITSA figures for the
US with the official investment data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The relationship
between WITSA expenditure and BEA figures for investment on hardware, communications equipment
and software is used to calculate the share of business expenditure/investment in the overall figure.
Under these assumptions, hardware investment in the US is 58.6 % of total hardware spending as
reported by WITSA, communications equipment is 31.6  % of WITSA expenditure and software
investment (including own-account software) is about 212.5 % of the WITSA software item. These
coefficients are then multiplied by the corresponding WITSA spending items for EU countries to obtain
nominal ICT investment data for the 1992–99 period.44
Table III.4: Business investment in ICT in percent of GDP
ICT investment/GDP Total fixed investment/GDP
1992 1999 Difference




2,12 2,59 0,47 21,29 20,99 - 0,30
Denmark 2,04 2,72 0,68 18,14 20,97 2,83
Germany 1,74 2,17 0,43 24,04 21,29 - 2,76
Greece 0,75 1,80 1,05 21,32 23,00 1,69
Spain 1,52 1,58 0,06 23,09 23,69 0,60
France 1,70 2,05 0,35 20,93 18,86 - 2,07
Ireland 1,82 2,32 0,50 16,59 24,13 7,53
Italy 1,49 1,77 0,28 20,47 18,43 - 2,04
Netherlands 2,23 3,09 0,86 21,32 21,47 0,15
Austria 1,61 1,89 0,28 23,50 23,65 0,15
Portugal 0,96 1,81 0,85 25,01 27,48 2,46
Finland 1,61 2,48 0,87 19,61 19,28 - 0,32
Sweden 2,49 3,64 1,15 18,26 16,47 - 1,79
United Kingdom 2,43 3,76 1,33 16,53 17,97 1,44
EU 1,81 2,42 0,61 20,72 21,26 0,54
US 2,60 4,54 1,94 17,01 20,33 3,32
Source: Daveri (2001).
The rapid diffusion of information technology is mirrored in the rising share of ICT
investment goods in gross capital formation in the business sector. In 1999, about
one third of business sector investments in Finland and the US were devoted to ICT
goods while in France, Germany, Italy and Japan this share was about half as large
(OECD, 2001A). The dramatic drop in ICT prices (see Box III.2) boosted investment
in these new technologies and led to substitution of ICT for other types of capital
goods.
There are considerable differences across countries in investment and uptake of ICT,
reflecting partly policy differences. Competition is particularly important in that it
contributes to lowering costs, thus encouraging ICT investment and diffusion. Policy
plays an important role in ensuring sufficient competition, e.g. through regulatory
reform, effective competition policy and the promotion of market openness at the
domestic and international level. Regulatory reform of the telecommunications sector
is of particular importance, as the use of ICT in networks relies to a considerable
extent on the costs of communications (OECD, 2001A). Consequently, the effects of
recent liberalisation measures, such as those undertaken in 1998, are likely to
become evident in forthcoming data releases.45
Table III.5: Annual growth of ICT and aggregate capital stocks
(1991-1999, percent)
Communications
equipment Hardware Software All capital goods
(business sector)
Belgium 10,3 27,9 8,4 3,0
Denmark 9,8 26,6 11,7 2,9
Germany 13,5 29,6 13,3 2,6
Greece 16,4 42,6 16,1 2,7
Spain 12,6 25,2 7,2 4,0
France 11,4 24,0 10,3 2,3
Ireland 13,2 28,8 15,9 3,2
Italy 11,1 23,6 5,1 2,7
Netherlands 9,9 32,1 14,0 2,3
Austria 9,7 29,9 12,4 4,3
Portugal 24,6 43,2 11,1 4,5
Finland 8,8 23,8 9,7 0,5
Sweden 5,2 25,0 9,6 2,1
United Kingdom 7,8 31,6 14,3 2,9
EU 11,2 27,6 10,8 2,7
US 4,9 31,2 17,4 2,6
Source: Daveri (2001).
Over the past two decades, the share of ICT in total business investment increased
substantially. In particular, investment in software expanded spectacularly. In the US,
the share of ICT in total business investment rose from 15 percent in 1980 to 32
percent in 1999. As Table III.5 shows, the stock of ICT capital has risen much faster
than that of capital goods in general.  The capital stock of both communications
equipment and software increased by about 11 percent annually in the EU, that of
hardware by about 28 percent (unweighted averages). Compared to the US, growth
rates for capital stock of communications equipment were higher in the EU, about
the same for hardware and lower for software.
3.2. The economic impact of ICT investment
Investment in information technology affects output and productivity growth through
three separable channels (see Stiroh, 2001 and European Commission, 2000):
1. Technological progress in the production of ICT goods: Technological
progress allows production of improved capital goods at lower prices, thus
raising total factor productivity growth in the ICT-producing sector.  The
magnitude of this effect on the total economy depends on both the speed of this
technological progress and the share of the ICT sector in the economy.
2. Capital deepening in the total economy: The most important effect of ICT
use could be an increase in labour productivity through additional capital
formation (ICT capital), which raises the productivity of labour.46
3. Spillover effects: ICT investment induces embodied technological change,
thus increasing total factor productivity growth outside the IT sector,
generating production spillovers or externalities.
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One approach to estimate the impact of ICT on economic growth and productivity at
the macroeconomic level has been growth accounting. Growth accounting is based
on the neo-classical growth model pioneered by Solow (1957). Although subject to
several limitations, this approach has produced considerable evidence confirming the
presence of the three effects mentioned above.  Additional evidence produced by
alternative methods has also been useful to validate the results (see Oliner and
Sichel, 2000 and Stiroh, 2001). Studies at the sectoral or firm level usually apply
econometric models based on production functions to assess the impact of ICT use.
28
3.2.1. Estimates for the US and the EU
The evidence suggests not only that ICT significantly contribute to growth and
productivity, but also that this impact is larger in the US than in the EU. Moreover,
this impact is greater in the second half of the 1990s compared to earlier periods.
These findings are consistent with the higher levels of ICT investment in the US
compared to the EU and with the fact that in both regions these levels have been
rising through the 1990s, as reported in the previous section.
The US economy grew rapidly in the 1990s, especially in the second half. The EU
also registered an acceleration, albeit more modest, in economic growth – see the
discussion in Chapter II. Most studies conclude that “there is no single factor that
explains the divergence in growth performance. OECD countries that have improved
performance in the 1990s have generally been able to draw more people into
employment, have increased investment, and have improved total factor productivity
(TFP)”.
 29
                                                
27 OECD (2001A) finds evidence that there is a strong positive correlation between indicators of ICT use
(e.g. numbers of secure servers, Internet host density, PC density and Internet access costs) and the rise
in TFP growth in the second half of the 1990s. Countries that experienced a substantial acceleration in
TFP growth in this period typically have wider diffusion and lower costs of ICT technologies.
28 For a survey see Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) and Stiroh (2001).
29 See OECD (2001A), for further empirical evidence see also Schreyer (2000), Scarpetta et al. (2000) and
Federal Reserve Board (2000).47
Box III.2: The growth contribution of hardware, software and
communications equipment
Some growth-accounting studies calculate capital stocks for computer hardware, software and
communications equipment and assess the impact of these components of ICT investment
separately. This provides information on the relative growth impact of the various forms of
information technology. In the US, the largest contribution to output growth stems from
hardware investments
30. In the second half of the 1990s, hardware investment raised output by
0.5 to 0.6 percentage points (see Table III.6). Software contributed about 0.2 to 0.3 percentage
points and communications equipment about 0.1 to 0.15 percentage points. Hardware and
communications equipment doubled their impact in the second half. The increase was slightly
lower for software. The evidence available for Europe (Daveri, 2001) estimates the growth
contribution of hardware at about half the US level (0.24 percentage points – weighted average
based on Daveri, 2001), slightly lower for software (0.13) and at the same level for
telecommunications equipment (0.12). Thus, lower hardware spending seems to be the major
cause for lower ICT capital stocks in Europe and consequently lower contributions of ICT to
overall growth.
The estimated growth impact of hardware investment is to a significant extent due to the use of
hedonic indices to deflate prices for ICT equipment (see Schreyer, 2001). For example, quality-
adjusted prices for computers and peripherals have been falling at about 24  % annually
(Landefeld and Grimm, 2000). This is a much faster decline than for software and
communications equipment. Research in Germany (Moch, 2001) confirms the rate of price
decline of computer hardware found for the US.
Rapidly falling prices for information technology push up the growth rate of real capital stocks
(see Table III.5), thus allocating a larger part of overall growth to information technology. As
demonstrated by Sterner (2001), heeding price measurement may in some countries double the
magnitude of growth effects for hardware investments.
One candidate for explaining the performance of the US economy is the rapid
diffusion of information technologies, which was fuelled by a steep decline in prices
for ICT goods. The key result of various studies is that ICT investment explains
about 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points of output growth in the first half of the 1990s, and
0.8 to 1 percentage point in the second half (see Table III.6).
31
                                                
30 Firm-level evidence supports this view. These studies suggest that computers did have an impact on
economic growth that is disproportionately large compared to the size of the capital stock or
investment, and that this impact is likely to grow in the future (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000).
31 See Bureau of Labour Statistics (1999), European Commission (2000), Daveri (2000, 2001), Gordon
(2000), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Kiley (1999), OECD (2001A, 2001B), Oliner and Sichel (2000)
and Whelan (2000). The major exception is Kiley (1999) that estimates a negative growth impact of
ICT that is due to adjustment costs associated with the implementation of ICT. In this framework the
effect of ICT would turn positive once investment in ICT is reduced or halted and adjustment costs no
longer cancel out the positive impact of ICT on output growth.48
Table III.6: ICT growth contribution (percentage points)
Country/




US 1990-95 0,14 0,20 0,08 0,42 OECD (2001)
1995-99 0,27 0,49 0,13 0,89
US 1990-95 0,15 0,19 0,06 0,40 Jorgenson &
Stiroh (2000)
1995-99 0,21 0,49 0,11 0,81
US 1991-95 0,25 0,25 0,07 0,57 Oliner &
Sichel (2000)
1996-98 0,32 0,59 0,15 1,06
Daveri (2001) EU 1991-99 0,12 0,24 0,13 0,48
EU 1992-94 - - - 0,27 European
Commission
(2000) 1995-99 - - - 0,49
There are basically two estimates available on the growth impact of ICT investment
covering all Member States
32 (European Commission, 2000 and Daveri, 2001).
OECD (2001B) and Schreyer (2000) present estimates for four European countries as
part of a sample of eight countries. Estimates for European countries generally
indicate a lower contribution of ICT to output growth than in the US. On average, in
the 1990s, about 0.4 to 0.5 percentage points of output growth in the EU are
estimated to be due to ICT investment.
                                                
32 With the exception of Luxembourg.49
















Belgium 0,48 0,48 0,35 0,49 0,60
Denmark 0,52 0,42 0,22 0,65 0,38
Germany(*) 0,49 0,54 0,25 0,45 0,41
Greece 0,34 0,25 0,12 0,46 0,21
Spain 0,36 0,38 0,19 0,34 0,39
France 0,41 0,40 0,24 0,44 0,42
Ireland 0,64 0,38 0,84 0,96 1,91
Italy 0,31 0,28 0,25 0,35 0,42
Netherlands 0,68 0,65 0,41 0,72 0,67
Austria 0,45 0,47 0,24 0,43 0,41
Portugal 0,43 0,39 0,25 0,49 0,55
Finland 0,45 0,21 0,31 0,74 0,63
Sweden 0,59 0,38 0,30 0,85 0,68
United Kingdom 0,76 0,43 0,35 1,17 0,64
EU 0,48 0,43 0,27 0,57 0,49
US 0,94 0,53 - 1,45 -
(*) Germany = 1992-1999.
Source: Daveri (2001), European Commission (2000).
The estimates in the two available studies for the full sample exhibit some
differences (see Table III.7). Daveri (2001) estimates a substantially larger ICT
growth contribution for the EU than the European Commission (2000) in the first
half of the 1990s; as a consequence, the acceleration between the two periods in
Daveri (2001) is not as strong. The differences in the growth contribution of
information and communication technologies in Member States and the US can be
seen in Table III.7. Both in the 1990s and in the two sub-periods, no EU country
achieved a growth contribution of ICT investments comparable to the US.
33 The
growth contribution from ICT in the UK was 0.76 percentage points in the 1990s,
which was the highest value in the EU. In the US, ICT investments accounted for
0.94 percentage points of output growth in the same period.
                                                
33 The difference in the results between Europe and the US is somewhat lower in the OECD (2001B)
estimate, which uses official data from the System of National Accounts (France, Germany, Finland and
Italy are the only European countries in the sample).50
Compared to the US, the EU appears to have forgone 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points of
economic growth.
34 The major cause for the lower contribution of ICT to aggregate
growth in the EU is lagging investment in ICT. Other factors which normally affect
the outcome of growth-accounting exercises (price measurement and capital
utilisation costs) were assumed to be similar to the US in these exercises, and thus
cannot account for these growth differences (see Daveri, 2001, European
Commission, 2000).
3.2.2. ICT productivity or ICT spillovers?
There is uncertainty about the relative importance for overall economic and
productivity growth of two factors: 1) the contribution of productivity growth within
the ICT sector and 2) spillovers from the ICT sector to other industries on the other
hand.
Box III.3: The productivity impact of ICT–producing industries
The importance of ICT to productivity growth can be evaluated by analysing the sectoral
productivity performance and the contribution of each sector to overall productivity growth. It
is widely accepted that rapid productivity increases in the ICT-producing industries contributed
substantially to overall productivity growth. OECD studies confirm this for several OECD
countries (Scarpetta et al., 2000).
The contribution of the ICT-producing sector to overall economic performance depends on its
rate of productivity growth and on the size of the sector. Labour productivity growth was much
higher in the two key ICT-producing sectors, i.e. In general, the ICT manufacturing sectors (in
particular the electrical and optical equipment industries) have a considerably higher
productivity growth than manufacturing overall, and the ICT services sectors tend to have more
rapid productivity growth than the services sector as a whole. The large variation in
performance across countries points, among other factors, to varying specialisation within the
ICT sector. Some countries are specialised in ICT products for which technological progress
was not as fast as in semi-conductors or computers (OECD 2001A).
The OECD (2001A) study on Denmark, Finland and Germany – the only countries with
sufficient data –indicates that in Finland
35 and Germany the contribution of the ICT-producing
sector increased substantially in the second half of the 1990s compared to the first half. In
contrast, the role of ICT-producing industries in Denmark declined over the same period.
The importance of the ICT-producing sector for the recent growth performance has been
confirmed also in several country-level studies. In Finland, the mobile telephone producer
Nokia accounted for 1.2 percentage points of the country’s GDP growth of 4 percent in 1999,
even though it produced only 4 percent of overall GDP (Forsman, 2000). The Bank of Korea
reports that 40 % of recent GDP growth in Korea came from the ICT sector, five times its 1999
share in GDP (Yoo, 2000). In the Netherlands, the ICT-producing sector accounted for about
17 % of GDP growth over the 1995–98 period, four times its share in GDP (CPB, 2000). The
ICT-producing sector is thus an important driver of growth and productivity, although
countries such as Australia, which do not have a large ICT-producing sector, have also
improved their growth and productivity performance.
                                                
34 The major forces determining ICT growth contribution are the size of the capital stock, its growth rate,
capital utilisation costs and price trends for ICT goods.
35 See also OECD (2001A): “...Finland shows a substantial acceleration of TFP growth in both machinery
and equipment and electrical and optical equipment in each sub–period. For Finland, the TFP
calculations broadly confirm the importance of the ICT sector for overall TFP growth; about 20 % of
TFP growth over 1995–1999 is due to the ICT sector, which is substantially more than in previous
periods.”51
The acceleration of labour productivity growth in the US between 1973/95 and
1995/99 is mainly due to capital deepening (the estimates range from 0.1 to 0.33
percentage points; see Table III.8) and total factor productivity growth (0.3 to 0.9
percentage points). Both are substantially influenced by ICT production and use. A
positive impact of ICT-related capital deepening is found in all studies reported in
Table III.8, reflecting a direct effect of ICT investment on the growth of labour
productivity. In contrast, the contribution of non-ICT-producing sectors to total
factor productivity growth remains controversial. Gordon (2000) attributes almost all
of the acceleration in total factor productivity growth to the ICT-producing sectors –
see Box III.3 for further information on the impact of the ICT-producing sector.
Although Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2000) obtain about the
same effect for ICT-producing sectors as Gordon (2000), they still find a substantial
contribution from non-ICT related sectors to total factor productivity growth (0.4 to
0.5 percentage points), thus supporting the view that ICT use has had positive effects
in non-ICT producing industries.








(2000) (2000) (2000) (2000)
Average Labour Productivity, 1995-99 2,30 2,75 2,37 2,57
Average Labour Productivity, 1973-95 1,39 1,42 1,42 1,41
Acceleration 1973-95 to 1995-99 0,91 1,33 0,95 1,16
Sources of the acceleration:
•  Capital Deepening: 0,10 0,33 0,29 0,33
– IT-Related 0,38 n.a. 0,34 0,50
– Other - 0,31 n.a. - 0,05 - 0,17
•  Labour Quality
(skill composition)
0,06 0,05 0,01 0,04
•  Total Factor Productivity: 0,90 0,31 0,65 0,80
– IT-Related n.a. 0,29 0,24 0,31
– Other n.a. 0,02 0,41 0,49
•  Cyclical Effect 0,50
•  Price Measurement 0,14
Source: Stiroh (2001).
Gordon (2000) argues that the recent productivity growth is not based on ICT use but
that the increase in labour productivity is a normal, cyclical acceleration as the52
economy expands.
36
 In his estimates the contribution of non-ICT-producing sectors
to the acceleration of total factor productivity growth is almost nil (see Table III.8).
The exercise is repeated for sub-samples of the economy by either excluding the
ICT–producing industries or the manufacturing sector and thus leads to lower total
factor productivity in the remaining parts of the economy. Gordon’s interpretation of
these findings is that there is no such thing as a “new” economy but that the massive
ICT investments outside the ICT–producing sector may be focused on unproductive
activities like market share protection, duplication of existing operations, or on–the–
job consumption and thus have a negative productivity impact.
37
This controversy cannot be solved at the aggregate level but requires evidence either
at sectoral or firm level. If there is a positive impact of ICT across the economy, it
should be visible in the largest users of ICT investment in the service sectors –
communications, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance and business services
(see OECD, 2001A). However, there are various problems in measuring the output of
these sectors, which may partly explain why most of these service sectors have
exhibited rather weak measured productivity growth.
Modest acceleration of productivity growth in non-ICT-producing industries was
found in a number of studies (see Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000, Brynjolfsson and
Yang, 1996 for studies at firm level), which suggests that productivity growth is
mainly confined to ICT–producing industries. However, the OECD (2001A) found
evidence of a positive productivity impact of ICT in the ICT–using sectors. Denmark,
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the US experienced an increased contribution
of ICT–using industries to labour productivity growth, while industries which are
less intensive users of ICT did not increase their contribution to labour productivity
growth.  This positive effect on labour productivity growth was confined to the
second half of the 1990s. In contrast, the European Central Bank (2001), using data
for Germany, France, Italy and Finland for the period 1991-1998, finds no clear
evidence of ICT spillovers – unlike in the ICT-producing sectors, labour productivity
in the ICT-using sectors (both in services and in manufacturing) did not rise
significantly faster than in the remaining sectors.
To be successful, the introduction of new technologies through investment has to be
coupled with organisational changes and improvements in labour force skills
38,
which in turn require flexibility in input markets, namely in labour markets.
Conceivably, such changes have taken place only recently and as a consequence
more recent studies detect a positive impact of ICT use while older ones do not.
                                                
36 In a fast-growing economy , labour input is quasi-fixed in the short run. The labour force adapts to
rising demand by working harder and sometimes longer (variable utilisation and resource allocation
effects) as inputs are not immediately increased in a business cycle upturn. Consequently labour
productivity rises although the basics of the economic process are unchanged. The argument that ICT is
behind productivity increases in the second half of the 1990s is weakened by this longstanding
observation of a positive relationship between productivity and growth. Even without increased ICT
investment, productivity would have increased in the upturn of the 1995 to 1999 period (see Gordon,
2000).
37 There are also other critical comments: Roach (1998) argues that much of the productivity growth is
due to the understatement of actual hours worked, which leads to an overstated productivity growth, as
the white-collar working week expands faster than the data measure. Kiley (1999) assumes large
adjustment costs that create frictions which cause investment in ICT capital to be negatively associated
with productivity, at least in the short run.
38 See Bresnahan et al. (1999).53
Stiroh (2001) concludes that “... those industries that made the largest IT investment
in the early 1990s show larger productivity gains in the late 1990s and production
function estimates show a relatively large elasticity of IT capital, indicating that IT
capital accumulation is important for business output and productivity.” This again
suggests that the impact of ICT investment takes time to emerge in output and
productivity data, and it implies that productivity growth due to ICT is not confined
to the ICT–producing sectors alone.
39
 Stiroh (2001) also provides evidence that the
US productivity revival appears to be fundamentally linked to ICT. It should be
stressed that the cyclical effect, claimed by Gordon (2000) to be the major factor
behind the revival of productivity growth, should have materialised at the beginning
rather than in the middle of the expansion. Moreover, if the productivity increase is a
cyclical phenomenon, it should be evenly distributed over industries and be unrelated
to ICT use. On the contrary, the acceleration in US productivity growth coincides
with a significant increase in ICT spending and according to Stiroh (2001) the most
intensive ICT sectors experienced the largest productivity gains. This suggests that a
structural change has indeed taken place.
3.3. Concluding comments
The growing consensus that the strong growth and productivity performance in the
US is related to increased investment and diffusion of ICT goods and services has
raised concerns that the weaker economic performance of EU Member States is
caused by a sluggishness in the adoption of these new technologies.
The ICT spending gap between the EU and the US widened in the 1990s, even
though both regions expanded their ICT expenditure. In 1992, EU ICT expenditure as
a percentage of GDP (5.2 %) was 2.3 percentage points below the corresponding US
level. While the gap narrowed in the first half of the 1990s, it thereafter increased to
2.7 percentage points in 1999. In 1992, ICT expenditure in the EU still amounted to
90 % of US expenditure, but by 1999 had declined to about 75 % of the US level.
The gap is even larger for ICT investment in the business sector.  In 1999, US
business investment in information technologies was about 4.5 % of GDP, almost
twice the European level of 2.4 %
ICT spending in the EU Member States is diverse. While the UK and Sweden have
already surpassed the US, and the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland have drawn
close to it, some of the larger countries have performed less well.
Recent growth-accounting studies have demonstrated the increasing contribution of
ICT to aggregate economic growth. In the US, ICT investment accounted for 0.8 to 1
percentage point of output growth in the second half of the 1990s. Most studies found
that the importance of ICT for economic growth in the second half of the 1990s more
than doubled compared to the first half. Estimates for European countries generally
indicate a lower contribution of ICT to output growth. On average, about 0.4 to 0.5
percentage points of output growth in Europe are due to ICT. Compared to the US,
Europe would appear to forego 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points of economic growth as a
result of lower investment in ICT.
                                                
39 See also Bailey and Lawrence (2001) and Nordhaus (2001).54
The acceleration of labour productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s in the
US is due to capital deepening (the estimates range from 0.1 to 0.33 percentage
points) and to total factor productivity growth (0.3 to 0.9 percentage points). Both
categories are substantially influenced by ICT production and use. Evidence suggests
that ICT have a positive impact on productivity in ICT–using industries. In the US,
both ICT producers and ICT users experienced significant productivity gains; in
contrast, industries that experienced no ICT impact made no contribution to the
productivity revival in the US.
The effects of ICT investments take time to manifest themselves since ICT
technologies are most productive when associated with organisational changes,
improvements in the skills of the labour force and favourable framework conditions
encouraging and rewarding innovation. Given the complementary investments
needed, it is not surprising that much of the evidence on the positive productivity
impact of ICT use has been obtained only in recent studies. In earlier years, the size
of the ICT capital stock was too small and the time to implement the technology too
short, with the consequence that the impact was not visible until the second half of
the 1990s.
Even if there is an emerging view that ICT has lead to both a permanent rise in
productivity and an acceleration in productivity growth, it is not possible to
completely dismiss the idea that some of the impact attributed as permanent may in
fact be based on cyclical factors. From an analytical point of view, the current
downturn in the economy, and in the ICT industry in particular, should shed more
light on the question. Based on data from a full economic cycle it should be possible
to say with even more confidence how much of the productivity increase was
cyclical and how much is permanent.
It should be noted, that though ICT makes a positive contribution to output and
productivity growth, it does not explain entirely the divergence in the growth
performances of the main industrialised countries. Countries that have improved
production and labour productivity performance in the 1990s have generally been
able to draw more people into employment, have increased investment, and have
registered improvements in total factor productivity. ICT investment is playing a
crucial and probably growing role in setting the foundation for future growth. Hence,
policies should ensure that competition (and regulation) will allow further lowering
of prices for ICT equipment and services and foster adequate skill upgrading, thus
making it possible to draw more people into employment and supporting
complementary organisational innovation at firm level.
---------------------
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ANNEX III.1:
EUROPEAN SKILL SHORTAGES IN ICT AND POLICY RESPONSES
- Why has the demand for ICT skills increased in recent years?
Technological progress and the globalisation of the economy have increased the
importance of human skills in our economies (see Berman et al., 1998). The share of
university and college graduates in the population has increased trendwise since the
Second World War. Evidence from econometric and case studies indicates that the
demand for more skilled workers is positively correlated with capital intensity and
the implementation of new technologies, both across industries and across plants
within industries. Autor et al. (1998) find evidence for the US that “...skill-biased
technological and organisational changes that accompanied the computer revolution
appear to have contributed to faster growth in relative skill demand within detailed
industries starting in the 1970s”. This rapid skill upgrading was concentrated in the
most computer–intensive sectors of the US economy and resulted in increasing wage
inequality and growing educational wage differentials.
It is important not to oversimplify the relationship between the introduction of
computers and demand for “skilled” workers. Several authors (e.g. DiNardo and
Pischke, 1997 and Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt, 1999) stress that the causal
relationship between computer use and demand for “skilled” workers is not
straightforward but rather entangled with complex innovation processes which
involve increased computer usage and, more importantly, changes in organisation
and in production processes. Studies that analyse the employment impact of
innovative activities support the existence of a relationship between skill upgrading
and the introduction of new technologies. Innovations tend to increase the overall
demand for labour but simultaneously lower the demand for unskilled labour (see
Leo and Steiner, 1995 and Leo et al., forthcoming).
However, indicators of the use of new technologies (e.g. PCs), innovations and
educational qualifications as a proxy for skills and competencies may not capture
some of the fundamental changes behind the skill upgrade in the economy. In
particular, educational qualifications may fail to capture many important skills which
are needed at the workplace. Howell and Wolff (1992) conclude from case studies
that “most jobs require a multitude of different skills for adequate task performance,
ranging from physical abilities, like eye-hand co-ordination, dexterity and strength,
to cognitive skills (analytic and synthetic reasoning, and numerical and verbal
abilities) and interpersonal (supervisory, leadership) skills”.
Howell and Wolff’s analysis of the situation in the United States attempts “to
account for skill composition and its change over time with direct measures of job
skills and a more complete model of the demand for skills than appears in previous
work”. They therefore distinguished between cognitive, interactive and motor skill
requirements for different jobs and adjusted their figures for industry characteristics.
In their results they obtained little support “for either the standard factor substitution
model or the widely accepted capital–skill complementary hypothesis”. They found
that capital intensity was strongly associated with rising interactive skills and
declining cognitive skills. These results are in line with many case studies, which
find that mechanisation is linked to the de-skilling of production workers and to the
growing share of managers and supervisors.58
Although this annex focuses on the demand for ICT skills, it is important to
recognise that the effects of the new technologies on working life go beyond the
increased demand for specialised technical skills. Firm-level evidence on the impact
of ICT investment suggests that ICT use is correlated with increases in the demand
for human capital skills, but also with more decentralised decision–making and
greater use of teams (Bresnahan et al. 1999)
40. These authors conclude that “the
combination of computerisation, workplace organisation and increased demand for
skilled workers appears as a cluster of changes in modern firms, almost certainly
because they are complements”. This of course implies that the recent changes in the
structure of the corporation and the demand for human capital have a common origin
in technological change.
The demand for labour with skills in information and communications technology
(ICT) has increased rapidly in both the ICT sector itself and in the rest of the
economy. The ICT-producing sector ranks amongst the most knowledge–intensive
sectors in our economies. ICT production is highly research-intensive: in 1997, more
than one third of all business R&D in Ireland and Finland, and more than one fifth in
Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the US, was carried out in the ICT sector
(see OECD 2000A). The rapid development and diffusion of new digital
technologies in the fields of telecommunications, the Internet and new media has led
to a pronounced expansion of the demand for ICT skills throughout the economy.
During the 1990s, ICT became a common form of economic infrastructure. In the
EU, computer density (PCs per 10 000 inhabitants) rose from 930 in 1992 to about
2 500 in 1999; during the same period, Internet density (estimated Internet users per
10 000 inhabitants) saw an even more dramatic increase, from 31 to about 1 600.
Several trends have shaped the demand for ICT-skilled personnel in the past quarter
of a century:
–  Digitisation of telephony led to a decrease in the demand for lower-skilled ICT
personnel who had been necessary for the operation and rollout of an analogue
network. In turn, the demand for the skills needed to handle digital equipment
increased. In net terms, the number of employees in public telecommunications
operators has been falling since the beginning of the 1980s.
–  Liberalisation of the telecommunications sector has not only forced former
monopolists to introduce cost-saving measures, but has also permitted the entry
of a large number of new competitors into the market. In the European Union,
the number of operators authorised to offer public voice telephony almost
doubled between 1998 and 2000 (European Commission, 2000).
–  Internet and new media diffusion has created a demand for ICT skills both in
specialised IT firms and in companies which have sought to establish a
presence on the Internet and/or to engage in electronic commerce.
The downswing of Internet and technology stocks in spring 2000 led to significant
layoffs and to low recruitment activity in the ICT sector. Nevertheless, given the
                                                
40 These empirical results are confirmed by a survey of managers that found that ICT is skill–increasing, a
tendency particularly pronounced in high human capital, ICT-intensive, and decentralised firms.59
positive long-term perspectives of the sector and the need for ICT skills in the rest of
the economy, skill shortages are likely to remain a problem for the economy.
- Estimates of ICT skill shortages in Europe
Existing studies on ICT skill shortages differ widely in terms of their methodology
and scope. ICT skill shortages are measured, for instance, in terms of the number of
vacant jobs, or the expected number of jobs to be created in the future, or the
required number of persons with specific qualifications. Several studies analyse only
the ICT branches of industry, which were the first to experience skill shortages. The
ICT skill shortages have since spread throughout the economy, rendering it
increasingly difficult to come up with an estimate of the skills gap for the whole
economy.
Differences in educational curricula impose further difficulties for the estimation of
skills shortages. Any estimate of the future skills gap requires information not only
on demand, but also on the future supply of labour with ICT skills. In order to
estimate the supply of skills, data are needed on the output of the educational system
at a highly disaggregated level. Furthermore, training and re-training activities also
generate ICT skills, while their overall effects are difficult to estimate.
The overall business cycle and developments at industry level affect the demand for
labour with specific skills and increase the uncertainty of any projections of skill
shortages. This is particularly so in areas like ICT, where technological change is
rapid and the organisation of commercial activities changes at an equally rapid pace.
Hence, the estimates which are presented below should be taken as indicating the
order of magnitude of the trends in the demand for and supply of ICT skills.60
Two studies on ICT skills shortages are available at European level, both carried out
by the International Data Corporation (IDC)
41. In 2000, the IDC finalised a study on
ICT skills shortages for Microsoft (IDC, 2000). The study covered the skill needs for
Internetworking Environments (i.e. Internet-related activities), Technology-Neutral
Environments (i.e. IT-supported business processes) and Other Technology
Environments (i.e. host-based, distributed and applications environments).
The demand for ICT skills was expected to grow from approximately 9.5 million
ICT professionals in 1999 to 13.1 million in 2003, while supply was estimated to
grow from 8.6 million in 1999 to 11.3 million in the same period. Consequently, the
ICT skill shortages in Western Europe (EU-15, Norway and Switzerland) were
estimated to reach 1.7 million ICT professionals by 2003, representing 13 percent of
the demand for such skills.
The level of demand for ICT professionals varies strongly among the West European
countries included in the study (see Graph A III.1.1). On average, the demand for
ICT specialists amounts to 5.7 percent of total employment. This ratio is almost
twice as high in the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, while Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain display the lowest levels of demand for ICT professionals.
In relative terms, the ICT skill shortages are highest in those countries where ICT
also has the highest weight in total employment: in the Netherlands, the shortage of
ICT-skilled personnel amounts to 1.2 percent of total employment; it is followed by
Sweden, Austria and Belgium (Graph A III.1.1). At the opposite end of the range is
Greece, where supply and demand are balanced.
                                                
41 As part of its continuous tracking of the IT services industry, IDC reviews, on a bi-annual basis, the
level of demand for and supply of skilled professionals. From more than 12  000 interviews with
information systems (IS) managers across Europe, IDC translates IS spending intentions into the
amount of work that needs to be done in order to assimilate acquired technology.
IT work is segmented into activities that have to be performed during the planning, implementation,
maintenance, management and training phases. For example, in networking environments, these
activities would include needs assessment, network design, configuration, capacity planning,
optimisation, network monitoring, maintenance and management. This segmentation, along with trends
in IT investment, is analysed by company size for each country, generating a picture of demand for
skills over time.
Investigation of trends among “intermediaries”, typically recruitment agencies, provides a validation of
this demand profile. IDC estimates that these intermediaries fill 40–70 % of all vacancies (depending on
the country). Trends in their activities thus provide valuable validation of the demand profile generated
by IT spending patterns.
The supply of resources has been analysed and forecast by researching output levels in the network of
universities and other educational establishments. IDC conducted a survey of the academic community
in Western Europe; the primary research was carried out in cooperation with administrators with insight
on intake trends, evolution of courses and the subsequent employment tracks of graduates. These data
have been used to compile baseline trends in the supply of new professionals to the IT sector. In
addition to data from the academic community, IDC has also factored in a contribution (12 % of new
supply) from the re-skilling of workers from other industries, for example the defence and
manufacturing sectors. Source: IDC (2000).61
Graph A III.1.1: Demand for and shortage of ICT skills as percent
of total employment, 1999






















Source: WIFO calculations using IDC (2000); European Commission (2001).
The projected evolution of demand up to 2003 follows a fairly similar pattern in all
the countries covered in the study. In most countries, demand for ICT skills is
expected to grow at annual rates between 7 and 10 percent in the period 2000-2003.
After a moderate slowdown in 2001, growth is expected to accelerate again in 2002.
In Spain, growth in the demand for ICT skills was significantly higher than in the
other countries in 2000, while Luxembourg and Greece are expected to record
below-average growth until 2002.
In 2001, the IDC carried out a second study on ICT skill shortages, this time on
behalf of EITO (EITO, 2001). This study has a broader occupational coverage than
the previous one: three main categories of ICT skills are analysed. The first category
consists of ICT professionals, who support and develop technology environments in
the industries that use ICT. This category roughly corresponds to the narrower scope
of the earlier study (IDC 2000, see above). The second category covers e-business
professionals, who support business strategies related to the Internet. The third
category consists of call centre professionals, who provide sales and support
activities.62
Table A III.1.1:Demand, supply and shortage of ICT skills in Western Europe
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Demand (1 000 persons)
ICT professionals 9 450 10 397 11 170 12 127 13 030
E-business 1 812 2 800 3 914 5 084 6 327
Call centre 1 000 1 300 1 690 2 113 2 577
Total 12 262 14 497 16 774 19 324 21 935
Supply (1 000 persons)
ICT professionals 8 613 9 188 9 815 10 609 11 344
E-business 1 481 2 255 3 040 3 761 4 347
Call centre 900 1 183 1 546 1 954 2 397
Total 10 994 12 626 14 401 16 324 18 088
Shortage (1 000 persons)
ICT professionals 837 1 208 1 355 1 519 1 686
E-business 331 546 874 1 324 1 980
Call centre 100 117 144 158 180
Total 1 268 1 871 2 373 3 001 3 846
Shortage in % of demand
ICT professionals 8,9 11,6 12,1 12,5 12,9
E-business 18,3 19,5 22,3 26,0 31,3
Call centre 10,0 9,0 8,5 7,5 7,0
Total 10,3 12,9 14,1 15,5 17,5
In % of total employment
Demand 7,4 8,9 10,2 11,6 n.a.
Supply 6,6 7,7 8,7 9,8 n.a.
Shortage 0,8 1,1 1,4 1,8 n.a.
Source: WIFO calculations using EITO (2001).
The total demand for ICT, e-business and call centre skills in Western Europe is
estimated to have exceeded 10 percent of total employment in 2001, exceeding the
supply of such skills by 1.4 percent of total employment (Table A III.1.1).
It is forecast that between 1999 and 2003 the demand for personnel with ICT, e-
business and call centre skills in Western Europe will almost double. By 2003,
demand for these skills will exceed 21.9 million jobs. The growth pattern of demand
is similar across the countries covered in the study. Despite the expected increase in
the supply of personnel with ICT, e-business and call centre skills, the skills gap will
continue to widen.63
The estimated shortage of ICT professionals in 2003 – the first of the three categories
included, which corresponds to the narrower scope of the earlier study (IDC 2000) –
is similar to the estimate given a year earlier, 1.7 million persons. Adding to this the
categories of e-business professionals and call centre professionals leads to a total
estimated skills gap of 3.8 million persons. The shortage of e-business professionals
is expected to increase particularly rapidly, reflecting the more than threefold
increase in the demand for e-business skills over the forecast period 1999-2003. For
call centre skills, the gap between demand and supply will increase moderately in
absolute terms, but narrow in relation to total demand in the sector.
In relative terms, the estimated skills gap is highest for e-business skills, where it is
projected to amount to 31 percent of demand in 2003. The skills gap for ICT
professionals is forecast at 13 percent of demand, and that for call centre
professionals at 7 percent of demand. Under the category ICT professionals,
businesses appear to be looking primarily for Internet specialists (where the shortage
amounts to 32 percent of demand).
In Table A III.1.2, the estimates of the two IDC studies [IDC (2000) and EITO
(2001)] are compared with a selection of national-level studies. Differences in the
scope of the studies, sector definition, time horizon, data-gathering method or period
of study are likely to explain at least partly the wide differences in the estimates for
ICT skill shortages. National-level estimates for ICT skills demand, or skill
shortages, are in most cases substantially lower than the IDC estimates.
In more recent studies, the estimates of ICT skill shortages tend to be lower than in
earlier studies (see e.g. the studies by ITAA in the US). This is likely to reflect the
recent downswing of the ICT industry. However, the studies still point to existing












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































- Policy responses to the ICT skills gap
Many governments and businesses alike have taken measures to combat ICT skill
shortages. Member States have introduced changes to their educational systems and
intensified ICT training; some have also encouraged immigration. At the EU level,
the European Commission launched the Initiative for New Employment, the
eLearning Initiative and the European Computer Driving Licence. Ten Member
States participated in a benchmarking project on “ICT and new organisational
arrangements”
42, which recommended inter alia that more be done to train the
personnel and management of SMEs in new technologies. Some firms have
established learning centres outside Europe, or transferred part of their development
and production units to non–EU countries (for examples, see EITO 2001).
Table A III.1.3: Actions in response to the ICT skills shortage





countries with a highly
qualified labour force























The appropriate response to the ICT skills gap depends on the type and urgency of
the skills needs. Table A III.1.3 groups the possible measures according to the level
of skills needed, and to the urgency of the skills shortage.
In most cases, the obvious response to skill shortages would be the adaptation of the
national educational system to provide more graduates with the required skills. If
highly skilled ICT personnel with ICT specific training of more than three years are
needed, changes in the education system may take too long to reduce current
shortages. Introducing new courses has lead times of one to two years as new
curricula have to be developed and additional resources are needed. Altogether, it
may take five to seven years before additional highly-skilled graduates leave the
                                                
42 See recommendations in “Summary of Results of Best Practice-related Activities in the field of
Enterprise Policy” (SEC(2000) 1824 of 26.10.2000) p.4-5. Detailed information on the benchmarking
project are available on Internet:
http://www.benchmarking-in-europe.com/eu_initiatives/enterprise_dg/framework_conditions/index.htm67
education system and enter the labour market. Consequently, immigration or
outsourcing to countries with sufficient highly skilled ICT personnel may be the only
available short-term solution.
Short-term shortages of medium-skilled ICT personnel (with ICT-specific training of
one to three years) may also call for outsourcing and/or immigration policies, but to a
lesser extent than for highly-skilled ICT personnel. In the short run, ICT skills at
both intermediate and lower levels can be increased through training measures.
Training programmes may also have the beneficial side-effect of drawing more
people into the labour market and increasing participation rates. To succeed, it is
essential that public training measures be implemented in close co-operation with
firms.
Only some governments and few experts predicted the skill shortages in time, and
many were surprised by the magnitude of the problem in 1999 and 2000. While it is
difficult to predict with accuracy the future demand for occupational skills, it is
essential that the education and training regime be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate shifts in skills demand, especially when these are of a permanent
character.
- Concluding comments
The long-term increase in the demand for highly skilled professionals and the recent
shortage of ICT-skilled workers is bound up with technological change. The longer-
term trend was matched by a constant increase in output from the education system.
In contrast, the more recent surge in ICT investment in the 1990s led to a constant
widening of the ICT skill gap, which was at its widest in the first half of 2000 and
was not accompanied by an increase in the output of the education system. This more
recent increase in demand for ICT skills is the direct product of the development and
diffusion of new technologies and has been intensified by the digitisation and
liberalisation in the telecommunication sector and the rapid expansion of the Internet
and new media.
Shortages of ICT skills have appeared both in the ICT sectors itself and in companies
which use ICT, for instance electronic commerce. The current shortages of personnel
with ICT skills may be even as high as 1½ percent of total employment in Western
Europe. The skills shortages are expected to worsen in the coming years, despite an
increased supply of the requisite skills.
While changes in educational curricula may be the solution in the medium to long
term, short-term skill shortages have been met by measures such as targeted training,
immigration or outsourcing.
In recent years, measures to combat shortages of ICT skills have topped the policy
agenda in the Member States and in ICT firms. Both have been promoting strategies,
occasionally by co-operative arrangements, to increase the supply of ICT–skilled
labour. The Commission put forward the Initiative for New Employment, the
eLearning Initiative and the European Computer Driving Licence. Member States
have also initiated changes in their education systems and have intensified training
and requalification activities. Businesses have introduced new ways to recruit skilled
people (most notably online recruiting) and to raise employee loyalty by offering
stock options. They have also invested in technology-focused alliances with partners,68
launched eLearning systems, virtual learning centres, etc. Some Member States have
also tried to solve the ICT skill shortages by encouraging immigration, and some
firms have established learning centres outside Europe or transferred part of their
development and production units to non–EU countries.
--------------------
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CHAPTER IV:
THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION ON MANUFACTURING PERFORMANCE
This chapter discusses the influence of innovation on production and productivity growth. It
focuses on manufacturing, first at the aggregate level, then at the level of sectors and
industries. The data confirm the key role of capabilities, knowledge , ICT and research output
in growth and productivity. The industry pattern of productivity growth appears to be similar
across countries and to have recently become even more similar, with technology-driven
industries now taking the lead in productivity increase in Europe also. With respect to the
forces facilitating innovation and growth, lagging European countries are catching up, albeit
slowly, and some European countries compare well with the US.
As discussed in Chapter I, the US is forging ahead in productivity growth. Following a long
period of more rapid productivity growth in Europe, productivity growth accelerated in the
US during the last decade and is now higher than in Europe and in Japan.
43 Between the first
and the second half of the 1990s the US experienced an acceleration in terms of both output
and productivity. In contrast, in the EU productivity decelerated by 0.7  percentage points
despite acceleration in output of 1.1 percentage points. The next section investigates these
trends in the manufacturing sector.
4.1. Manufacturing production and productivity growth in the EU and the US
Labour productivity in EU manufacturing increased at 3 percent per year during the
1990s and, in contrast to productivity in the whole economy, a modest acceleration
was registered between the first and the second halves of the decade. Nevertheless,
this acceleration was less strong than in the US (see Graph IV.1). The highest
productivity growth in the EU during the nineties was recorded in Ireland, Finland,
Austria and Sweden; in these four countries, productivity in manufacturing rose
faster than in the US (see Graph IV.2). The lowest growth rates were recorded in
Portugal, Spain and France (less than 2 % p.a.). In the second half of the 1990s, three
countries saw productivity increase faster than in the US, eleven countries
experienced productivity growth lower than in the US, and in Spain productivity
growth was negative (see Table IV.1).
44
In manufacturing production, EU growth, which had been superior to that in the US
in 1986–90, declined at a lower rate than US growth in the 1990s (1.7 % annually
compared to 4.1 % annually in the US). Countries with low growth recorded barely
more than 1 % annually for the decade, while countries with high growth achieved
around 4  %, with the exception of Ireland (11.2  %) and Finland (6.2  %).
Nevertheless, an important acceleration took place in almost all Member States
between the first and the second half of the 1990s.
                                                
43 This is true not only for labour productivity, both for the whole economy and for manufacturing, but
also for total factor productivity.
44 If ranked according to the acceleration observed between the first and the second halves of the nineties,
Finland, France, Ireland and Germany spurred up productivity fastest while Denmark, Austria and
Portugal came in next.71
























Note: Average annual growth in percent. Productivity is measured as manufacturing production per
employee.
Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT (New Cronos); 1999-2000 estimate, Economic
Forecasts 2000-2002 (European Commission).72
Graph IV.2: Productivity growth in manufacturing (countries ranked according
to growth in the 1990s)




















Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT data (New Cronos); 1999-2000 estimate, Economic





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2. The underlying forces
As discussed in Annex II.1, modern growth theories suggest that innovation is a
crucial determinant of growth. Innovation can be achieved through different channels
– through own R&D activities leading to new products or processes, but also through
a diffusion effect associated with imported technology or inputs or due to the
presence of multinational firms; or through spillover effects that magnify the benefits
of own R&D efforts. For this reason, when evaluating the innovative strengths of a
country, indicators other than the ones directly related to own innovation (such as
measures of R&D effort) must be taken into account. In particular, equally relevant
are indicators on the ability of a country to build on and to make the most of existing
knowledge and innovation through a process of diffusion and adoption. Stern et
al.(2000) in fact shows that innovative performance depends not only on research
input but also on other variables such as the existing stock of knowledge, the
openness of the country to international trade and investment and the share of GDP
spend on higher education.
This section examines the relation between indicators on research, the knowledge
base, ICT and capabilities, and growth of output and productivity. Each indicator is
subject to measurement problems and can account for only part of the growth
differences; together they establish a system of growth forces which relate to the
performance differences of EU countries in the 1990s. Clearly, these indicators do
not capture all aspects relevant for fostering and implementing innovation. Factors
such as the presence of multinational firms, the degree of labour mobility between
universities and firms or across countries, or the openness of an economy, are
important determinants of the absorptive capacity of a country and of the extent to
which spillovers can successfully take place.
45
The present discussion concerns exclusively the manufacturing sector.
46 There is
evidence that it is the manufacturing rather than the service sector that drives
productivity growth and differentials thereof.
47 Moreover, examination of the
manufacturing sector allows the use of additional information on research intensity at
sectoral level. Other than the indicators related to knowledge, innovation and ICT,
this section also uses information contained in the Community Innovation Survey to
verify the importance of capabilities.
48 These variables are presented in Table IV.2.
Also, a measure of the speed of structural change may indirectly add information
regarding the need, as well as the potential, for change, building a bridge to the
country profiles presented in Annex 1. Finally, the potential relation between the
                                                
45 One area where these factors are particularly important is biotechnology, which is discussed in
Chapter V of the Report.
46 Results for macroeconomic growth are already available in the OECD growth project (OECD 2001)
and it is not necessary to repeat them here. Its main results and one of the core findings - that in OECD
countries the acceleration of total factor productivity in the total economy is significantly related to
increases in business research intensity - are reported in Annex II.2.
47 See, for example, Scarpetta et al. (2000).
48 Though the indicators chosen are all linked to, and suggested by, theories of economic growth and are
also partly related to the empirical evidence discussed earlier, a certain ambiguity remains as to which
indicators should be used; first, because most indicators are poor proxies for the processes considered
important; and, second, because each single indicator is flawed by severe measurement problems. These
obstacles are partially overcome by using rank correlations (which are more robust than simple
quantitative indicators) and by looking at the combined rankings of several indicators.75
growth forces and the performance indicators is evaluated by means of rank
correlations and the results are reported in Table IV.2. It should be stressed that
correlation indicates only the closeness of a relation but proves no causality.
Graph  IV.3 shows the relationship between productivity growth and each of the
underlying forces.
•  Research indicators
Growth of production and productivity are positively related to research inputs,
patents and publications. Although the relationships are not particularly close, those
between growth and publications and between productivity growth and patents are
statistically significant (see Table IV.2 and Graph IV.3). Sweden and Finland rank
high according to both research and performance indicators; Germany ranks high in
patents and research input, but has only a moderate position in output growth and
productivity; the UK, which is among the leading countries with respect to research
indicators, displays low productivity growth. In contrast, Austria is far better ranked
in growth performance than in research indicators. The southern countries – Greece,
Spain, Portugal and Italy – rank low in all research indicators and in performance
indicators. Ireland, the fastest growing economy, has seen an increase in its research
input and output, and enjoys a high share of technology-driven industries, but lags
behind compared to research-intensive countries.
•  Knowledge base
To capture the concept of knowledge base, human capital indicators (such as
secondary and tertiary education and human resources in technology as discussed in
Chapter II) are combined with indicators of production and use of ICT. Sweden (see
Graph IV.3) ranks highest according to human capital indicators and Denmark and
Belgium also rank high, reflecting high expenditure on higher education. The UK
performs less well in this category, and Austria and Ireland rank better in human
capital than according to research and ICT (see Graph IV.3). For ICT, Ireland ranks
high in consumption and in the production share of ICT industries in manufacturing,
but only moderately with respect to diffusion (Internet hosts and computers per
resident). Germany and Belgium rank lower in ICT production and computers per
resident. The Member States ranking lower in this category are the same as those for
R&D indicators.
Finally, all correlations are positive and the share of the work-force with tertiary
education, computers per resident and Internet hosts are significantly correlated with
production growth (see Table IV.2).
•  The role of capabilities
The results show that indicators meant to capture the notion of firms’ capabilities are
closely related to growth. There is a consensus that capabilities are decisive for the
performance of firms, but also that they are difficult to measure. Four indicators from
the CIS innovation survey which proxy some aspects of capabilities are used here,76
(see Table IV.2). Innovation expenses relative to sales,
49 and the share of firms that
report co-operative and continuous research are significantly related to production
growth; the last two are also related to productivity growth. However, the share of
new products in sales does not find decisive statistical support.
According to the capability indicators, Ireland and Austria rank lower than according
to the performance indicators, while the opposite holds for Germany, France and the
United Kingdom. Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal rank low in terms both of
performance and capability indicators – and in particular rank the lowest in
innovation expenditure and in the share of firms reporting co-operative activities and
continuous research. In contrast, Finland and Sweden rank high in both dimensions.
•  Growth and speed of change
The speed of change of industrial structure
50 is significantly related to productivity
growth, being highest in the case of Ireland where productivity growth is also the
highest. Finland, which registers high productivity growth, ranks fourth in the speed
of change indicator. At the lower end, Germany, Italy and the UK display both slow
speed of change and slow productivity growth. Austria's and Sweden's productivity
has increased despite slow structural change, while in Portugal rapid change
combines with low productivity growth – see Table IV.2 and Graph IV.3.
                                                
49 Innovation expenditure includes software, acquisition of patents, know-how, trademarks, training,
industrial design, etc. Some of these reflect activities that allow firms to build up a competitive
advantage and make use of knowledge that is in principle available, but requires specific abilities to get
hold of. Thus innovative expenditure signals elements addressed by the capability approach but not
contained in research expenditure.
50 This indicator measures the sum of absolute changes in the shares of sectors or industries in total
manufacturing between a base year and the final year. It is a proxy reflecting changes in demand, but it
also indirectly measures rigidities, see Aiginger (2000) and European Commission (2000). In the
correlations, a comprehensive indicator was used which combines changes in value added, exports and
employment at the 2–digit and 3–digit level (see Aiginger, 2001A).77
Table IV.2: Correlation, across EU countries, between growth and underlying












0.4374 0.3626 R&D personnel as a % of the labour force
(0.1178) (0.2026)
0.3670 0.5253 Patents per inhabitant
(0.1967) (0.0537) *
0.4593 0.3363 Publications per inhabitant
(0.0985) * (0.2398)
Human Capital
0.4813 0.1736 Public expenditure on education
(0.0814) * (0.5528)
0.3758 0.4110 Percentage of the population that has
attained at least upper secondary
education by age group (1998)
(0.1854) (0.1443)
0.4316 0.4094 Percentage of the population that has
attained at least tertiary education (1998) (0.1234) (0.1460)
0.3451 0.2703 Human resources in science and technology
by country (0.2269) (0.3499)
0.4681 0.3670 Working population with tertiary education
(0.0914) * (0.1967)
Information and Communication Technologies
0.3011 0.2440 ICT expenditure as a % of GDP
(0.2955) (0.4006)
0.4559 0.2967 ICT production as a % of total
manufacturing (0.1022) (0.3030)
0.6484 0.4681 PCs per inhabitant
(0.0121) ** (0.0914) *
0.6088 0.5341 Internet users per inhabitant
(0.0209) ** (0.0492) **
0.4286 0.2396 Cellular mobile subscribers per inhabitant
(0.1263) (0.4094)
Capabilities
0.5431 0.3444 Innovation expenditures as a % of sales
(0.0447) ** (0.2278)
0.4462 0.3495 Share of new/improved products as a % of
sales (0.1098) (0.2207)
0.6084 0.4596 Share of co-operations
(0.0210) ** (0.0983) *
0.7582 0.6396 Share of firms with continuous research
(0.0017) ** (0.0138) **
Other
0.4154 0.4637 Structural change indicator (speed of
change)
2 (0.1397) (0.0949) *
0.6264 0.4593 Combined indicator
(0.0165) ** (0.0985) *
1 Growth 1991/2000; 
2 Aiginger (2001B).
Note: * (**) denotes significance at 10 % (5 %) level; for growth drivers: average of the nineties
(usually up to 1998).78
Graph IV.3: Forces underlying productivity growth































































































































































5 1 01 52 02 53 03 5











































































































































0 5 10 15 20










































































































































10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75




































































15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60



























































































































































































Given the complexity of the relationship between the innovation system and
productivity growth, no close statistical correlation between any single indicator and
growth performance should be expected. When information on the possible growth
factors is combined in a single indicator (called "combined indicator" in Table IV.2
and Graph IV.3), measurement errors in the individual series are reduced, and the
results indicate that a statistically significant relation between the variables exists.
To sum up, among the various sets of indicators, those meant to capture the notion of
capabilities appear to bear the closest relation with manufacturing growth
performance, supporting the relevance of evolutionary theories and of approaches
emphasising the absorptive capacity of firms.
51 None of the available indicators on
human capital shows a significant relation with productivity growth in
manufacturing, and only public expenditure in education and working population
with tertiary education bear a significant relation with production growth. Among the
indicators on ICT, Internet penetration and number of PCs per inhabitant display a
positive relation with both production and productivity growth in manufacturing,
while ICT production or expenditure do not appear to be significantly related to the
performance, indicators. Concerning research, R&D inputs, R&D intensity and R&D
personnel in the labour force are not significantly related to growth performance
while research outputs – patents and publications per resident – bear a significant
relation with performance, the first with productivity growth and the second with
production growth. Note that, in general, the indicators are more closely related to
production growth than to productivity growth.
52
4.3. Productivity growth and research intensity at sectoral level in the EU and the
US
In the second half of the 1990s productivity increased fastest in technology-driven
industries, while in the first half it grew fastest in capital-intensive industries.
53 The
experience of the second half of the decade suggests that a close connection between
research intensity and productivity growth across sectors could be present. However,
the experience of the first half weakens this relationship since own–research input is
typically low in capital–intensive industries.
54
                                                
51 The indicators also offer a partial explanation for the acceleration of production growth in the nineties,
as compared to the eighties. Best again are indicators from the category including capabilities
(innovation/sales ratio, co–operations, continuous research), as well as human capital, ICT share in
value added and speed of change. On the other hand, no satisfactory correlations provide an explanation
of the acceleration of growth in the second half of the nineties, as compared to the first. The reason is
that the distribution of growth between the two halves of the nineties is determined by the business
cycle, economic crises and measurement problems.
52 For the combined indicator, significance levels are 2  % for production growth, and 10  % for
productivity growth.
53 For a classification of industries according to main inputs used, see Table IV.7 at the end of the chapter.
54 Productivity is measured by real value added per employee, and research intensity by research outlays
as a percentage of value production. Real value added (when not available from SBS) was estimated
using nominal value added from SBS and price data from STAN (OECD). ANBERD was used for
research and development, and STAN for production (both provided by the OECD). For the
correlations, a combined indicator of productivity (with nominal and real value added and production
value as the numerator) was also used, which should help to eliminate noise and measurement errors in
each of the series. The results reported here are robust across indicators.80
•  Technology, restructuring, and productivity growth
Graph IV.4 presents data on manufacturing production and productivity growth in
the EU and the US for the period 1991–1998. High–tech industries with strong
productivity growth in the EU are electronic equipment and medical equipment, but
productivity also increased very fast in capital–intensive industries like basic metals,
pulp and paper, and chemicals. In the last two sectors, apparent productivity growth
was influenced by reductions in employment.
The smallest increases are found in the cases of apparel, leather and the food sector.
Textiles registered an average growth in productivity and a steep decline in
employment. In printing and publishing, productivity increases were modest and
employment was on the increase.81
Graph IV.4: Sectors with the highest increase in productivity, EU and US

















































Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT data (New Cronos).82
In the second half of the 1990s, technology–driven industries recorded marked
increases in productivity growth. None of the capital–intensive industries mentioned
above recorded an increase in productivity growth between the first and second
halves of the decade.
55 In the early 1990s, the greatest productivity increase took
place in capital–intensive industries (4.1  %), followed by technology–driven
industries (3.4 %), with labour-intensive and marketing–driven industries trailing in
productivity performance. In the latest years, however, technology–driven industries
increased productivity most strongly (4.8 %). This suggests that this group accounts
for a large part of the acceleration in productivity growth observed during this
period. Capital–intensive industries experienced a modest 2 % productivity growth
during this latter period (see Graph IV.5).
56
                                                
55 Taking the acceleration of productivity alone as a criterion shows several industry–specific and cyclical
effects not linked to innovation; for example, in the petroleum industry productivity accelerated, while
in pulp and paper it declined.
56 All these tendencies are replicated if nominal data or a combined productivity indicator is used.83
Graph IV.5: The role of technology-driven and capital-intensive industries in
EU and US productivity growth
EU
US
























Note: Productivity is measured as real value added per employee. For the industry classification see
table IV.7.
Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT data (New Cronos).
•  Impact of technology on US industry
In the US, the role of technology-driven industries in productivity growth is even
more important than in the EU. First, their share in manufacturing is larger than in
the EU (see Graph IV.6). Second, in the US these industries recorded an average
annual productivity increase of 8.3 % in the 1990s – a much higher rate than the
3.5  % achieved by the EU technology-driven industries. In technology-driven84
industries, productivity accelerated from 5.4 % per year in the first half of the decade
to 13.3 % per year in the second. In 14 industries, productivity increased at double–
digit rates in the period 1996–1998, most of which are technology-driven industries.
In Europe, only four industries enjoyed such large productivity increases.
57
Graph IV.6: Share, productivity level and productivity growth
of technology–driven industries
Share in % of total manufacturing Productivity level (value added in 1000 ECU/employee)
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Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT data (New Cronos).
•  Sectoral research intensity in the EU and the US
Graph IV. 7 presents data on research intensity during the 1990s, measured by R&D
expenditure over production, for the 11 highest and lowest research intensity sectors
in the EU and the US.
The data show that the telecommunications equipment sector has the highest research
intensity among European sectors. In the leading sectors, research relative to sales
declined in the late 1990s, while productivity growth increased.
In the US, office machinery, other transport, and telecommunications equipment are
the most research–intensive sectors. Productivity – notoriously difficult to measure in
these industries – increased during the 1990s, partly in the second half (in office
machinery and aerospace), and partly in the first. The ranking of sectors by research
intensity is very similar in the US and the EU, but research intensity is higher in the
US in 16 of the 22 sectors. Three sectors with low research activity are leading in
increases: leather, textiles and printing recorded large increases in research intensity.
                                                
57 These were telecom equipment, motor vehicles bodies, weapons and ammunition, and aircraft and
spacecraft.85
Graph IV.7: Research intensity across sectors in the EU and the US
Low R&D sectors
High R&D sectors









Publishing, printing and reproduction
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
Wood, products of wood and cork
Tanning and dressing of leather
Tobacco products
Food products and beverages
Textiles
Pulp, paper and paper products
Furniture; manufacturing n. e. c.
Fabricated metal products













Rubber and plastic products
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel
Machinery and equipment n. e. c.
Electrical machinery and apparatus n. e. c.
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Chemical and chemical products
Office machinery and computers
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches
Other transport equipment
Radio, TV and communication equipment
Total manufacturing
EU US
Note: Research intensity is measured as R&D expenditure as percent of production (average
1990/1997).
Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT (New Cronos) and OECD (STAN) data.
•  Research intensity and productivity growth
Productivity growth in the 1990s and research intensity are significantly related
across sectors (see Table IV.3). This holds for the EU as a whole and for the US, but
not for the majority of the member countries individually. International spillovers in
research could be one reason for the lack of correlation at country level. Research86
intensity does not relate closely to production growth – with the notable exceptions
of Finland and Sweden. Lags do not change the closeness of the relation.
58
Table IV.3: Correlation between production and productivity growth and
research intensity across sectors
(rank correlation coefficients, with p value in parentheses)
Production Productivity
Contemporaneous Lagged Contemporaneous Lagged
Belgium 0,4681 0,5031 0,5042 0,5076
(0,0280) ** (0,0170) ** (0,0167) ** (0,0159) **
Denmark 0,2410 0,1851 0,1508 0,1154
(0,2799) (0,4097) (0,5030) (0,6092)
Germany - 0,0390 0,0412 0,1191 0,0977
(0,8633) (0,8555) (0,5974) (0,6654)
Spain 0,1530 0,2095 0,0548 0,0457
(0,4966) (0,3494) (0,8087) (0,8398)
France 0,3698 0,3902 0,5483 0,5731
(0,0902) * (0,0726) * (0,0082) *** (0,0053) ***
Italy 0,0186 0,0186 0,0457 0,0887
(0,9344) (0,9344) (0,8398) (0,6948)
Netherlands 0,0954 0,0751 0,3642 0,3134
(0,6727) (0,7398) (0,0956) * (0,1556)
Finland 0,4421 0,4071 0,0830 0,0491
(0,0394) ** (0,0600) * (0,7134) (0,8281)
Sweden 0,5370 0,5618 0,3145 0,3710
(0,0100) *** (0,0065) *** (0,1540) (0,0892) *
0,2784 0,2998 0,3123 0,3439 United
Kingdom (0,2097) (0,1752) (0,1571) (0,1171)
0,2535 0,2343 0,6894 0,6996 Average over
EU countries (0,2549) (0,2939) (0,0004) *** (0,0003) ***
Japan - 0,0536 - 0,0243 0,3947 0,3913
(0,8126) (0,9146) (0,0691) * (0,0717) *
US 0,3066 0,3427 0,4771 0,4579
(0,1652) (0,1184) (0,0247) ** (0,0321) **
Notes: Contemporaneous: production (productivity) growth 1991/1998 vs. research intensity
1991/1998; lagged: production (productivity) growth 1991/1998 vs. research intensity 1985/1995. For
production (productivity) three indicators are combined: nominal production (STAN), nominal value
added (New Cronos), real value added (New Cronos; WIFO estimate). * (**, ***) denotes
significance at 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level.
Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT (New Cronos) and OECD (STAN) data.
                                                
58 This is a usual finding in the presence of feedbacks and co-movements and given an “intrinsic” research
intensity at a given level of aggregation (for lags to matter, a lower level of aggregation would be
necessary).87
Electronic equipment, instruments and computers are sectors with both high research
intensity and high productivity growth.
59 Additionally, chemicals and motor vehicles
are in the top third of the sectors for both indicators (see Graph IV.8). In the
chemical sector, biotechnology undoubtedly accounts for these results. Leather and
apparel and the food industry have low research intensities and low productivity
growth.
Textiles combines low research and low production growth, and although apparent
productivity is about average, competitive pressure has led to decreasing
employment (- 3.9 % between 1991 and 1998). Other transport is the sector with the
second highest research input but production and productivity increases are low,
possibly reflecting the wide diversity of this sector (from aircraft and spacecraft to
railways). In addition, the locations of research and production in this sector are not
the same and are sometimes even outside Europe. Electrical machinery belongs to
the top three sectors in research intensity and has a moderate position in productivity
growth. Publishing and printing is a sector with low direct research intensity but is
implementing new forms of technology at a very fast speed, via technology
investments embodied in equipment and intermediate inputs. It is a high-growth
sector, but its employment is also increasing, so that apparent productivity
performance is below average (ranking the fourth lowest, as measured by real value
added per employee).
                                                
59 The position varies according to the productivity indicator. For the combined indicator (production
value, nominal plus real value added) these rank first, third and seventh among 22 sectors, respectively.88
Graph IV.8: Sectoral productivity and research intensity in the EU
























































































15 Food products and beverages 26 Other non-metallic mineral products
16 Tobacco products 27 Basic metals
17 Textiles 28 Fabricated metal products
18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 29 Machinery and equipment n. e. c.
19 Tanning and dressing of leather 30 Office machinery and computers
20 Wood, products of wood and cork 31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n. e. c.
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 32 Radio, TV and communication equipment
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction 33 Medical, precision and optical instruments,
watches
23 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
24 Chemical and chemical products 35 Other transport equipment
25 Rubber and plastic products 36 Furniture; manufacturing n. e. c.
Source: WIFO calculations using EUROSTAT (New Cronos) and OECD (STAN) data.89
Table IV.4 is a matrix classifying sectors according to productivity and research
intensity in the EU and in the US. The purpose is to uncover regularities across these
variables in the two regions. It is clear, to begin with, that high research intensity is
not associated with low productivity growth either in the EU or in the US. In the EU,
low research intensity is not associated with high productivity growth either.
However, this is so in two sectors (tobacco products and wearing apparel and
dressing and dying of fur) in the US.
Electronic equipment displays high research intensity and high productivity growth
in 10 of 11 EU countries. This favourable position is attained five times for
instruments and three times for other transport. For motor vehicles, chemicals and
office machinery, the matrix contains two entries. On the other hand, in at least three
countries, food, wood products, and pulp and paper combine low research intensity
and low productivity growth. Publishing and printing is an exception in that six
countries research intensity and productivity growth are low, but production growth
is high.
Table IV.4: Research intensity and productivity growth: sectoral evidence
EU Low productivity growth High productivity growth
Low research intensity Food products and beverages
Tanning and dressing of leather






Radio, TV and communication
equipment
Medical, precision and optical
instruments, watches
Office machinery and computers
Chemical and chemical products
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers
US Low productivity growth High productivity growth
Low research intensity Food products and beverages Tobacco products




Furniture; manufacturing n. e. c.
Office machinery and computers High research
intensity Other transport equipment
Radio, TV and communication
equipment
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers
Electrical machinery and apparatus
n. e. c.
Note: A sector is included in a box if, during the 1990s, its research intensity is in the lower or upper
tercile (upper: top seven) of the sectors and its productivity growth is in the lower or upper tercile.
Source: WIFO calculations based on EUROSTAT (New Cronos) and OECD (STAN) data.90
4.4. Productivity growth in 3–digit industries
This section extends the study of the patterns of productivity growth across the EU
and the US to the 3-digit industry level. In the 1980s, productivity growth across
industries in the EU differed significantly from the pattern observed in the US.
However, the 1990s witnessed a convergence in the industry hierarchy of
productivity growth, as shown by a positive and significant correlation between the
two regions’ productivity growth at industry level
60. This similarity became more
evident in the second half of the 1990s, and the correlation between the respective
EU and US variables reached its highest value in the last years of the decade. The
results, based on rank correlation coefficients, are presented in Table IV.5. Even the
acceleration in productivity is significantly related, at least at 2-digit level.
Table IV.5: Correlation between productivity growth in the EU and the US
Rank correlation between productivity growth in EU and the US
across sectors and industries
Sector level Industry level
Correlation p-value Correlation p-value
Periods
1986/1990 - 0,3416 0,1197 0,0826 0,4165
1991/1995 0,5234 ** 0,0124 0,0418 0,6813
1996/1998 0,5539 *** 0,0075 0,2429 ** 0,0154
1991/1998 0,5088 ** 0,0156 0,2170 ** 0,0310




0,4241 ** 0,0492 0,0824 0,4175
Individual years
1
1987 0,3645 * 0,0953 0,2512 ** 0,0121
1988 0,1226 0,5866 0,1400 0,1669
1989 0,0493 0,8274 0,1045 0,3032
1990 0,6900 *** 0,0004 0,2739 *** 0,0061
1991 0,6499 *** 0,0011 0,1490 0,1410
1992 - 0,0731 0,7446 0,1082 0,2862
1993 0,1795 0,4242 0,0532 0,6008
1994 0,1454 0,5185 0,2127 ** 0,0345
1995 0,0419 0,8531 0,0868 0,3928
1996 0,5336 ** 0,0105 0,2646 *** 0,0081
1997 0,7672 *** 0,0000 0,4908 *** 0,0000
1 Three-year moving average (e.g. 1987: growth between 1986 and 1988).
Note: * (**, ***) denotes significance at 10 % (5 %, 1 %) level.
Source: WIFO calculations based on EUROSTAT (New Cronos) data.
                                                
60 The rank correlation is 0.51 for sectors and 0.22 for industries (both significant at the 5 % level).91
Several factors are behind these findings. Technology–driven industries, which had a
disappointing productivity performance in the 1980s, started to experience a reversal
of fortune in the early 1990s. In the EU, during this period, productivity in these
industries was growing slowly (see Graph IV.6), possibly as a result of slowness in
the adoption of new technologies and timid structural reforms, and partly reflecting
the impact of the recession of the early 1990s and the recurrent ERM crises.
Competitive pressures, on the other hand, led to an increase in apparent productivity
in capital–intensive industries. In the second half of the 1990s productivity increased
the most in technology–driven industries, in both the EU and the US, but at a
significantly higher rate in the latter. The weak similarity in the early 1990s was
probably a reflection of the macroeconomic difficulties experienced in Europe, but in
the second half of the decade technological forces appear to have played a crucial
role in determining the pattern.
As already mentioned, the impact of technology–driven industries on overall
productivity is greater in the US than in the EU. First, productivity increased faster in
these industries; second, in the beginning of the 1990s, the share of technology–
driven industries was 22 % in the EU and 26 % in the US; and, third, the productivity
lead of the US – however difficult it may be to measure productivity levels – was
particularly large in these industries, so that the dynamics of this sector took place on







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Among the top 25 industries in both regions, three are electronic industries
(equipment, computers, valves and tubes) and two are motor-vehicle industries
(bodies for motor vehicles and parts and accessories for motor vehicles). Weapons
and ammunition, and instruments are other high–technology industries in which
productivity increased substantially both in the EU and in the US (see Table IV.6).
Most other industries in the top 25 group are capital–intensive industries, ranging
from man–made fibres to steel and pulp and wood. Technology–driven industries
with high productivity increases in the EU which are not among the industries with
high productivity growth in the US are pharmaceuticals, electronic apparatus, and
recorded media. In general, of the 25 industries with the highest productivity
increases in the 1990s in the EU, 14 are also among the first 25 in the US.
61 The
similarities at the lower end of the spectrum are less marked. Of the 25 industries
with the lowest productivity increases in Europe, only 10 are in the same group in the
US, among which are five textile industries, oils and fats and motorcycles.
Comparison of the individual countries with the EU average shows that patterns of
productivity growth have become similar across Member States. In 11 countries
during the 1990s, the ranks in each country are significantly related to the
corresponding EU ranks.
62 The only countries where the correlation is not significant
are Denmark, Ireland and Finland. In the case of France, Spain, the Netherlands and
Austria, the correlation is significant both for sectors (2-digit level) and for industries
(3-digit level). Three small countries (Belgium, Portugal and Sweden) have, together
with two large countries (France and Spain), the closest conformity to EU
productivity growth patterns.
63
If there is a strong pattern of variation in productivity growth across industries,
countries with a higher share of industries that have experienced high productivity
growth should themselves experience higher productivity growth. This is to some
extent the case. For example, if the US had had the EU production structure, its
increase in productivity would have been slower by half a percentage point in the
1990s. The reason is that the high productivity growth in technology–driven
industries would have had less weight compared to the actual US data. However, if
the EU had had the US production structure, it would not have had a higher
productivity increase since several of the capital–intensive industries, in which
productivity increases in the EU were specifically strong, would have had less
weight. According to the same hypothesis, Greece (because of its high share of
capital–intensive industries) and Ireland (because of its greater share of technology–
driven industries than the US) would have registered the greatest reduction in
productivity growth, while the highest gains would have been achieved in the
Netherlands and Belgium.
                                                
61 Of the 25 industries with the highest productivity increases in the EU between 1996 and 1998, 12
belong to the top 25 group in the US.
62 The selection criterion is the rank correlation for productivity growth (combined indicator) at the 90 %
level of significance at a minimum of one level of aggregation (2– or 3–digit level).
63 The relation between country and EU performances in productivity growth remains close when working
with the short period 1996 to 1998, and is better when using the acceleration of productivity growth
during this period vs. the first half of the nineties. Only four countries exhibit no significant relation
between own acceleration of productivity and that of the EU: Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and
Greece.94
Table IV.7: Industry taxonomy
Industries classified according to inputs used
Mainstream manufacturing Marketing–driven industries
1730 Finishing of textiles 1510 Meat products
1770 Knitted and crocheted articles 1520 Fish and fish products
1750 Other textiles 1530 Fruits and vegetables
1760 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 1540 Vegetable and animal oils and fats
2120 Articles of paper and paperboard 1550 Dairy products; ice cream
2430 Paints, coatings, printing ink 1560 Grain mill products and starches
2510 Rubber products 1570 Prepared animal feeds
2520 Plastic products 1580 Other food products
2610 Glass and glass products 1590 Beverages
2660 Articles of concrete, plaster and cement 1600 Tobacco products
2680 Other non-metallic mineral products 1910 Tanning and dressing of leather
2720 Tubes 1920 Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness
2870 Other fabricated metal products 1930 Footwear
2910 Machinery for production, use of mech. power 2210 Publishing
2920 Other general purpose machinery 2220 Printing
2930 Agricultural and forestry machinery 2230 Reproduction of recorded media
2950 Other special purpose machinery 2450 Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes
2960 Weapons and ammunition
2970 Domestic appliances n. e. c.
2820
Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators and
boilers
3110 Electric motors, generators and transformers 2860 Cutlery, tools and general hardware
3130 Isolated wire and cable 3350 Watches and clocks
3630 Musical instruments
3140 Accumulators, primary cells and primary
batteries 3640 Sports goods
3150 Lighting equipment and electric lamps 3650 Games and toys
3540 Motorcycles and bicycles 3660 Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c.
3550 Other transport equipment n. e. c. Capital-intensive industries
Labour-intensive industries 1710 Textile fibres
1720 Textile weaving 2110 Pulp, paper and paperboard
1740 Made-up textile articles 2310 Coke oven products
1810 Leather clothes 2320 Refined petroleum products
1820 Other wearing apparel and accessories 2410 Basic chemicals
1830 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 2470 Man-made fibres
2010 Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood 2630 Ceramic tiles and flags
2020 Panels and boards of wood 2650 Cement, lime and plaster
2030 Builders’ carpentry and joinery 2710 Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC)
2040 Wooden containers 2730 Other first processing of iron and steel
2050 Other products of wood; articles of cork, etc. 2740 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals
2620 Ceramic goods 3430 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles
2640 Bricks, tiles and construction products Technology–driven industries
2670 Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 2420 Pesticides, other agri-chemical products
2810 Structural metal products 2440 Pharmaceuticals
2830 Steam generators 2460 Other chemical products
3000 Office machinery and computers
2840 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of
metal 3120 Electricity distribution and control apparatus
2750 Casting of metals
2850 Treatment and coating of metals
3210
Electronic valves and tubes, other electronic
comp.
2940 Machine-tools
3160 Electrical equipment n. e. c.
3220
TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line
telephony
3420 Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers 3230 TV, radio and recording apparatus
3510 Ships and boats 3310 Medical equipment
3520 Railway locomotives and rolling stock
3610 Furniture
3320
Instruments for measuring, checking, testing,
navigating
3620 Jewellery and related articles 3330 Industrial process control equipment
3340 Optical instruments and photographic
equipment
3410 Motor vehicles
3530 Aircraft and spacecraft
Source: DEBA and COMPET. WIFO calculations.95
4.5. Concluding Comments
During the 1990s, manufacturing production and labour productivity growth in the
EU were far below the rates recorded in the US, marking a reversal of the situation
compared to the second half of the 1980s. An acceleration took place in the second
half of the 1990s both in the US and in the EU, though more markedly in the US.
Innovation, leading to new products and production processes, is an important
determinant of productivity improvements and economic growth. But innovation is
also a complex process intertwined with factors such as the strength of the
knowledge base, institutional arrangements, qualification of the labour force,
openness of the economy and overall ability to take on board improvements achieved
in other countries or sectors. Other than through own innovation, an economy may
also improve its performance as a result of innovation diffusion or through
technology embodied in inputs and new capital goods, which in turn may magnify
the benefits of own research efforts. Indicators proxying different aspects that
facilitate innovation and growth are indeed shown to be related to productivity and
economic performance in manufacturing. The relationship is not necessarily
significant for each indicator separately, conceivably due to the complex nature of
innovation, the complementarity required between certain factors, and the multiple
roads to innovation and growth.
In the 1990s, EU technology-driven industries experienced the highest productivity
growth, followed by capital-intensive industries, where this high growth took place
mainly in the first half of the decade. In the US, technology-driven industries took
the lead in productivity growth in every sub-period.
The good performance of capital-intensive industries in the EU during the first half
of the 1990s is most probably the result of the restructuring that took place in these
industries and hints at the importance of embodied technology in innovation
diffusion and its effect on economic performance.
In the 1990s, research intensity and productivity growth are significantly related
across sectors, both in the US and within the EU, though not in each Member State
individually. This relationship reveals the role of research efforts for innovation and
performance; on the other hand, the lack of such relationship at country level may be
a sign of international spillovers at work.
In terms of patterns of productivity growth, there appears to have been increasing
convergence between the US and the EU. While in the 1980s the US hierarchy of
productivity growth across industries was significantly different from that in the EU,
in the 1990s these patterns became more and more similar. This is partly the result of
the lag, relative to the US, in productivity performance of technology-driven
industries. In the EU, it was not until the second half of the 1990s that technological
forces appear to have played a determining role in the industrial pattern of
productivity growth; while competitive forces, driving the restructuring of capital-
intensive industries, are most likely behind the developments of the first half of the
decade.96
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ANNEX IV.1:
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO GROWTH: A COMPARISON ACROSS THE MEMBER
STATES
This annex presents country profiles combining information on the forces behind
growth, as presented in section IV.2, with results indicating the impact of research on
productivity from section IV.3 and the specialisation of national industries explored
in previous Competitiveness reports.
64 A graph (“cobweb”) for each Member State
summarises information on these indicators and on innovation and performance
assessments by the European Commission
65. Each variable is standardised, so that
points outside the unit circle indicate a performance above the average of the EU
Member States (see Table A IV.1.2 for the definition of variables).
Drawing on the trends in the indicators used in these country profiles in the 1990s,
section 2 investigates whether Member States have converged over this period.
- Country profiles
Belgium
Belgium's growth performance in total economy output is close to the EU average.
Labour productivity grew at a higher than average rate and its level is one of the
highest within the EU. These good performances have also been achieved in the
manufacturing sector.
Belgium spends relatively less than the EU average on research and close to the
average on education. Innovation expenditure in manufacturing is also low. ICT
expenditures are close to the EU average but ICT-producing industries are less
present than elsewhere. Patenting is low. The excellent productivity performance can
probably be explained by intense competitive pressure due to the high degree of trade
integration. The presence of enabling capabilities in manufacturing and a well-
educated labour force contribute too.
                                                
64 See European Commission (1999), European Commission (2000A, 2000B), Aiginger et al. (1999) and
Aiginger (2000).
65 European Commission (2001A, 2001B).98
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
At manufacturing level, the industrial structure is rather traditional in the sense that
capital intensive and low-skill industries have high shares. Belgium maintained its
position in the textile sectors. The chemical sector provides 17 % of value added and
is the largest industrial sector. Exports in pharmaceuticals are booming and its
market share in Europe has increased from 6.3 % to 9.6 %. Food is the second largest
sector, vehicles the third. Significant inroads in technology-driven industries can be
observed in the production of audio and video apparatus.
Belgium is one of the countries in which research intensity and growth across sectors
appear to be related
66. The two sectors leading in research intensity - other transport
and electronic equipment - are growing fast; the same is true for instruments and
office machinery. Food, textiles, and pulp and paper, on the other hand, are industries
with low research and low growth. Publishing and printing is an industry with low
research intensity and high growth; this may be due to embodied technology in
inputs and equipment. Leather and footwear have high and increasing levels of
research in Belgium – in contrast to other countries - but productivity growth did not
increase.
Denmark
Both total economy and manufacturing growth in Denmark were above average,
specifically in the first half of the 1990s.
Denmark displays a good research and education performance, especially in terms of
lifelong learning. However, the supply of new Science and Technology graduates is
low. ICT expenditures indicate a diffusion of these technologies in the economy, a
fact confirmed by the level of Internet penetration. Innovation expenditures are high
                                                
66 Rank correlation between these two variables is positive and statistically significant.99
and innovation capabilities are well developed; SMEs capabilities are the highest in
the EU.
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average
Denmark has a rather small industrial sector but presents a strong development of
high-technology services. At manufacturing level, the share of skill-intensive and
marketing-driven industries is high. The importance of marketing-driven industries is
due to the food sector, which accounts for 19 % of output and 23 % of exports. The
second largest sector is machinery. A specialisation in wood products and furniture is
also apparent. Denmark has a rather low share of capital-intensive and technology-
driven industries. High tech industries with relatively large export shares are
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. The fastest growing industries are wood
products, tobacco and motor vehicles.
In Denmark, research intensity and production or productivity growth across
industries do not appear to be related. Instruments, chemicals (specifically, the
pharmaceutical industry) and electronic equipment are research-intensive and fast
growing. Food and pulp and paper are low on both accounts. Office machinery and
the other industries (including furniture) are research-intensive, but post low growth.
On the contrary, wood, publications, and motor vehicles have high growth rates, but
are not research-intensive.
Germany
Germany's growth pattern reflects the problems and progress of unification. Growth
was above average in the first half of the nineties, but fell below the EU average
during the second half. Productivity in manufacturing accelerated, reflecting
restructuring and internationalisation of firms.
Germany scores high in research indicators. However, its R&D ratio has decreased in
the 1990s. The presence of innovation capabilities in SMEs is another strong point.100
Germany has a good supply of human capital but lifelong learning is lagging behind.
The diffusion of information and communication technology is slower than average.
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
Germany accounts for 30  % of the value added of European manufacturing. The
trade balance amounts to more than three quarters of the EU trade surplus.
Employment in medium-high and high technology industries is strong but it is below
the EU average in high technology services. Germany's strength is in skill-intensive
and mainstream industries. The largest sectors in production and exports are
machinery, vehicles, and chemicals, which together provide 50  % of exports. In
some of the technology-driven industries, Germany's export shares are below
average and have declined in the telecom industries. Aircraft and spacecraft,
instruments, and electronic components increased their shares. Apart from motor
vehicles, the highest degree of specialisation is in machine tools, electrical apparatus,
and measuring and musical instruments.
Research intensity and production or productivity growth across industries do not
appear to be related in Germany
67. This may be due to the fact that restructuring
affected productivity more than research activity. Many firms began to outsource and
became multinationals. For all five industries that lead in research, production
growth is not above average. Electronic equipment and chemicals have high research
intensity but low production growth. Vehicles, which rank sixth in research intensity,
increased production, but do not rank high in productivity growth. On the other hand,
food and printing are growing fast – with virtually no research activity –though with
low productivity growth.
                                                
67 Rank correlations are practically zero.101
Greece
Greece is catching up, albeit slowly and not without some turbulence. Production, as
well as labour productivity, increased in the 1990s slightly faster than the EU
average. Productivity in manufacturing grew faster despite slow output growth,
reflecting the increased competitive pressure.
Greece is below the EU average in most indicators of research and ICT. It has a
relatively high share of higher educated population of working age and its education
expenditure is increasing though it is still below average.
Greece has the smallest share of manufacturing in GDP of all European countries.
The highest rate of growth (in capital-intensive sectors like petroleum, basic metals,
textiles and wood) was achieved with employment decreasing by about 5  %  p.a.
Productivity growth was low in two sectors which are large in Greece, namely food
and wearing apparel. The share of low-skill industries is by far the largest and is still
increasing, as is the share of marketing-driven industries.
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Greece has less capital inflow and higher extra-EU exports than any other Member
State.
68 The breakdown of Yugoslavia has increased transport and transaction costs
with core European countries. The transformation of former socialist countries has
increased competitive pressure but also provided new market opportunities, bringing
faster than average structural change.
Spain
Spain’s GDP grew faster than the EU average while growth in manufacturing was
approximately at par. This coincided with a significant reduction in unemployment
with, as a consequence, low to negative productivity growth rates.
Spain is among the weaker countries with respect to indicators for research and
human capital and displays low ICT use. Exports are growing by 10 % p.a., led by
                                                
68 Extra-EU exports made up 50 % of total exports in 1998, singularly high for member countries. This
reflects high and growing trade shares with Cyprus, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Turkey, as well as with
other Eastern European countries and Russia.102
intra-EU exports. The share of industry in GDP is now below average. Productivity
and wages are low.
In manufacturing, three well represented sectors – food, apparel and leather –
exhibited a sluggish performance in productivity. Two capital-intensive (basic metals
and chemicals), and two high tech industries (computers and medical equipment)
increased productivity sharply.
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
The car industry doubled its production share and is now the second largest industry
in terms of both exports and production. Food is also an important sector for exports:
fish, fruits and vegetables have double-digit shares in European exports. Chemicals
are now third in production and exports. The high shares of pharmaceutical, audio
and video apparatus and medical equipment industries reflect successful clusters of
high-tech industries, often around subsidiaries of multinational firms, which supply
leading technologies.
There appears to be no relation between research intensity and production or
productivity growth.
69 Among the research-intensive sectors only office and
electrical machinery posts high growth; in chemicals, other transport and electronic
equipment, neither production nor productivity grew fast. Food and apparel combine
low research intensity with low productivity growth. Textiles and basic metals
combine high productivity growth with low research activity.
France
Production growth was below the EU average in the first half of the 1990s and about
average during the second half. Labour productivity growth was well below average.
Manufacturing growth was slightly lower than the EU average - as is the case for
                                                
69 The two rank correlations across industries are positive but not statistically significant.103
most large countries. The share of manufacturing in total production declined to
18.5 %.
France is strong in research and innovation outlays, but the trend of research
expenditure relative to GDP is downward. Indicators of human capital show a
position slightly above the European average. New graduates in Science and
Engineering are far above the EU average but efforts in life-long learning are lower
than average. The ICT producing sectors as well as high technology services are well
developed.
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
In general, the industrial structure of France is closer to the European structure as a
whole than to that of other large countries. The share of technology-driven industries
is high in France, as is the share of industries characterised by high inputs from
knowledge-based services. France’s two largest industrial sectors - chemicals and
food – are growing fast. Motor vehicles and machinery are the third and fourth
largest sectors. Cars and other transport are well represented in exports, and together
account for more than one quarter of total exports. The highest export shares are in
food and electrical machinery.
The specific success of France in aircraft and spacecraft can be seen in the "other
transport" sector: France accounts for 18  % of value added and 45  % of total
European exports, reflecting trans-European projects in spacecraft and aircraft.
Productivity is increasing in this sector, as it is in chemicals and plastics.
Research intensity and production, as well as productivity growth appear to be
linked.
70 Four of the five research-intensive sectors in France are also high growth
                                                
70 Rank correlations across sectors are positive and statistically significant in both cases.104
sectors with rapidly increasing productivity (instruments, electrical equipment, other
transport and chemicals); the exception is office machinery, where research is high
but production is decreasing a probable sign of delocalisation. Food is a low-research
sector with small increases in productivity. Publishing and printing combines low
research with about average production growth, but has below average productivity
increases.
Ireland
Growth of real GDP was 8 %, about half of which was due to productivity growth.
Two thirds of the double-digit (11.2  %) growth in manufacturing resulted from
productivity growth. Both production and productivity growth in the manufacturing
sector accelerated in the second half of the1990s. GDP per capita caught up with the
EU average in 1997.
Ireland still has low levels of public R&D and education expenditure. However,
business R&D is moving closer towards the EU average, even though multinational
firms still perform a larger share of research in their home country, as compared to
production. Skills are highly rated, due to an efficient education system and the
supply of new graduates in science & technology is the third strongest. Ireland has a
large share of ICT-producing industries. Average innovation expenditures (compared
with a fast increasing turnover) are complemented by higher rates of innovation
based on co-operation and on continuous research at firm level, as expressed by the
capabilities indicators.
Ireland has built its remarkable catching up process on its attraction of foreign
capital, but has ingeniously connected inward investments with local strengths. It has
attracted dynamic high-tech industries, developed programmes to upgrade
qualifications and to cluster firms around the subsidiaries of multinational firms. The
supply of skilled labour has been a contributing factor.105
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
The share of manufacturing is rising and, at 32  %, is now by far the highest in
Europe. Exports, specifically to the US, Japan and Switzerland, are rising but the
share of extra-EU exports is still below average. Ireland produces 1.7  % of total
European manufacturing, and export shares have doubled, now reaching 3 %. The
ratio of exports to production is the highest of all the Member States. Value added
per employee is also the highest among EU countries. The share of production in
marketing-driven and technology-driven industries is high. Chemicals is the largest
sector, with basic chemicals and pharmaceuticals each accounting for about 15 % of
Irish exports. Computers rank second in exports and telecom equipment third. 15 %
of EU computer exports and 10 % of chemicals come from Ireland.
Italy
Despite sluggish overall growth, labour productivity grew parallel to that of other EU
countries. In manufacturing, productivity growth was lower than the EU average
during the1990s, specifically in the second half, when production fell by one
percentage point and productivity by two percentage points below the EU average.
Italy is one of the four European countries with a deceleration in productivity
growth.
With respect to almost all the variables that are believed to facilitate innovation and
growth, Italy is consistently below the European average. This is specifically the case
for indicators of research, human capital and new technologies. An exception is ICT
production. The share of the economically active population having higher education
is particularly low relative to the EU average.106
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
Italy produces about 12 % of European manufacturing output. The export ratio and
openness are below average, reflecting strong domestic demand for consumption and
investment goods. Italy has a two-tier industrial structure. On the one hand, the share
of labour-intensive and low-skill industries is larger than in most other Member
States; on the other hand, high-skill and mainstream industries are also strong.
Technology-driven and marketing-driven industries are under-represented. Italy has a
large textile sector, with high export unit values indicating high fashion products.
71
Machinery - a skill-intensive, mainstream sector - is the largest single sector,
followed by chemicals in production and by cars in exports.
Productivity rose in electronics and computers, as well as in basic metals, paper and
metal products. In the textile industries, productivity actually decreased, but real term
figures underestimate the upgrade in quality. In machinery, productivity increased
slightly. Thus, though the pattern for productivity growth across industries is similar
to that of other countries, average growth is lower. Employment in Italian
manufacturing remained fairly stable, despite the very slow growth in output. Italy
has the slowest speed of change of industrial structure.
Three of the five leading research-intensive sectors in Italy do not translate high
research into productivity growth. Other transport has a particularly low level of
productivity growth; motor vehicles have increased production at a below-average
rate of growth in productivity. Research activity and productivity are high in
                                                
71 The textile industries account for 12 % of production and 17 % of Italian exports. These shares have
decreased slightly. Since, however, in other countries this sector has contracted (with some
fragmentation and outsourcing), Italy is now the leader in textile exports, supplying 25  % of total
exports. Italy is specialised in high quality, fashion products and enjoys above average unit values in
textiles, leather products and apparel.107
electronic equipment and in office machinery. The food industry and the textile
industries rank low in both areas, with the exception of apparel, where production
growth is about average. Publishing has low growth in productivity and production -
the latter in contrast to other countries. High growth, despite low research intensity,
characterises the wood, pulp and paper and fabricated metal sectors.
Luxembourg
Data availability is a recurrent problem when assessing Luxembourg’s
performance.
72 Luxembourg’s GDP per capita is almost double the EU average and
the highest in the OECD area. Production and productivity growth were more than
twice the EU average.
Capabilities in manufacturing are above the EU average.
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
Luxembourg has the highest contribution from the services sector to the economy
among OECD countries. Financial services and communications were the main
engines of growth.
Luxembourg traditionally has a strong position in basic metals, but the share of this
formerly dominant sector is declining. The steel industry accounts now for 13 % of
total value added, down from 41  % in 1985. Rubber and plastic are the second
strongest sector with a fairly constant share of value added of about 14 %. Fabricated
metals and chemicals grew at annual rates of around 10 %. Machinery is the most
important engineering industry; several food industries and printing have increased
their shares, thus broadening the industrial base. The overall share in European
manufacturing increased slightly. Employment in manufacturing remained stable
                                                
72 The low number of enterprises raises problems of confidentiality at more detailed levels of analysis.
R&D statistics are not available either.108
over the period 1995- 2000, while it declined in most other Member States. The jobs
lost in the steel industry were partly compensated for by job creation in chemical
industry, metal products, food and investment industries.
The Netherlands
In the 1990s, production grew above the EU average, while productivity growth was
slightly lower than average.
Research and development expenditures are close to the EU average and patenting is
very strong. There is a mixed picture as far as human capital is concerned, with
below average numbers of graduates in science and engineering, average public
outlays, and well above average performance in lifelong learning practice. The
development of ICT-producing sectors is above average and the diffusion of these
technologies in the economy is strong.
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
The share of capital-intensive and low-skill industries is somewhat higher than the
average, and so is the share of marketing-driven industries. Technology-driven
industries have a lower than average share, as do skill-intensive industries, while
industries characterised by high inputs from knowledge-based services are very
important. The largest sectors are chemicals and food. Food accounts for 14 % of
total European exports, although this share is declining. The publishing industry is in
third place and has raised its share of value added. The tobacco industry accounts for
the highest share in EU exports - for which the Netherlands provides one third of
European exports - and the petroleum industry contributes one fifth.
At the manufacturing level, research intensity is rather low. However, it is
complemented by higher than average innovation expenditure and a strong presence109
of innovation capabilities. Office machinery posts high levels of research and high
growth in production and productivity. High rankings in both research and growth
can also be seen in the car industry and in electronics. On the other hand, electrical
machinery and chemicals do not translate research intensity into production growth -
in the case of chemicals; this is perhaps due to the lower share of pharmaceuticals.
Tobacco and pulp and paper are capital-intensive industries with high productivity
growth.
Austria
Following a period of above average growth, Austria's performance drew closer to
EU average during the 1990s. The manufacturing sector increased its share in
European production and ranks fourth among EU countries in growth of output and
productivity.
Austria traditionally has a deficit in R&D and has now come close to the EU level.
Innovation capabilities are above average. Austria is moderately well placed with
respect to most human capital and ICT indicators.
The privatisation of manufacturing firms speeded up in the mid-1990s, after a period
of heavy losses. The liberalisation of telecom and privatisation started rather late.
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
The share of manufacturing in total production is rather large; its share in European
value added rose from 2.2 % to 2.8 % Productivity growth is specifically high, partly
in the wake of privatisation and the restructuring of formerly nationalised or bank-
owned firms, and partly due to the successful positioning of medium-sized firms in
market niches. The export ratio is high, becoming more dynamic owing to the
increasing trade surpluses with the accession countries in Central and Eastern110
Europe, as well as to exports to the US. The degree of openness is high, even when
compared to other small countries.
The production structure remains centred around traditional positions and the share
of technology-driven industries is rather low. The largest sector is machinery. Motor
vehicles are second in exports; Austria supplies parts to European and US car
manufacturers. Above average market shares are posted by traditional strongholds
such as the pulp and paper industry, the leather industry, metal products, and basic
metals. In none of the technology-driven industries does Austria have significantly
above average shares, possibly reflecting insufficient research efforts.
Portugal
The Portuguese economy is catching up, especially since the second half of the
1990s. Productivity is the lowest among Member States, but is increasing fast.
Research efforts, both public and at business level, are still very low in comparison
with the EU average. Expenditure on education is above average. The same applies
to ICT, with relatively high expenditures but low penetration levels.
The industrial sector is large, accounting for 23  % of GDP. The development is
driven by European integration; the intra-EU share of exports is the largest among
Member States, and is growing faster than extra-EU exports. Despite Portugal's
rising share in European exports, the trade deficit doubled over the last decade and
amounts to nearly one half of exports.
In the sectors with larger shares than in the EU, such as food and textiles, there has
been virtually no increase in productivity. By contrast, productivity increased at
double-digit annual rates in basic metals and pulp and paper. Motor vehicles and
other transport are catching up in productivity and display stable employment. A
high productivity increase was also apparent in office machinery, albeit from a very
low level.111
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
The share of Portugal's textile sectors - textiles, apparel, and leather - decreased from
24 % to 19 %; nevertheless, this share is still the second largest after that of Greece.
Cars are now the largest export industry. Telecom equipment has attained the fifth
largest export share; tobacco, wood (specifically cork), and made-up textiles are
industries with high export shares. In general, low-skill and labour-intensive
industries still dominate. The structure is adapting towards European demand,
specifically by increasing shares of skill-intensive and mainstream industries.
Portugal attracts foreign investments amounting to up to 3 % of GDP.
Finland
In the early 1990s, Finland was hit by a financial crisis and by the collapse of its
export markets in the Soviet Union. As a result, GDP growth was negative for three
consecutive years. In the second half of the 1990s, growth accelerated rapidly,
making up for lost ground. Productivity growth for the entire decade is far above the
European average. Finland’s performance with respect to research, formation of
human capital, development of ICT-producing sectors and innovative capabilities is
consistently above average. Finland gave priority to research - even during its crisis
years- and is now one of the countries with the best performance in research and
ICT. Finland focuses on academic research at a limited number of locations and has
reinforced engineering-oriented disciplines. The liberalisation of telecommunications
started early, with competition in long-distance telephony introduced in the 1980s.
Early and well operated programmes brought the information society into schools,
the government and institutions.
The share of manufacturing in GDP in Finland is the second largest (26 %) and, in
contrast to other countries, it did not decline between 1985 and 1998. Productivity
increased fastest in electronics, basic metals, and paper and wood industries.112
Electronic equipment jumped from 15th to 2
nd place in production. Finland increased
market shares in electrical machinery and in printing and publishing, while
maintaining strongholds in capital-intensive industries; pulp and paper is still the
most important sector, and accounts for one third of exports. The "forestry cluster"
has increased its share in value added, partly through complementary services and
technology centres.
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
Research intensity and production growth appear to be related across sectors
73; this
relation is less clear with respect to productivity growth, conceivably because of the
role of capital-intensive industries where, typically, productivity improvements do
not rely on own research but rather on embodied technology. Research is
concentrated in the high tech sectors. In electronics, electrical machinery, and
instruments high levels of research effort coincide with high productivity growth; in
chemicals and in office machinery, high levels of research did not result in fast
growing production and productivity. Productivity has also increased in Finland’s
traditional areas of strength: pulp and paper, the wood industry and basic metals are
all among the top five sectors with regard to productivity growth. In these sectors,
research intensity is lower than in other Finnish industries, but higher in Finland than
in the EU.
Sweden
Sweden faced a severe financial crisis in the early 1990s that led to a long period of
contraction of the economy. Production growth fell below the EU average, although,
                                                
73 The rank correlation is positive and statistically significant.113
over the decade, productivity growth was higher than the EU average. Growth of
manufacturing is above average and the productivity increase is the third highest.
Sweden is among the top countries for most of the factors facilitating innovation and
growth and has improved in most of them, even though high performances had
already been achieved at the beginning of the 1990s in research, education and ICT
use.
























ICT in % of manufacturing (v.a.)






Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
The highest increase in productivity occurred in two traditionally strong sectors. In
electronic equipment, where Sweden share of production is 10 percentage points
above the EU average, productivity increased by 10.3 %. This sector now accounts
for 15 % of exports, which is as much as wood and paper together. In motor vehicles,
productivity rose by 4.3  %. In both sectors, productivity rose faster than the EU
average. In other industries, productivity increases guaranteed continued
competitiveness in tough markets: basic metals, apparel and tobacco. Machinery and
motor vehicles are the largest sectors in Sweden. Pulp and paper is third, but its
production share decreased (in contrast to Finland). Basic metals have high market
shares, and the trend is on the rise. Extra-EU exports have grown faster than intra-EU
exports. Sweden has a large share of capital-intensive industries and the share of
technology-driven industries is increasing fast, as is that of industries characterised
by high inputs from knowledge-based services. Sweden has the lowest share of low-
skill industries, reflecting its former high wage position.
In Sweden, research intensity and production, as well as productivity, growth across
sectors are clearly related.
74 Other transport and cars are research-intensive sectors.
                                                
74 The two rank correlations are both strongly positive and statistically significant.114
For motor vehicles, as well as for electronic equipment and for office machinery,
high levels of research are combined with high growth in productivity. Productivity
growth in traditional strongholds is apparent in basic metals, but not in pulp and
paper or in wood.
United Kingdom
In the 1990s, the United Kingdom reversed its growing productivity gap in
manufacturing vis-à-vis other advanced countries, though output growth remained
lower.
In the United Kingdom, research indicators are comparable to the EU average, but as
in other large countries R&D expenditures relative to GDP have declined. The
United Kingdom ranks high in both the production and use of ICT. Public
expenditures on education are below average but the supply of skills is among the
best.
The United Kingdom produces 15 % of European manufacturing output, the second
largest production share among Member States. The United Kingdom enjoys the
second highest unit value of exports, reflecting structural change towards industries
characterised by high inputs from knowledge-based services. It also takes advantage
of its position as the headquarters and export hub for high-technology products.
Marketing-driven industries have a significantly higher share in the United Kingdom
than in the EU. Food is still the largest sector in production; followed by chemicals,
machinery, and vehicles. A clear and increasing specialisation of the United
Kingdom can be observed in printing and publishing, which now amounts to 8 % of
production; more than 20 % of European production and exports in this sector come
from the United Kingdom. High market shares have also been attained in office
machinery and telecom equipment.115
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Note: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the country relative to
EU average.
In the United Kingdom, research intensity and productivity growth across sectors do
not appear to be related. Electronic equipment, chemicals and instruments are sectors
with high research intensity, and high growth. Other transport has the highest
research intensity, but low growth in production and productivity; electrical
machinery has the fourth highest research intensity and the second lowest level of
growth in productivity. In general, capital-intensive industries like oil, chemicals and
food, have high productivity growth.
- Convergence of underlying forces across Member States
The trend in the 1990s in the variables used as proxies for the forces facilitating
innovation and growth and presented in the country profiles gives a rough idea of
whether Member States have converged in terms of these underlying forces. Indeed,
in a majority of cases there is convergence, both as a reduction of the dispersion of
performances
75 and as a reduction of the relative distance between the leading and
the “trailing” group of countries. Each group is composed of five countries - not
necessary the same at either point in time. The points in time are not the same for all
indicators, depending on the length of the time series. In the case of Internet
penetration, the period is just one year, yet the converging pattern is very strong.
Table AIV.1.1 summarises the information on convergence/divergence of the
different indicators across Member States.
                                                
75 Measured by the coefficient of variation.116
Table A IV.1.1: Convergence of underlying forces within the EU
1. Converging
♦  Population having
attained secondary
education
♦  Population having
attained tertiary
education
♦  Number of publications /
resident
♦  Lifelong learning (1996-
2000)
♦  Internet penetration
(Oct. 1999-Oct. 2000)
♦  ICT expenditure/GDP
(1991-2000)
♦  PCs/100 population
(1995-1999)
2. Diverging
♦  Patent activity (1996-
1999)
♦  Employment in high tech
services (1995/97-1999)




♦  R&D/GDP (1991-1999)







The indicators relative to ICT penetration are converging faster. Two of the three
diverging indicators refer to structural features that may be self-reinforcing
(specialisation, concentration), while in the third case (patents) the leaders increased
their advantage. As for the two measures of research intensity, there is a stabilisation
of relative distances, but greater dispersion in the case of the R&D to GDP ratio and
no clear pattern for R&D in manufacturing. Finally, spending in education behaves
in the same way as total R&D.
The lower performance group shows little tendency to vary; it consists mainly of the
southern EU countries. Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands tend to share
the top places, followed by the UK, Germany, France and Luxembourg
76. Again, for
most of the indicators the (relative) distance between top and low performers tends to
decrease over time. And, in balance, decreases in the coefficient of variation are
much stronger than increases, underlining the dominant trend of convergence.
The EU is closing the gap with the US for a few indicators only
A comparison can be made with the US for some of the above indicators. The EU
has improved its position in most of the cases, although not decisively. The gap in
ICT spending has been reduced substantially, as the improvements on Internet and
PC penetration confirm. However, with regard to the development of the ICT-
producing sector the situation has worsened. The EU is catching up with the US in
publications, in secondary and tertiary education attainment and in patents.
                                                
76 When data permit its ranking.117








Number of publications per 10,000 inhabitants
At least upper secondary education





ICT in % of manufacturing (v.a.)
EU/US Ist year EU/US last year
Notes: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the EU relative to the
US. The first and last year are not the same for all indicators; they depend on the length of the time
series
The picture is definitely better for the leading EU countries. They have surpassed the
US in patents, publications, ICT diffusion and total research and development
spending.
Graph A IV.1.17: Comparison of the top EU performers









Number of publications per 10,000 inhabitants
At least upper secondary education





ICT in % of manufacturing (v.a.)
top 5/US first year top 5/US last year
Notes: Each indicator outside the unit circle shows a superior performance of the top five EU
countries relative to the US. The first and last year are not the same for all indicators, they depend on
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ANNEX IV.2:
R&D AND GROWTH PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN AND US FIRMS IN
THE 1990S
77
This annex studies the contribution of R&D to firm performance using a sample of
2167 large, publicly traded firms in Europe and the US. Data show that firms that
report R&D are growing faster and have higher productivity. The econometric
analysis indicates that the impact of research on production is significant and robust,
and estimates the rate of return on R&D at approximately 12 %.
The database used- Global Vantage- provides information on company accounts,
sampled from a wide range of manufacturing sectors, for the United States and
twelve EU countries covering the period 1989-1998.
78
Table A IV.2.1: Distribution of firms in the sample, 1990-1998
All firms R&D firms Non R&D firms
absolute % of
sample absolute % of
sub-sample absolute % of
sub-sample
Belgium 39 1,8 6 0,6 33 2,8
Denmark 48 2,2 13 1,3 35 3,0
Germany 266 12,1 96 9,3 170 14,6
Greece 25 1,1 8 0,8 17 1,5
France 214 9,7 54 5,2 160 13,7
Ireland 154 7,0 10 1,0 144 12,4
Italy 82 3,7 7 0,7 75 6,4
Netherlands 73 3,3 18 1,7 55 4,7
Austria 34 1,5 11 1,1 23 2,0
Finland 51 2,3 36 3,5 15 1,3
Sweden 74 3,4 39 3,8 35 3,0
UK 305 13,9 155 15,0 150 12,9
EU-12 1 365 62,1 453 43,8 912 78,4
US 833 37,9 581 56,2 252 21,6
Total 2 198 100,0 1 034 100,0 1 164 100,0
Note: The sample excludes firms with large discontinuities in the data, generally caused by mergers;
all firms that reported non-zero R&D expenditures in one or more years in the 1990-1998 period are
classified as R&D firms.
                                                
77 This annex is based on Wieser, R. (2001), The Impact of R&D on Output and Productivity: Firm Level
Evidence, Background Report, European Commission, DG Enterprise, Brussels.
78 There is no information on R&D expenditures for firms in Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal. The
original data was restricted to 2 167 firms due to omissions and questionable data on certain variables
and in response to merger and acquisition problems (outliers).121
Table A IV.2.1 presents the distribution, in the sample, of R&D reporting and non-
reporting firms across countries. 47 % of firms report R&D expenditures of which
about 56 % are from the US, 15 % are from the UK and 29 % are from the other EU
countries.
79
Table A IV.2.2 presents the average, lower quartile, median and upper quartile of
employment, sales, gross physical capital, R&D expenditures and R&D intensities
for the European and US firms in 1994/1995. European firms in the full sample are,
on average, only slightly smaller than the US firms (in terms of average employment,
average sales and average physical capital stock). However, European firms that
report R&D expenditures are much larger than the corresponding US firms.
European R&D firms have, on average, 25 600 employees, against 14 600 in the US.
Furthermore, in Europe, R&D firms are more than twice as large as non–R&D firms,
whereas in the US sample they are roughly similar in size. Additionally, in Europe,
average R&D expenditures of R&D firms are considerably higher than in the US.
These observations suggest that small European firms active in research are not
adequately represented in the sub–sample of R&D reporting firms.
Also, average R&D intensity (R&D/sales) is higher in the US (4.8  % compared
3.6 % in Europe). However, if the firms’ disclosure decision depends positively on
the importance of R&D activities (measured by the R&D/sales ratio),
80 then the
“true” average R&D intensity of European firms might be even smaller. Finally, the
size distributions in both samples are highly skewed (in most cases the mean is above
the third quartile). Hence, even after outlier corrections, large firms in both regions
heavily dominate the sample.
                                                
79 For the purpose of the following descriptive analysis, no distinction is made between firms whose R&D
is reported as “zero” and firms whose R&D is just “missing”. All such firms are treated as not having
reported positive R&D. However, there may be a selection bias in the data, and this is accounted for in
the econometric model.
80 This is one of the conclusions reached in Gaeremynck – Veugelers (2000).122
Table A IV.2.2: Sample characteristics of key variables, 1994–1995
EU-12 US
Variable All firms R&D
firms
Non R&D




N 1.365 453 912 833 581 252
Employment (thousands)
Average 12,3 25,6 5,9 12,5 14,6 7,8
Lower Quartile 0,8 1,1 0,7 1,0 10,0 1,2
Median 2,2 5,2 1,9 3,1 3,3 2,8
Upper Quartile 8,7 21,8 6,5 10,0 12,0 6,9
Sales (millions of dollars)
Average 2.160 4.570 1.050 2.274 2.766 1.210
Lower Quartile 103 156 106 152 146 157
Median 307 728 278 473 501 414
Upper Quartile 1.324 3.605 1.011 1.539 1.870 909
Physical Capital (millions of dollars)
Average 821 1.747 402 853 1.035 436
Lower Quartile 26 40 28 34 33 39
Median 89 206 83 128 142 112
Upper Quartile 398 328 512 623 328
R&D (millions of dollars)
Average 199 119
Lower Quartile 3 4
Median 13 14
Upper Quartile 71 45
R&D/sales
Average 3,6 4,8
Lower Quartile 1,0 1,2
Median 2,2 2,8
Upper Quartile 4,7 6,4
Notes: for all variables, average for 1994–1995; physical capital refers to property, plant and
equipment (gross of depreciation); R&D refers to research and development expenditure.
Table A IV.2.3 presents annual median growth rates of major variables for the two
types of firms, in Europe and in the US, during the 1990s. R&D firms display higher
labour productivity growth, as well as more capital deepening than non–R&D firms
in both regions. While the physical capital stock grew significantly faster in R&D
firms, there was no statistically significant difference in employment growth.
81
                                                
81 The significance of observable differences in the growth rates of the variables is evaluated using the
Mann-Whitney U test statistic.123
Another important observation is that R&D firms in the US exhibit higher growth in
all variables, compared to European R&D firms, during all the periods under
consideration. Growth in R&D expenditures by US firms was almost twice that of
European firms, and labour productivity increased annually by 1.6 percentage points
more in the US.
82
Table A IV.2.3: Median annual growth rates – non parametric tests for
significant differences in growth rates
EU-12 US
Variables
Non R&D R&D Non R&D R&D
sales 2.6 4.0 5.3 6.8
US vs. EU * * * *
Non R&D vs. R&D * * * *
employees 1.9 1.3 2.3 2.3
US vs. EU n.s. * n.s. *
Non R&D vs. R&D n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
physical capital 3.2 4.6 5.8 7.0
US vs. EU * * * *
Non R&D vs. R&D * * * *
labour productivity (sales/employee) 1.1 2.7 3.3 4.3
US vs. EU * * * *
Non R&D vs. R&D * * * *
capital deepening (phys. cap./empl.) 1.1 2.7 3.4 4.0
US vs. EU * * * *
Non R&D vs. R&D * * * *
R&D 4.1 7.8
US vs. EU * *
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5 % level; n.s. = not statistically significant.
Estimating a Cobb Douglas production function linking output growth to the growth
rates of physical capital and labour, as well as the R&D intensity at the beginning of
the period provides estimates of the contribution of R&D to output growth.
83
                                                
82 However, this last observation might be partly due to the under–representation of small, fast growing
firms in the European sample; see the discussion on sample selection below.
83 The measure of output is “net sales or revenue”, physical capital is measures as “net property, plant and
equipment”, employment is “average number of employees” and R&D intensity is “research and
development expenses” divided by sales.124
One important econometric problem in estimating the relationship between R&D and
productivity is the selectivity bias. Given the large number of European firms that do
not report R&D expenditures, it is likely that some bias exists, at least in the
European sample.
84
                                                
84 European firms are in most cases not forced to disclose their R&D activities in their official accounts;
compared to the EU, the reporting rules for R&D expenses are less liberal in the US. This bias problem
was addressed using the Heckit method, where first a selection equation, relating the reporting
probability to a set of variables (capital, labour, firm size, cash flow, industry and geographic dummies)
is estimated, which is then used in the regression equation linking R&D to output growth. The
estimated probability of reporting R&D expenditures depends negatively on employment growth and on
European country dummies and positively on the size of firms and on the research intensity of the
industry but it does not depend on cash flows. In other words, disclosure of R&D is more likely for
large, slowly growing R&D intensive firms from the US. Thus, what is noticeably missing from the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table IV.2.4 presents the basic results regarding the contributions of R&D capital to
output (total net sales). Four specifications of the estimating equation were used:
•  In Specification 1 (Basis) the independent variables are the growth rates of
physical capital and labour and research intensity; the estimates are all statistically
significant at the 5 % level and reveal important effects on total net sales, while
the estimated rate of return on R&D is 12 %.
85
•  Specifications 2 (Intra-industry Spillovers) includes a spillover variable,
constructed as the industry R&D in percentage of the industry’s production value,
meant to capture intra-industry spillovers. The regression shows that this intra-
industry effect is not statistically significant.
•  In Specification 3 (Inter-industry Spillovers), the industry–wide R&D intensities
are aggregated for the individual countries to measure inter–industry effects.
Again, the spillover effect is not statistically significant in this specification.
•  Specification 4 (country effects) addresses the relative impact of R&D activities
carried out by firms in the two regions (the US and the European countries as a
whole). Although the estimated rate of return on R&D is lower for European firms
(8 % compared to 14 % in the US), the coefficient is not statistically significant at
the usual levels.
To examine robustness, these estimations were performed using real values with the
Heckit method and also using OLS for both nominal and real values. The estimates
for the private rates of return remain significant and are of rather comparable
magnitude in all specifications. This is also true for the estimates of labour and
physical capital input. Furthermore, no single specification reveals significant
country effects. However, the OLS results point to high and significant spillovers
(both intra– and inter–industry) when output growth is measured in nominal values.
                                                
85 Adding industry dummies to this specification does not change the estimates.127
CHAPTER V:
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
A CASE STUDY OF INNOVATION
This chapter reviews the state of innovation and production systems in European
biotechnology and, in particular, its innovative capacity and related factors 
86. As such,
biotechnology cannot be considered as an industrial sector but rather as a set of technologies
developed in the field of life sciences. Its applications span over a number of other industrial
or service sectors, and agriculture. This direct link with science makes innovative capacity a
major determinant of competitiveness.
While large biotechnology firms are undoubtedly important
87, the emphasis of the chapter is
on the role of the small and medium, research-intensive companies, which have emerged from
the new opportunities opened up by the life sciences. In this chapter they are referred to as
dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs).
Inevitably, comparisons with the US biotechnology industry are made throughout. One
notable difference between Europe and the US in the 1990s has been that, while in the US a
new research–intensive industry in the life sciences has continued to develop, there has not
been a comparable specialisation in entrepreneurial biotechnology in Europe (see also
Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2001). Partly reflecting this difficulty in developing an
industry of DBFs, the perception has emerged that the US has a competitive advantage over
Europe in biotechnology.
The US have pioneered the rise of an effective division of labour between smaller and larger
companies, which possess different comparative advantages in the “exploration” and
“exploitation” of new innovation opportunities (March, 1991). Europe has been less effective
in facilitating the growth of research–intensive DBFs. While large multinationals, such as
biopharmaceuticals and agri-food, may not need local technology suppliers, the presence of a
local industry of research–based firms and technology suppliers is critical, because the
industry is, by itself, a powerful source of growth and social progress. The US biotechnology
industry has, over the past two decades, created a large number of new jobs, and at least a
dozen new world–class companies (e.g. Amgen, Chiron, Genzyme, and others), along with
several new ones in the new tool technologies (e.g. Incyte, Millennium, Celera, Human
Genome Sciences, and others). It has also produced a substantial stream of revenues, mostly
in the form of royalties from licences or R&D contracts and collaborations.
                                                
86 There are several statistical and methodological problems that affect the quality and reliability of data
concerning the European biotechnology industry. This chapter uses data from the BID (Biotechnology
Industry Databank) of the University of Sienna, as well as statistics collected by publicly funded
organisations such as the US National Science Foundation in the US and NUTEK in Sweden, from the
most important patent offices, and from commercially available databases such as Windhover,
Recombinant Capital, Pharmaventures and Bioscan. Reports and data from commercial sources like
Ernst&Young, Decision Resources, SRI, McKinsey, the European Venture Capital Association, have
also been used. For a detailed description of the data used in this Report, see the background study
“Innovation and Competitiveness in Biotechnology: a European Perspective”, July 2001, prepared for
the present Report by a team of researchers coordinated by Prof. Fabio Pammolli and Dr. Massimo
Riccaboni at the University of Siena (see Allansdottir et al., 2001).
87 These are the agri-seed firms such as Syngenta, Aventis, and Advanta, large chemical firms such as
BASF, and large pharmaceutical firms like Astra- Zeneca, Novartis, Aventis, and GlaxoSmithKline.128
As in many other technologies, innovation in biotechnology was first undertaken not by
incumbents but by new companies. In the US, biotechnology was the motive force behind the
first large–scale entry into the pharmaceutical industry since the early post-World War II
period. Entry rates soared in 1980 and remained at a very high level thereafter, but with waves
linked to both the stock market performance and to the appearance of successive new
technologies. Despite the high rates of entry of new firms into biotechnology, it took several
years before the industry started to have an impact on the pharmaceutical and agri-food
markets. Many of the early research efforts proved to be dead-ends and/or much more
difficult to develop than expected.
These companies were primarily university spin-offs and were usually formed through
collaboration between scientists and professional managers, backed by venture capital. Their
specific skills related to knowledge of new techniques and to research capabilities in that area.
The “function” of this type of national biotechnology firms has been to mobilise fundamental
knowledge created in universities and to transform it into commercially useful techniques and
products.
Section V.1 reviews the recent evolution of industrial biotechnology in Europe and the
contribution of the new DBFs that entered the industry during the 1990s. Section V.2 provides
a detailed analysis of R&D activities and research collaborations of European biotechnology
companies. Section V.3 analyses the essential features of biotechnology clusters in Europe
and the position of European biotechnology firms in the context of the international division
of labour within the field. Section V.4 reviews briefly the institutional, legal, and cultural
factors that have an impact on the evolution and performances of the biotechnology industry
and Section V.5 surveys the adoption of biotechnology by large European firms. The final
section V.6 summarises the main findings.
5.1. Innovation activities of the European biotechnology industry
This section provides an overview of the innovative performance of industrial
biotechnology in Europe, on the basis of patent data and patent citations. A
traditional indicator of innovative performance, patents are even more important in
the context of biotechnology where they often represent the only tradable asset.
5.1.1. General observations and comparisons with the US
The available empirical evidence shows that the US is and continues to be the most
important locus of innovation in biotechnology (see Graphs V.1 and Graphs V.2),
followed by Japan, Germany, the UK and France.129



































Source: OECD, calculations based on data from USPTO and EPO
Graph V.1 gives an account of the dominance of the US in biotechnology inventions.
From 1990 to 2000, the US share in all biotechnology patents granted by the
USPTO
88 increased by nine percentage points. The share of Japan declined by 11 %.
A modest increase occurred in the case of Denmark (1.1 %), while Germany’s share
declined by 1.2  % The shares of all other European countries have remained
generally stable over the last decade. Between 1990 and 1997, national shares of
biotechnology EPO patent applications
89 have been stable (see Graph V.2), with the
exception of Japan, which saw a decline of 6 %. The UK shows the best performance
with an increase of 2.1 %.
                                                
88 Biotechnology patents are covered by class 435 of the USPTO classification system (“molecular
biology and microbiology”). For a complete definition of class 435 see
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/moc/435.htm.
89 European biotechnology patents are covered by 5 IPC codes: C12M: Apparatus for enzymology or
microbiology; C12N: Micro-Organisms or Enzymes; compositions thereof; C12P: Fermentation or
enzyme-using processes to synthesise a desired chemical
  compound; C12Q: Measuring or testing
processes involving enzymes or micro-organisms; C12S: Processes using enzymes or micro-organisms
to liberate, separate, or purify a pre-existing compound or composition. For complete definitions of
these IPC codes, see http://classifications.wipo.int/fulltext/new_ipc/index.htm.130
Graph V.2: Biotechnology patent applications to the EPO

































Source: OECD, calculations based on data from USPTO and EPO.
Patent citations data provide a better measure of the potential technological and
economic value of innovative activities than patent counts. Citations are a measure of
the importance or impact of inventions and a proxy for knowledge flows among
patenting institutions. Widely cited patents tend to be “seminal” patents, i.e. key
inventions to which further patents must refer. Moreover, high citation rates have
been shown to correlate with the economic value of patents. Thus, a high number of
citations received by a given firm or country can be interpreted as a measure of the
quality and relevance of its innovative activities.
Allansdottir et al. (2001) show that the share of citations to US patents is
substantially higher (around 55  %) than the share of US patents in total patents,
suggesting that on average US patents are more important. Moreover, among
European nations only UK patents show a higher share for citations than for patent
counts. On the basis of a subset of “highly cited” patents (i.e. patents receiving at
least 10 citations not counting self–citations) in the period 1978 – 1995 (with
citations up to 1997) the US lead increases further to 65.4 %.
National biotechnology firms (DBFs) hold a disproportionate share of these highly
cited patents (48  %), and US DBFs account for more than 80  % of highly cited
patents of DBFs. In Europe (including Switzerland), around 65 % of the highly cited
patents belong to large incumbent firms and around 20 % to DBFs (almost all of
them British). Considering the top 20 institutions in terms of patent citations, eleven
are American (four DBFs, three incumbents, four universities and other research
organisations), two are, respectively, German, British and Japanese, while
Switzerland, France and Denmark are represented with one institution. Almost all of
these European institutions are large corporations, the only exceptions being one
British DBF and one French public research organisation.131
Finally, the US appears to be more specialised in the pharmaceutical segment of
biotechnology. The US share in highly cited agri–food patents is 13.5 % compared to
a total of 17  %. However, only two European countries have agri–food patents,
Germany (35 %) and the UK (33 %), among their total highly cited patents.
The importance of biotechnology depends to a considerable extent on the size and
the growth of downstream industries, which demand biotechnology products and
technologies (see also Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2001). Table V.1 shows,
over a period of twenty years, the shares on GNP of the most important industries
related to biotechnology: food, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, for the US, Japan,
and four major European countries: Germany, France, the UK and Sweden.
Table V.1: International patterns of specialisation in related industries: share of
food, pharmaceutical and chemical industries in GNP,
1978-1997
Average share of GDP (%)
1978-1985 1986-1993 1994-1997
Food 19,11 17,97 17,00
Chemicals 19,03 18,00 19,66 United Kingdom
Pharmaceuticals 1,50 2,14 2,78
Food 14,46 12,82 11,77
Chemicals 20,31 17,71 18,61 Germany
Pharmaceuticals 1,11 1,32 1,43
Food 17,79 17,01 16,68
Chemicals 19,47 16,40 18,11 France
Pharmaceuticals 1,65 2,24 2,65
Food 4,06 2,78 2,81
Chemicals 12,87 10,69 10,25 Sweden
Pharmaceuticals 0,85 1,67 2,72
Food 14,27 14,36 13,35
Chemicals 19,42 16,69 16,59 US
Pharmaceuticals 1,17 1,83 2,21
Food 11,07 10,90 11,11
Chemicals 14,47 9,52 11,28 Japan
Pharmaceuticals 1,26 1,42 1,56
Note: 
“ “Chemicals” excludes Drugs.
Source: OECD, STAN Database (2000).
The data in Table V.1 show a continuous growth of the share of pharmaceuticals,
while the shares of the food industry and of chemicals in GNP decreased
significantly. The countries that recorded the highest growth in the GNP share of
pharmaceuticals are the US and the UK, while Germany and Japan experienced a
much slower growth. As for chemicals, the UK, Germany and France have the
highest share in GNP.132
5.1.2. R&D activities and research collaboration: Inter–country and inter–regional
comparisons
Patent data provide important information about the geographical distribution of
biotechnology research across macro-regions (Europe and the US) and across
countries. The extent to which companies locate biotechnology research outside of
their home country (internationalisation of research) is also important. To put the
analysis in perspective, biotechnology is compared with four other branches of the
chemical industry (materials, organic chemistry, pharmaceuticals, and polymers). It
is assumed that the location of the inventors of the (97 785) patents and the location
of the (7 264) chemical R&D laboratories coincide with the location of the inventive
activity.
The data suggest that the US is comparatively more specialised in biotechnology
innovations, and that smaller European countries show greater specialisation in
biotechnology compared to larger European countries.












Graph V. 3 shows the sectoral break down of patents by chemical subsectors. In
1987–1996 biotechnology patents were 17  % of the total chemical patents, rising
from 16 % in 1987–1991 to 19 % in 1992–1996. Clearly, these EPO patents include
patents developed in Europe and in the US and Japan. Graph V. 4 shows the share of
patents attributed to each country.133
Graph V.4: Share of 1987-1996 EPO patents in chemicals
by country of invention
18% 19%
7%


















































The biotechnology patents invented in Europe represent 14.4 % of the total number
of chemical patents invented in Europe, compared to 22.5  % of the EPO
biotechnology patents invented in the US over the total number of chemical EPO
patents invented in the US. This suggests that the US chemical companies are
relatively more focused than European ones on biotechnology. To examine this issue
further, the Revealed Technological Advantage Index (RTA) was computed for
different countries. RTA is a country's share of all patenting in a given
technology/sector relative to the share of patents in that technology/sector over all
technologies/sectors, and it gives an account of the specialisation of a country or
region in a technological field.
90 Table V.2 shows the Standardised Revealed
Technological Advantage Index (SRTA) = (RTA-1)/(RTA+1), for Europe, the US
and Japan. The standardised index varies between –1 (non-specialisation) and 1
(specialisation). The evidence in Table V. 2 suggests that the US has a stronger
specialisation in biotechnology than Europe (and Japan). The biotechnology RTA
index for the US is 0.13 compared to –0.09 for Europe, and –0.12 for Japan.
                                                
90 RTA =     J ij i ij i J ij ij P P P P ) / ( / ) / ( ,
where Pij denotes the number of patents in country/region i and sector j.134
Table V.2: Standardised Revealed Technological Advantages of Europe,
US and Japan in biotechnology, materials, organic chemistry, pharmaceuticals
and polymers (97 785 patents in 1987-1996).
(RTA-1) / (RTA+1)
Country Biotech. Materials Organic
chemistry
Pharma Polymers
EU total (*) - 0,09 0,01 0,06 0,02 - 0,05
US 0,13 - 0,06 - 0,08 0,01 - 0,01
JP - 0,12 0,08 0,01 - 0,11 0,15
OTHERS 0,22 0,02 - 0,08 0,11 - 0,39
Note: (*) This is EU-15 plus Switzerland (CH) and Norway (NO).
Source: European Patent Office (1998).
Table V. 3 reports the standardised RTA by individual European country. It suggests
that it is the larger European countries that show no specialisation in biotechnology
compared to the other branches of the chemical industry. The standardised
biotechnology RTA for Germany (–0.31), Italy (–0.24), France (–0.03) and the UK
(0.01) are negative or very close to zero. By contrast, the standardised biotechnology
RTA for the smaller European countries – Denmark (0.41), Ireland (0.23), the
Netherlands (0.15), Sweden (0.25), Finland (0.12) and Norway (0.45) – is positive
and has a high value. Germany and the UK have dominated the traditional chemicals
industry for many years, while Italy and France have also been important world–
wide. The RTA results indicate that whereas the larger countries continue to focus
their activities on traditional chemicals, smaller European nations have taken
advantage of the new opportunities opened up by biotechnology research. Thus, the
traditional dominance of the larger European nations in chemicals does not provide
them with a critical advantage in the new biotechnology industry.135
Table V.3: Standardised Revealed Technological Advantages of European
countries in biotechnology, materials, organic chemistry, pharmaceuticals
and polymers (97 785 patents in 1987-1996)
(RTA-1)/(RTA+1)
Country Biotech. Materials Organic
chemistry Pharma Polymers
Germany - 0,31 0,05 0,12 - 0,08 0,07
France - 0,03 0,08 0,01 0,12 - 0,22
United
Kingdom 0,01 - 0,14 0,04 0,16 - 0,37
Italy - 0,24 - 0,07 0,00 0,09 0,05
Switzerland - 0,17 - 0,40 0,25 - 0,06 - 0,27
Netherlands 0,15 0,16 - 0,14 - 0,18 0,15
Ireland 0,23 0,02 - 0,30 0,19 - 0,24
Belgium 0,02 0,14 - 0,23 0,06 0,12
Sweden 0,25 - 0,07 - 0,28 0,26 - 0,55
Denmark 0,41 - 0,29 - 0,12 0,06 - 0,80
Spain - 0,02 - 0,21 0,19 0,05 - 0,54
Austria 0,34 0,19 - 0,19 - 0,10 - 0,16
Finland 0,12 - 0,08 - 0,29 0,01 0,18
norway 0,45 0,42 - 0,30 - 0,14 - 0,54
Greece 0,39 0,02 - 0,31 0,03 - 0,28
Luxembourg - 1,00 0,31 - 0,24 - 0,14 0,42
Note: Portugal is excluded because it had too few patents.
Source: European Patent Office (1998).
The results shown by Tables V.2 and V.3 are confirmed by simple ratios of the total
biotechnology patents over the total number of patents by country of invention. Table
V.4 shows that 45.4 % of the total biotechnology patents in the sample were invented
in the US and 36.5 % of biotechnology patents invented in Europe. However, in all
chemical sectors the US share is 34.5 % while Europe’s share is 44.8 %.136
Table V.4: Share of patents by region of the assignee,
region of the inventor and by sector (10 000 sample patents)
Country of the assignee
Country of the inventor EU US Total
All chemical sectors
EU 86.3 % 9.0 % 44.8 %
US 11.9 % 87.8 % 34.5 %
Total 98.2 % 96.8 % 79.3 %
Biotechnology
EU 82.1 % 4.9 % 36.5 %
US 14.6 % 92.7 % 45.4 %
Total 96.7 % 96.6 % 81.9 %
Materials
EU 90.7 % 8.0 % 44.9 %
US 7.8 % 90.1 % 30.9 %
Total 98.5 % 98.1 % 75.8 %
Organic chemistry
EU 89.1 % 10.8 % 50.8 %
US 9.5 % 87.4 % 28.4 %
Total 98.6 % 98.2 % 79.2 %
Pharmaceuticals
EU 85.0 % 11.5 % 47.3 %
US 13.3 % 86.2 % 36.0 %
Total 98.3 % 97.7 % 83.3 %
Polymers
EU 85.4 % 8.3 % 40.1 %
US 12.9 % 84.6 % 33.5 %
Total 98.3 % 92.9 % 73.6 %
Source: European Patent Office (1998).
The data on the R&D laboratories also shed light on the comparative specialisation
of European countries in biotechnology. Of the 7 264 chemical R&D labs in the
sample, 32  % perform biotechnology research
91. Smaller countries (Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands) are more focused on biotechnology than the
larger countries (Italy, Germany, and France), thus confirming the results seen
earlier.
Finally, in Europe about 72  % of the biotechnology laboratories are public
(government research institutions, universities, and hospitals). This share is slightly
lower in pharmaceuticals (71 %), and much lower in the chemical sectors (40 %).
The evidence across countries is mixed. In Finland and in Ireland, 82.9 % and 80.6 %
of the biotechnology labs are public. This percentage drops to 67.7 % in Denmark,
and to 56.8 % in the Netherlands. It could be said, therefore, that the entry of Finland
and Ireland is related to public funding and public research in biotechnology. By
contrast, in the Netherlands and to some extent in Denmark, the share of activities in
                                                
91 Each R&D lab in our sample can perform more than one activity. For example, only one third of the
32 % of labs carrying out biotechnology research perform only biotechnology research. The other two
thirds perform research in biotechnology and in one or more other chemical sectors.137
biotechnology is more closely associated with private research. No single model
emerges. Either private or public research can be the means by which newcomer
countries can take advantage of the opportunities opened up by biotechnology.
The data can provide information on the extent to which patent assignees locate
research activity in their home country. It is assumed that the locus of the innovative
activity is the location of the inventors of the patent and that the location of the
patent assignee is given by the nationality of the ultimate owner of the assignee
92.
The results show that, in general, the home country is the preferred location of
inventive activities in all countries and sectors; and that biotechnology is a partial
exception, with the European countries locating a sizeable share of their inventive
activity in the US.
Table V.4 shows that European assignees invent 86.3 % of their chemical patents in
Europe and US assignees 87.8  % of their patents in the US. When European
companies locate their patenting activity outside Europe, they develop almost all of
their “foreign” chemical patents in the US − the total share of patents by European
assignees invented either in Europe or in the US is 98.2 %. Thus, the US is the
favoured foreign location of the European assignees. Finally, there seems to be a
fairly balanced interchange of research between the two continents in chemicals
since the share of EPO patents by European assignees invented in the US (11.9 %) is
very close to that of the EPO patents by US assignees invented in Europe (9.0 %).
As shown also in Table V.4 this pattern of cross-location between Europe and the US
is also similar across the chemical subsectors with biotechnology being the only
exception. The result that really stands out is the share of biotechnology patents by
US assignees invented in Europe, which is only 4.9 %, while the share in the other
direction is 14.6 %, suggesting that the US is an attractive location for biotechnology
research by European assignees.
Therefore, the data do not show that European assignees perform a
disproportionately large amount of biotechnology research in the US – they do
almost as much biotechnology research in the US as they do in the other chemical
sectors – but that Europe is not attracting similar levels of biotechnology research by
US assignees. Even in pharmaceuticals, which is the closest to biotechnology,
Europe attracts 11.5 % of the patents applied for by US assignees. The apparent
European lack of attractiveness to US research seems to be specific to biotechnology.
                                                
92 The need to control for the ultimate owner of the assignees was the reason why the smaller sample of
10,000 patents was used here. It would be very difficult to examine the complete sample of 97 785
patents for the purpose of this Report.138
Table V.5: Share of biotechnology patents invented by European assignees in
the home country, in the US and in other European countries
(sample of 10 000 patents in 1987-1996 in percent)
Country of the assignee
Patents Switzerland Germany France Italy Netherlands UK
•  invented in the
home country
30,6 76,2 81,5 73,3 70,7 76,9
•  invented in the US 48,2 7,6 11,0 4,9 4,4 8,1
•  invented in the
other EU
countries
18,4 11,2 4,2 21,8 24,8 12,8
Source: European Patent Office (1998).
Table V.5 shows the shares of biotechnology patents invented by European assignees
in their home country, in the US and in European countries other than the home
country. The table confirms that the assignees locate research largely in their home
country, although inter–country differences exist. The most important difference is
that Swiss assignees invent almost half of their biotechnology patents in the US,
while assignees from all the other countries in Table V.5 (Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, and the UK) invent over 70 % of their biotechnology patents at home.
Apart from the US, the latter countries have a sizeable share of biotechnology patents
invented in other European countries and, moreover, these patents are not
concentrated in the leading nations – Germany or the UK – but are spread across
European countries. When Swiss multinationals are excluded from the sample, the
share of biotechnology patents by European assignees invented in the US declines
from 14.6 % to 11.3 %. This is closer to the similar share for the other chemical
sectors presented in Table V.4.
5.1.3. Division of innovative labour and markets for technology
The ability of firms to access and make efficient use of markets for technology and
networks of collaborative relations has become a crucial source of competitiveness in
the new markets for technology (Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 2001; Arora,
Gambardella, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2001). As a consequence, in the last 25 years,
collaborations in biotechnology have increased dramatically world-wide (Science
and Engineering Indicators, 2000; Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2001).
The very existence of dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) depends on their ability
to participate in networks of collaborative relations and markets for technology. Most
exploit their basic competence and act primarily as research companies and
specialised suppliers of high technology intermediate products, performing contract
research for, and in collaboration with, established corporations in downstream
sectors. Collaboration allows DBFs to survive and – in some cases – to pave the way
for subsequent growth. First, collaboration with large companies clearly provides the
financial resources necessary to fund R&D. Second, it provides the access to
organisational capabilities in product development and marketing.139
The latest generations of DBFs (and the new “stars” like Affymax, Incyte and
Celera) were created on the basis of specialisation into radically different new
technologies like genomics, combinatorial chemistry, bioinformatics and what is now
called “platform technologies”. These technologies are essentially research tools and
their developers do not aim to become producers but providers of tools and services
to corporations involved in drug discovery and development. They may thus be able
to sell customised services to a wider range of potential buyers.
Established companies face the opposite problem. While they need to explore,
acquire and develop new knowledge, they have the experience and the structures
necessary to control testing, production and marketing. Confronted with expanding
innovative opportunities, no individual company, irrespective of its size, can consider
originating and controlling the whole relevant knowledge on its own. Thus,
participation into the network of collaboration and in markets for technology
becomes a crucial ingredient for sustained technological and economic
performances.
Assessing the involvement of European firms and institutions in these networks is a
crucial exercise for an evaluation of the state of the European biotechnology
industry.
5.1.3.1. Collaboration across assignees
A review of the multiple assignee patents shows that in biotechnology the share of
patents assigned to multiple assignees is higher than in the other sectors. On the basis
of the 10 000 patent sample, there are 11.2 % biotechnology patents with multiple
assignees against 8.9 % in pharmaceuticals, 5.4 % in organic chemistry, 3.8 % in
polymers, and 3.1  % in materials
93.  Biotechnology appears to be more open to
collaborations. This is still the case when it is compared to pharmaceuticals which is
technologically closer to biotechnology and is a more collaborative field (8.9  %
multiple assignee patents) than the other fields in traditional chemicals. Furthermore,
the evidence suggests that there are no country–specific factors that could account
for this.
5.1.3.2. Collaboration among inventors
Single inventors develop only 18.3 % of the sample’s 97 785 chemical patents, the
remaining (81.7 %) are developed by two or more inventors. Hence, while there are
few patents with multiple assignees, there is a great deal of collaboration among
individuals. These teams of inventors are mostly national. Overall, 90.8 % of the
patents in the sample developed by multiple inventors refer to inventors from the
same country.
To review further the question of the nature and characteristics of research teams in
biotechnology patents a sub–sample of 4 649 patents from the EPO sample of 10 000
patents was selected on the basis of their having at least one inventor located in
Europe. The focus on inventions carried out in Europe is related to the finding that
                                                
93 Overall in our sample of 10 000 patents, the share of single assignees is 93.2 %, for the same as in the
97 785 sample. This is suggestive of the comparability of the statistics computed by using either of the
two samples. In this case, we are using the 10 000 sample because, as we shall see below, we need to
use the information on the country of origins of the ultimate parent of the assignees.140
Europe does not appear to be a very attractive location for biotechnology research. It
is therefore interesting to understand in greater depth the characteristics of the
research located in there.
The data show that single inventors develop 788 patents (16.9  %) and multiple
inventors the remaining (83.1 %). Furthermore, there is no major difference across
countries or sectors in the size of the research team.
Table V.6 reports the average number of supplementary classes of these patents.
Again, this is broken down by sectors and by some leading countries. This table
shows that the biotechnology patents by US assignees that were invented in Europe
have a significantly higher degree of interdisciplinarity compared to the
biotechnology patents by the other countries in the table (Germany, France and the
UK). This suggests that the US assignees in Europe patent research outputs with a
greater degree of generality compared to the others. The difference is particularly
striking with Germany. The average number of IPC classes in German biotechnology
patents invented in Europe is 1.8, compared to 2.7 for the US. The figures for France
and the UK are respectively 2.4 and 2.5.
Table V.6: Mean number of supplementary classes by patent. Inter-country
(country of the assignee) and inter-sectoral differences
Sectors German



































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Our elaboration from the EPO data.
The greater interdisciplinarity of the US biotechnology patents might reflect the fact
that, for US assignees, patents in Europe are inventions patented abroad. Since
patenting abroad is more costly, one may patent abroad only the more important
patents, which are likely to be the more interdisciplinary ones. But Table V.6 shows
that in biotechnology the US patents are relatively more interdisciplinary compared
to other countries than are the US patents in the other sectors. For example, even in
pharmaceuticals, which is the sector closest to biotechnology, the average number of
IPC classes of the US patents is 1.2 as against 1.7 for Germany, 1.2 for France, and141
1.5 for the UK. This suggests that US biotechnology patents invented in Europe may
indeed be broader on average. Trajtenberg (1990) suggests that more general patents
are also more cited, and they are more valuable. If so, this would indicate that US
biotechnology research in Europe play a beneficial role, as US assignees are likely to
perform research that leads to more valuable inventions than European assignees.
Finally, there is evidence that large firms are less involved in interdisciplinary
biotechnology. This is consistent with the existing literature about this industry,
which has stressed that competencies for producing innovations with greater breadth
(and value) are often associated with smaller academic labs or smaller research-
intensive firms (e.g. see Gambardella, 1995). In other words, it is the quality of the
team rather than the size of the organisation that matters in this case. Moreover,
biotechnology appears to be a more internationalised research process and this is
consistent with the view that, as a modern science-based industry, its knowledge
foundations are being developed in different areas on rather “global” basis.
5.1.3.3. Networks of collaborative relations
Table V.7 shows the nationality of origin and development of collaborative
agreements (CA) in biotechnology for selected years. A crucial difference between
Europe and the US becomes immediately apparent. The overwhelming majority of
the biotechnology collaborative projects originate (70.07  %) and are developed
(66.12 %) in the US. However, European biotechnology organisations have gradually
increased their role both as originators (from about 14 % in 1990-94 to 20 % in
1998-00) and as developers (from 12.46 to 21.61 %) of new projects.142
Table V.7: Number of organisations and number of originated
and developed collaborative agreements (CAs),
by nationality
Number of Organizations Number of CAs
EFs DBF s PRO s as originators as developers Nationality
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
1990-1994
EU-15 112 41 36,61 36 32,14 35 31,25 274 14,05 243 12,46
US 496 154 31,05 241 48,59 101 20,36 1 463 75,03 1 459 74,82
Japan 25 23 92,00 1 4,00 1 4,00 65 3,33 84 4,31
Other 93 31 33,33 36 38,71 26 27,96 148 7,59 164 8,41
Total 726 249 34,30 314 43,25 163 22,45 1 950 100,00 1 950 100,00
1995-1997
EU-15 226 89 39,38 95 42,04 42 18,58 510 17,90 553 19,41
US 652 196 30,06 338 51,84 118 18,10 1 989 69,81 1 830 64,23
Japan 47 41 87,23 6 12,77 0 0,00 61 2,14 173 6,07
Other 195 59 30,26 73 37,44 63 32,31 289 10,14 293 10,28
Total 1 120 385 34,38 512 45,71 223 19,91 2 849 100,00 2 849 100,00
1998-2000
EU-15 447 117 26,17 223 49,89 107 23,94 838 20,19 897 21,61
US 1 124 334 29,72 587 52,22 203 18,06 2 819 67,91 2 629 63,33
Japan 81 64 79,01 8 9,88 9 11,11 119 2,87 212 5,11
Others* 313 78 24,92 151 48,24 84 26,84 375 9,03 413 9,95
Total 1 965 593 30,18 969 49,31 403 20,51 4 151 100,00 4 151 100,00
1990-2000
EU-15 785 247 31,46 354 45,10 184 23,44 1 622 18,12 1 693 18,92
US 2 272 684 30,11 1 166 51,32 422 18,57 6 271 70,07 5 918 66,12
Japan 153 128 83,66 15 9,80 10 6,54 245 2,74 469 5,24
Others* 601 168 27,95 260 43,26 173 28,79 812 9,07 870 9,72
Total 3 811 1 227 32,20 1 795 47,10 789 20,70 8 950 100,00 8 950 100,00
Note: *Argentina, Australia, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech
Republic, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, South
Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Yugoslavia.
EFs: established firms; DBFs: dedicated biotechnology firms; PROs: public research organisations.
Source: BID, University of Siena.
In the second half of the 1990s, the number of DBFs rose in Europe but remained
substantially unchanged in the US. However, European DBFs are still not as active in
the networks of division of innovative labour. Age is not the only factor underlying
the lower participation of European DBFs in markets for technology. The
background study contends that the following structural differences between Europe
and the US may affect the collaborative capabilities of DBFs.
•  American DBFs develop a larger share of projects originated by domestic public
research organisations (PROs) and DBFs and by European DBFs than their
European counterparts. In Europe, DBFs tend to be replaced as developers by
established companies. Interestingly enough, the only exception is for projects143
originated by European PROs, which are developed mainly by co-localised DBFs
or by European PROs.
•  European PROs increased their relationships with both European and American
DBFs in the period 1996-2000. On the contrary, US-based PROs collaborate more
and more directly with established companies and act more frequently as
developers of projects originated by DBFs. In general, universities and research
institutes increasingly reach out and collaborate with delocalised partners both as
originators and as developers. European DBFs do not seem to be able to attract
US established pharmaceutical companies as developers of projects originated in
Europe, and they turn in preference to European partners.
•  Only a minority of European DBFs in Europe participates as developers in
collaborative projects originated by other organisations. Established companies
have the lion’s share of bio-pharmaceutical products in Europe.
•  European companies tend to access markets for technologies later on during
product development (clinical research and marketing), while they are less active
in the early stages of research. Product innovation in therapeutic biotechnology is
highly dependent on both the originator and developer capabilities of US
companies. European DBFs, still young and small, do not take part in the division
of innovative labour in product development, particularly with American PROs
and established companies.
•  Finally, PROs in Europe tend to be focused on the generation of new research
opportunities, while they tend to be absent from the downstream stages of product
development.
5.2. Characteristics of the new European biotechnology industry
It was suggested in the previous section that European biotechnology is lagging
significantly behind the US. However, encouraging signals related mainly to the
good performance of some small (mainly northern) European nations and to a recent
impressive increase in the number of DBFs was also stressed. This section examines
the characteristics of European DBFs.
DBFs are widely considered to be the most efficient available organisational solution
for the development of innovative activities in biotechnology:
•  First, DBFs are fundamental organisational devices for exploring an enormous,
quickly expanding and incredibly complex space of new innovative opportunities.
•  Second, they perform a crucial function of transforming fundamental scientific
knowledge into technological and commercially valuable knowledge. They
intermediate in the transfer of knowledge from universities to established large
corporations which cannot be always at the forefront of scientific discovery but
which have the downstream capabilities needed for commercialisation (Orsenigo,
1989; Henderson, Orsenigo and Pisano, 1999).
•  Third, DBFs promote and are crucial agents in the process of division of labour in
innovative activities that emerges in response to the increasingly codified and144
abstract nature of the knowledge bases on which innovations draw (Arora,
Gambardella, 1994; Gambardella, 1995).
5.2.1. The structure of the industry
This section uses data from the Biotechnology Information Databank (BID),
maintained at the University of Siena, which includes 3669 organisations active in
biotechnology. Among them, there are 2092 independent dedicated biotechnology
firms (DBFs). More specifically, there are 1730 core biotechnology firms (according
to the OECD classification) and 362 specialised suppliers. Detailed data for each of
these have been collected.
Graph V.5 shows the number of independent dedicated biotechnology firms in major
European countries at the end of year 2000. The data do not consider public research
organisations, or companies whose main activities are in fields other than
biotechnology, or biotechnology divisions of larger firms. They represent the ‘inner
core’ of the European national systems of innovation in biotechnology. According to
the data collected in BID, Germany leads the league with more than 500 small
independent dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs), followed closely by the UK.
Taken together, Germany and the UK account for about one half of the total number
of DBFs in Europe registered in the database. France ranks third with 343
biotechnology companies, followed by Sweden.































Ernst & Young, Total: 1,570
Note: *Others: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia.
Source: BID, University of Siena.
If one calibrates the number of DBFs using population or GDP numbers, a clear
representation emerges, with Sweden ranked first according to both measures,
followed by Switzerland, Ireland, Finland, and Denmark. The UK, Germany and
France have similar values, while Italy and Spain have the lowest ratios.145
Graph V.6 shows the European biotechnology innovation and production systems in
terms of the types of active organisations. There are important differences in the
composition of the industry across European countries. In particular, the UK differs
from Germany, both because of the high number of divisions of companies focused
on biotechnology and because of the higher number of large firms. Moreover, in the
UK one observes a higher number of non-industrial research institutes in the fields of
molecular biology and biotechnology. In Italy and Spain the number of DBFs is
particularly low when compared to the number of large firms or of divisions of large
firms.





































Established Firms PROs Divisions Independent Biotechnology Firms
Note: *Others: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Russia,
and Slovakia.
Source: BID, University of Siena.
Graph V.7 shows the distribution of currently existing European DBFs by year of
foundation. Peak years of entry were 1997 and 1998. In 1999 and 2000, after a 4–
year period of intense entry, in which the overall number of EU biotechnology firms
almost doubled, the rates of company formation decreased. This slowdown is not
corroborated by the Ernst & Young data. If it were confirmed, it could be similar in
nature to the one observed in the US at the beginning of the Nineties and it could
prefigure a period of stabilisation, consolidation, and selection, with mergers,
acquisitions, and exit offsetting new company formation. As a consequence, the
impact of intense entry on the long–term evolution of the industry is not known, and
the industry seems to be far from any equilibrium configuration.146
Graph V.7: European dedicated biotechnology firms:
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Source: BID, University of Siena.
Table V.8 shows the distribution of currently existing dedicated biotechnology
companies in Europe, by cohorts of entrants. It is clear that there are important
differences in terms of the generational composition of DBFs in major European
countries. Nordic countries like Sweden have experienced a relatively stable pace of
entry of new firms, while in other countries, particularly Germany, the upsurge of the
number of new firms has occurred in the last five years. At present, Germany
accounts for a third of the total number of new European firms (i.e. those which
entered the industry after 1995), followed by UK and France. The three countries,
taken together, account for more than three quarters of the new biotechnology firms









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Graph V.8 shows the size distribution of European DBFs, in December 2000, divided
into classes according to the number of employees. As is evident, most European
DBFs are either micro or small research–intensive firms. Only approximately
10  percent of active European DBFs have more than 50 employees, while the
majority (about 57 %) has less than 20 employees94. It is worth noting that despite
general similarities in the shape of business size distributions, European national
systems of innovation in biotechnology rely on quite different mixtures of small and
medium biotechnology companies. Surprisingly enough, when compared to general
figures about business firm size in manufacturing, the size of French DBFs is well
above the mean for EU–15, while the opposite is true for Sweden. Moreover, while
UK and Germany look similar in terms of shares of micro business units in the total
number of firms active in biotechnology, Germany has a higher proportion of firms
in the middle size range (10 to 50 employees), compared to the UK, which relies
upon a higher number of medium and large DBFs.
Graph V.8: European Dedicated Biotechnology Firms:
















Source: BID, University of Siena.
The sustained flow of entry shown in Graph V.7 has changed the relative importance
of agri–food and pharmaceuticals as areas of application. The share of new DBFs
that entered the agri–food industries declined from 1995, from about 15 % to less
than 5 % in the year 2000; this fall is likely to reflect regulatory factors and growing
public opposition to genetically-modified crops. During this time, the number of
dedicated biopharmaceutical companies rose from 35 % to more than 50 % of the
                                                
94 Presumably, the real number of small biotechnology companies is even higher. In particular, some of
the youngest firms have barely enough people to run early-stage research activities, not revealing
themselves through alliances, venture capitalist, company Internet sites, participation in public
programs, surveys, directories and the like. Moreover, the BID also includes about 40 virtual companies
(0 employees), concentrated mainly in Sweden. Virtual companies have been excluded from the
analyses discussed in this chapter.149
total number of new firms. Thus, the dramatic increase in the number of European
DBFs from 1996 to 2000 reflects, to a large extent, the entry of new DBFs that
entered the industry to exploit the therapeutic application of genomics and new
techniques, such as combinatorial chemistry and bio-informatics, which can be used
to improve and speed up the development of new therapeutic treatments.
Table V.9 summarises the technological profiles of EU DBFs according to broad
areas of interest in biology, chemistry and medicine. It shows the existence of
differences among European countries concerning the areas of specialisation of


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































German biotechnology companies are active mainly in human health care
(therapeutics and diagnostics), Swedish firms concentrate on human and animal
therapeutics, while France, Italy, and Switzerland have a higher proportion of
companies active in agri-food. A large proportion of French and German DBFs
entered the industry, both in pharmaceuticals and agri-food, to explore the
commercial value of recent technological advances at the lowest levels of the
organisation of the living organisms in genomics, proteomics and bioinformatics.
The UK keeps a strong technological basis in cell and tissue engineering, process
biotechnology, instrumentation, and devices. Moreover, new UK DBFs are more
active in combinatorial chemistry and in other general–purpose research techniques
applied to drug discovery and development. Italy’s specialisation is in targeting sub–
cellular organisms, while Swedish companies tend to focus mainly on manufacturing
of biomaterials and on innovative technologies in drug discovery, such as
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, Table V.10 shows the extent to which biotechnology applications and
research technologies are integrated at the firm level in key European countries.
French and British companies have the highest degree of integration between
technologies and applications. The higher level of integration of UK firms could well
reflect a difference in the composition of industry in terms of cohorts of entrants,
since the UK has a higher fraction of early entrant DBFs, which had sufficient time
to implement their technologies in specific domains of application.Conversely,
German firms and a significant fraction of Swedish firms, in particular, tend to be
vertically specialised either in terms of technologies or domains of application.
5.3. Geographical clusters in European biotechnology
5.3.1. Clustering
In the US, biotechnology has been characterised, historically, by a relatively high
concentration of firms, employment and activities in a restricted number of regions,
mainly in San Diego, the Bay Area, Boston, Seattle, New Jersey, the New York
metropolitan area and the Houston area in Texas. Based on this, economists, analysts
and policy–makers have argued that spatial concentration of innovative and
industrial activities is fundamental for successful development of biotechnology. To
this effect, policies have been devised (e.g. the German BioRegio Program) with the
explicit aim of supporting not so much the birth of new DBFs but rather the
development of clusters of biotechnology activities.
Why is such concentration observed? As this is fundamentally a science-based
technology, involving abstract and codified knowledge, it should in principle be
available to everybody. What forces lead to the agglomeration of biotechnology
activities in specific clusters? Different explanations have been suggested.
•  The (partially) tacit nature of knowledge means that personal contacts, imitation
and frequent interactions are necessary for knowledge transmission. These are
clearly possible at lower cost for firms located within the same city or region. The
transmission of tacit knowledge requires mutual trust, a sharing of language and
culture and intense non-business relations are aspects which are made easier by
co-location.
•  Discoveries in this technological area are characterised by high degrees of natural
excludability, i.e. techniques for their replication are not widely known and
anyone wishing to build on new knowledge must gain access to the research team
or laboratory setting having that know–how. In these circumstances, inventor–
scientists tend to enter into contractual arrangements with existing firms or start
their own firm in order to extract the supranormal returns from the fruits of their
intellectual contribution. And they tend to do so within commuting distance of
their laboratories.
•  However, empirical evidence suggests that there might be a threshold effect: local
sources of knowledge are key in determining success in the development of new
products and processes only in areas with a large accumulation of knowledge
(Silicon Valley). Innovations by firms located in other areas depend on distant
relationships with universities and other high–technology firms (suppliers and
customers) located elsewhere, especially in urban centres.154
Trying to draw some conclusions from this discussion, it would appear that
clustering might be the outcome of different factors, but mainly:
–  the existence of a strong critical mass of scientific knowledge, in absolute
terms: in other words, excellence in scientific research is a basic precondition
for attracting innovative activities. Where this is lacking, firms (incumbents
and/or prospective entrepreneurs) might look for other locations for tapping the
relevant knowledge. Moreover, diversity is also important. Insofar as
innovation rests on the integration of different fragments of knowledge, the
presence of a diversified scientific base becomes a key issue.
–  The existence of a strong and diversified industrial base, with accumulated
capabilities and organisational structures enabling them to actually participate
in the network of cognitive and social relationships that are necessary to get
access to, absorb and integrate the new knowledge and, on these bases, to
engage in successful innovative activities.
–  The existence of specific and often formal organisational devices (including
markets for know-how) that allow flows of knowledge to take place.
5.3.2. Geographical concentration of biotechnology in Europe: Evidence from patent data
Table V.11 shows the regional distribution of the 4 649 patents invented in Europe
from our sample of 10  000 chemical patents and lists the top 20 among the
146 European regions
95.
The top 20 regions (13.7 % of the total number of regions) account for 77.5 % of the
sample of chemical patents invented in Europe. The top 10 regions (6.8 % of the
total) host 59.5  % of these patents. The distribution of chemical patents across
European regions is highly concentrated
96.
                                                
95 Based on the Eurostat classification at the NUTS1 and NUTS2 level.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There are many German regions among the top 20, ranging from five in
biotechnology to nine in pharmaceuticals. This is consistent with the well–known
leadership of Germany in chemicals, although the smaller number of German regions
among the top 20 regions in biotechnology confirms earlier remarks about its lower
specialisation in this field. Other studies show that, in general, many of the most
innovative European regions are in Germany (Paci and Usai, 1998). Overall, 52 % of
the patents invented in the top 20 regions were invented in Germany, followed by
France (with 13.8 % of the patents in the top 20 regions), the UK (13.8  %), the
Netherlands (5.3 %) and Italy (4.6 %).
Although the data in Table V.11 show that patenting concentrates geographically in
all five chemical branches, biotechnology shows the least geographic concentration.
In the sample, the top 20 regions account for 68.6 % of the biotechnology patents
invented in Europe. There are some regions that appear in all five listings in the
top  20 positions. These are South–East England, Île de France, Bayern, Hessen,
West-Netherland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Baden-Württemberg, Vlaams Gewest and
Rhône-Alpes. There are other regions, such as Rheinland-Pfalz and Sachsen, which
are in the top 20 in all the chemical sectors, except in biotechnology.
There are also regions that are ranked in the top 20 in biotechnology, but that are not
among the top 20 in any of the other four chemical fields. This suggests a peculiarity
of biotechnology within the overall chemical sector, and in particular that
biotechnology is a technology which facilitates the entry of new actors. Specifically,
it is opening up opportunities for regions that have not been active in developing
innovations in the traditional branches of the chemical sector, including
pharmaceuticals. The new regions in our top 20 for biotechnology are Københavns in
Denmark, Uusimaa in Finland, Stockholm in Sweden, and the area around Madrid in
Spain. This suggests that biotechnology offers opportunities for new entries in
technologically dynamic fields.
5.3.3. Clusters of biotechnology activities in Europe
Data on firms and research centres in the BID database permit identification of the
principal biotechnology clusters in Europe. These are presented in the detailed
Annex-Graphs V.1 to V.6. The data show that a process of clustering is taking place
in Europe where a small number of local clusters are capturing a dominant majority
of biotechnology firms and of public research organisations.
Some of these clusters (i.e. Oxford, Cambridge, Munich and Stockholm) are older
and can rely upon sound research background and high international reputation,
coupled with a critical mass of both young and established spin–off companies and
international contacts. Other biotechnology clusters – the Medicon Valley between
Copenhagen and Lund, the German bio-regions of Rhine/Neckar and Rhineland, and
French districts – are younger. They took off during the 1990s, mainly thanks to a
supportive policy environment, availability of public and private finance, new
infrastructures, the presence of large companies active in related downstream
industries and institutes of research in biomolecular biology, biomedical sciences and
biochemistry. Biotechnology activities in Germany, UK, France, Sweden and
Switzerland are concentrated in a handful of clusters. Apparently, most of the factors
that contribute to the growth of the national systems of innovation and production in157
biotechnology are local in nature. Annex Graphs V.1 to V.5 provide a descriptive
atlas of biotechnology regions in Europe.
•  In the UK, British DBFs are clustered in East Anglia (Cambridge), south-east
England (Oxfordshire, Greater London, Surrey), and Central Scotland – see
Annex Graph V.2. In particular, most of the activities around the Oxford and
Cambridge campuses as well as within the City of London are to be found within
a radius of 10 kilometres. In addition to the university, Oxford includes other
prestigious research organisations and hospitals (John Radcliffe Hospital, AEA
Technology, MRC Radiobiology Institute, and Wellcome Trust Human Genetics
Center). Also, a number of well-known Oxford spin–offs are located along the
A34 corridor from Oxford to Didcot (i.e. Oxford GlycoSciences, Oxford
Asymmetry, Powderject Pharmaceuticals).
•  Around the university campus in Cambridge are located other leading institutes
(Laboratory of Molecular Biology, the Babraham Institute, the Sanger Centre, and
the European Bioinformatics Institute) as well as 27 % of UK DBFs with a large
variety of technological and business profiles.
•  A large variety of actors – public research organisations (Imperial College,
Medical Research Council, University College), research hospitals (Guy’s and St
Thomas’ Hospital), venture capitalists, headquarters of the main pharmaceutical
and chemical enterprises and new biotechnology firms – are located in London.
•  On 20 November 1996, the German Federal Ministry for Education, Science,
Research and Technology announced the three winners of the BioRegio contest.
Munich, Rhine/Neckar and Rhineland received an extra DM 50 million of federal
funding over the next five years and at least the same amount from industry. Also
as a consequence of this program, German DBFs tend to be located in Bayern,
Baden–Württenberg, Rheinland-Pfalz, Nordrhein–Westfalen, and Berlin (see
Annex Graph V.3). Many of the new DBFs benefited from the BioRegio program
and located their activities close to leading institutes of research. The key Swiss
clusters are Basel and Zurich. All these clusters emerged in the last five years,
thanks to both strong public and private support and world–class local research
institutes, particularly in small molecule discovery and computational chemistry.
•  Annex Graph V.4 shows the high concentration of French biotechnology firms in
Paris, the second largest cluster in terms of number of DBFs in Europe after
Cambridge (Mytehlka, Pellegrin, 2001). According to BID data, about 30 % of
French biotechnology firms are located in Paris trailed by a group of French
regions (Alsace, Rhone–Alpes, Midi Pyrennees, Auvergne, Bretagne and
Aquitaine) that have been catching up in the last five years (see France Biotech,
2000). Here again, in a 10 km
2 area one can find a heterogeneous set of both
public and private biotechnology organisations.
•  Finally, Annex Graph V.5 shows two large Nordic clusters. The Novum Biopark
in Stockholm is closely related to the Karolinska Institute Complex, which has a
long tradition of excellence in medical and biological fields. The southern one is
called Medicon Valley and grew up between Copenhagen and Lund–Malmö,
especially after the construction of the bridge between Denmark and Sweden.
Almost all biotechnology firms in Sweden are located in four major regions:
Stockholm-Uppsala, Skåne - which is the southern region including Lund and158
Malmö- Gothenburg and Umeå (Vinnova, 2000), while in Denmark they are
highly concentrated in the Sjælland Island.
•  Other fast-growing clusters are in Finland (Helsinki, Turku, Tampere, Kuopio,
Oulu), in the Netherlands (Zuid-Holland Region) and in Lombardia (Milan).
This data review suggests two remarks. First, clustering would seem to be strongly
related to the presence of heterogeneous and interconnected prestigious research
institutions. And, secondly, the main clusters are not simply characterised by dense
internal or local relations, but also by the ability to establish strong and varied
external ties with other clusters.
European clusters such as Cambridge, Oxford and Karolinska show a remarkable
degree of organisational heterogeneity and internal interconnectivity, comparable to
that which characterises the most important clusters in the US. The Swedish
collaborative network presented in Annex Graph V.6 shows the central role of the
Karolinska complex (Karolinska Institute and KaroBio) in the middle between the
Astra and Pharmacia stars of international contacts. The most important cluster of
Swedish biotechnology firms around Karolinska is brought into closer connection by
diverse organisations located outside Sweden. The density of the Swedish national
innovation network is greatly increased by the inclusion of diverse organisations
from other geographical locations. Moreover, the Swedish picture emphasises the
central role that small science–based firms can play in reaching out to other areas.
This model suggests that successful systems of innovation in biotechnology appear to
grow from “old” regional clusters, developed around the strength of scientific
expertise, the integrative capabilities of established pharmaceutical companies, and
the dynamic role of small firms. These clusters have become over time both
internally denser and much more outward–oriented.
In the second model of EU clusters (many French and Germans regions) networking
is not yet developed to the same extent. They seem to lack interdisciplinary teams
and the connections across stages of the R&D process that dense webs of local
relations among hospitals, university labs and firms make possible. These
difficulties, together with the centralisation and bureaucratisation of some of the
relevant evaluation and selection processes, could constitute an inherent element of
fragility for some of the younger clusters in continental Europe.
The tendency towards clustering is accompanied by a parallel process of increasing
openness of the original clusters, a process also noted in the US. Recent trends
suggest a combination of an increasing number of collaborations and a decreasing
proportion of local connections (Owen-Smith, Riccaboni, Pammolli, Powell, 2001).
5.4. Institutional factors affecting Europe’s industrial competitiveness in
biotechnology
The commercial development of European biotechnology, as already indicated
previously, is lagging significantly behind the US. Despite encouraging signs of
dynamism – especially by the small Northern European countries – and a wave of
entries of new DBFs – especially in Germany – innovative activities remain far
below US levels. European companies make significant use of American research
while US firms do not seem to make as much use of European research. The new159
European DBFs are much smaller than their American counterparts, much less active
in the global network of collaborative relations and in the markets for technology,
and mainly present in platform technologies.
One explanation for this may be that US firms enjoy first–mover advantages. In
technologies where innovative activities are often characterised by increasing
returns, first–mover advantages are an important phenomenon and are likely to
provide long–lasting and difficult-to-erode leadership. European DBFs may have
simply been pre-empted by their American counterparts, while the excellence of the
American scientific research system has attracted financial and human resources
from all parts of the world, further strengthening the US leadership in biotechnology.
However, other variables have likely played a role. With biotechnology being
fundamentally science–based and characterised by rapid innovation, it is possible
that, at least partially, first–mover advantages may not be sustainable. Under these
circumstances, catching–up and forging ahead – at the firm and country level – might
be possible.
This section reviews some major institutional determinants of industrial
competitiveness in biotechnology that might have hindered the development in
Europe. In particular, the role of the following variables, known to contribute to
competitiveness and growth in biotechnology and in the life sciences, will be
examined:
•  The size and the structure/organisation of the biomedical education and research
systems;
•  Basic institutions governing labour markets for skilled researchers and managers,
as well as corporate governance and finance;
•  Intellectual property rights and patent law, with particular reference to their role in
the functioning of markets for technologies.
5.4.1. The structure of the research system
5.4.1.1. Funding
Biomedical research is expensive and public money always played an important role
in supporting this field. With the advent of biotechnology the cost of research
increased further, thus making a strong support even more necessary in maintaining
high quality competitive research.
Molecular biology was developed predominantly in the US and in the UK, even
though significant research groups were active in many other European countries.
After World War II, US support for research in life sciences literally exploded.
Public funding of biomedical research in the post–war period increased dramatically
in Europe as well, but total spending remained significantly lower than in the US.
The sheer size of resources devoted to biomedical research in the US in the post–war
era explains much of the American leadership in life sciences.
Table V.12 provides an indication of the relative importance of public funding for
biotechnology in OECD countries other than the US. In absolute PPP$ terms
Germany spends the most on biotechnology, followed by the UK and France. The160
median contribution of government budgets dedicated to biotechnology is 3.5  %,
with a considerable spread, ranging from 0.4 % in Italy to 13.8 % in Belgium, 10.1 %
in Canada and 8.1 % in Finland.
Table V.12: Public funding of Research and









Austria 16.8 1 146.5 1.5
Belgium 181.7 1 314.0 13.8
Canada 261.4 2 581.0 10.1
Denmark 45.2 945.6 4.8
Finland 94.5 1 165.0 8.1
France 560.0 12 683.1 4.4
Germany 1 048.2 15 595.7 6.7
Greece 6.5 430.9 1.5
Iceland 0.9 68.5 1.3
Ireland 15.0 229.9 6.5
Italy 32.1 7 329.6 0.4
Netherlands 78.0 3 069.9 2.5
Norway
1 26.8 - 32.2 880.3 3 - 3.7
Portugal 19.2 781.9 2.5
Spain 15.5 3 202.6 0.5
Sweden
2 65.6 1 795.2 3.7
Switzerland
2 16.4 1 379.7 1.2
United Kingdom 705.1 9 055.7 7.8
Notes
1. These data are national estimates, hence the range.
2. GBOARD has been estimated.
Source: OECD, based on data from the European Commission (Inventory of public biotechnology
R&D programmes in Europe, 2000), Eurostat, Statistics Canada, and national sources.
In the US, the funding of human health research has been traditionally attributed to
the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland. Every year the NIH Grants
Office deals with thousands of applications from all over the World, which are
evaluated with a peer- review system. In 1998 the budget for funding extramural
research (NIH has is own direct funding system for intramural research which is
about 40 % of the extramural budget) was of $ 8 billion. President Clinton took the
commitment to double this budget for the year 2003. Thus, for the fiscal year 2000,
NIH invested about $ 13.5 billion to fund 50 000 research projects world-wide.161
On the other hand, the total budget of the 5
th  EU Framework Programme
(1998-2002) is of about € 15 billion, comparable to the NIH budget for one year. Of
this total, the amount of money dedicated to the Programme Quality of Life is
€ 2.4 billion. One must consider that this Programme is only partially devoted to
biotechnology. The first prevision for the total budget of the 6
th Framework
Programme (2002-2006) is of € 17.5, i.e. exactly equal to the NIH budget for the
year 2003 at the present exchange rate.
The total EU budget for research is only 4-5 % of the total research budget of all
European nations together. The EU strategy has focused on supporting co-operative
projects among EU Member States, the exchange of researchers, and the promotion
of quality research in the most disadvantaged EU Member States. Recently, the
European Commission introduced the new European Research Area concept and
proposed a number of very large multi-centric projects for the next 6
th Framework
Programme, such as the Integrated Projects, the Centres of Excellence or the Clinical
Trial Platform. This last project is aimed at supporting the development of new
interventions against HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in developing countries.
5.4.1.2. The institutional structure of research
The institutional structure of research – and of biomedical research in particular –
evolved differently in continental Europe compared to the US (and partly to the UK).
•  The structure of the funding system and the strategies of the funding agencies are
crucially important. In the US, most of the funding is administered through the
National Institute of Health (NIH). There is substantial integration between the
production of biological knowledge concerning the nature and mechanisms of
human diseases, clinical research, medical practice, and the discovery and
development of new therapeutic treatments; and significant support towards
fundamental science in universities and public research centres, widely
disseminated through publication in the refereed literature. Moreover, the US
system is characterised by a variety of sources of funding and selection
mechanisms, which complement the role of the NIH and act according to different
allocation principles (see Owen-Smith et al., 2001) Overall, the US research
system achieves efficiency through competition among research units providing
room, at the same time, for diversity and institutional flexibility.
•  In Europe, funding tends to be administered mainly at national level, with strongly
differentiated approaches and wide differences across countries. This is likely to
have hindered the development of a critical mass, especially in smaller countries.
In many cases, resources have either been spread over a large number of “small”
laboratories, or they have been excessively concentrated in the few available
centres of excellence. Funding from the various European programmes has only
partially changed the situation. The absolute size and the higher degree of
integration of the US research system, as opposed to the fragmented collection of
national systems in Europe, amount to a fundamental difference.
5.4.1.3. The organisation and structure of universities
The US system is highly decentralised. Even public universities rely on diverse
sources for funds, including state and national governments, foundations and162
corporate supporters, tuition revenues, and alumni gifts. Private universities,
especially elite ones, are also supported by generous endowments.
The organisation of research and teaching has characteristics that facilitate flexibility
and decentralisation but also integration of research. In the US and the UK, academic
departments have long been the main organisational entities, while in Europe a single
professor dominates. The departmental structure makes it easier to respond to the
emergence of new disciplines, like computer sciences and biotechnology, both by
integrating them into curricula in conventional programmes and/or by creating new
departments and programmes.
It is possible to argue that the European model is characterised a high degrees of
division of labour and specialisation between teaching and research institutions,
whereas in the US the dominant model of post-graduate students being exposed to
and trained to undertake scientific research within teams made up by students and
professors within departments has been a more integrated one. In Europe, this
separation might have had negative effects on both the quality of research and on the
ability of academic institutions to interact with industry.
Despite national distinguishing characteristics, the structure of research systems in
Europe is profoundly different from the Anglo–Saxon model.
•  First, in Europe financing is considerably more centralised and, consequently, it
entails more hierarchical control.
•  Second, research institutions are far less interdisciplinary and flexible. In
Germany, for example, a number of the highly prestigious Max Planck institutes
are organised hierarchically around a single field, such as biochemistry, genetics,
or immunology.
•  Third, the integration of teaching with research has progressed far less than in the
US (and, to some extent, the UK). Ph.D degrees are a relatively recent innovation
in many continental European countries, and research has tended to be far more
removed from teaching than in the US. Thus, for example, the diffusion of
molecular biology into the general training in many European countries is a
relatively recent phenomenon as compared to the US, and it has become only
recently a standard part of the curricula of pharmacologists, pathologists and
medical consultants, and plant biologists.
5.4.1.4. Diversity and integration among publicly-funded research organisations (PROs)
The research systems in the US and Europe are organised in qualitatively different
ways and, hence, any comparison must be sensitive to differences in multiple
dimensions.
Large and densely interconnected networks composed of tight, repeated
interconnections among a diverse set of PROs characterise the US. Elite universities
(Harvard, MIT), research institutes (the Dana-Farber Cancer Center), and hospitals
(Brigham and Women’s and Massachusetts General) play central roles in innovative
collaborations both within Boston and across US regions. In contrast, for example,163
the French and German national clusters show organisational homogeneity, do not
include hospitals and have no identified universities97. The UK has a somewhat
higher degree of organisational diversity, reflected in the presence of both
government and non–profit research and funding agencies. Closely–knit regional
networks such as those found in Boston help account for the global centrality of
American PROs. Connections across US regions linking geographically dispersed
universities to the National Institutes of Health illustrate a public research system
that also reaches across regions and organisational forms.
The evidence suggests that national specialisation in Europe falls along scientific
lines. In the US, there is abundant regional clustering but, unlike in the European
case, agglomeration is not driven by scientific specialisation. Points of excellence
develop in both the US and European systems, but in Europe those clusters are
limited to narrower specialities and specific nations. The US represents a very
different profile, characterised by diverse, substantively generalist research
organisations connected both within and across key regional clusters
98 (see Owen-
Smith et al. 2001).
This difference in the science base is critical, implying that increases in scale alone
will not alter the focus of R&D efforts, because organisations typically engage in
local searches, and would continue to patent in those areas in which they are most
skilled. In essence, one reason for greater integration across and within US regions is
the scientific overlap among generalist patentors. Alterations in the scale of patenting
activity without corresponding shifts in this division of labour will not make the
European system resemble its American counterpart. Instead, mere increases in scale
might deepen specialisation and, perhaps, heighten fragmentation among European
national research systems.
5.4.2. Industry–university relations
A further set of factors that explain the US advantage relate to the ability and
willingness of the American academic system to interact with the industrial and
commercial world. The key role acquired by scientific knowledge for technological
innovation manifested itself in an unprecedented intensification of both industry–
university ties and in the direct involvement of academic institutions and scientists in
commercial activities. While both phenomena are not new, since the mid-1970s the
drive towards an increasing commercialisation of the results of research accelerated
dramatically, and patenting and licensing activities on the part of universities started
to soar. The number of universities having established Offices for Technology
Management also increased from 25 in 1980 to 200 in 1990. The creation of spin-
offs became a distinct and crucial phenomenon of the American academic system.
Increasingly, universities were assuming and were asked to assume the role of direct
engines of (local) economic growth.
The emergence of the entrepreneurial university and the specific forms this process
took in the US depend strongly on some general characteristics of the social,
institutional and legal context, including the attitudes towards intellectual property
                                                
97 Scientists at the CNRS or Max Plancks may well have university laboratories, but the government
institute is identified as their primary affiliation on the patents.
98 For greater detail on the correspondence analysis used in this section, see the background study
“Innovation and Competitiveness in Biotechnology: a European Perspective”, op. cit.164
rights and the availability of venture capital. There is high mobility between
academia and the commercial world – and, more generally, there is an active labour
market for scientists, technicians, and managerial experts – to a much more
developed extent than in Europe. American university professors often participate in
various ways in commercial activities, either retaining their academic affiliation or
migrating back and forth between different affiliations. An alliance between
scientific, organisational and entrepreneurial capabilities (together with a favourable
attitude towards the establishment and enforcement of robust intellectual property
rights) constitutes an essential pre–condition for growth in industry–university
relations. It is possible to argue that a high degree of integration between research
and teaching tends to favour further linkages, easier communication and more
intense flows of knowledge and people between academia and the business world.
Conversely, the ties, bureaucracy, and hierarchies of its scientific institutions, at both
the national and the European levels, strongly discourage labour mobility between
academia and industry. As discussed by Soskice (1997), and Zucker, Darby and
Brewer (1997), the organisation of labour and company law in Europe, combined
with the organisational strategies of most large companies and with the structure of
the academic labour market, constrains the development of US–style active labour
markets, and makes it harder for companies to “hire and fire” personnel or rapidly
cut non–performing assets. Moreover, though there is often some lateral movement
between firms very early in a person’s career, the vast majority of European
employees build their careers within one firm and university.
Correspondingly, the structure of decision–making, remuneration, and career paths
within firms and universities differ fundamentally from the US or UK model. Career
paths, especially in universities, tend to be well-defined, incremental, and based on
rank hierarchies. This structure works quite well in industries dependent on long–
term investment strategies in relatively stable technologies, characterised by the
diffusion of deep skills throughout the firm, but it creates fundamental obstacles to
the creation of high–risk technology firms.
To the extent that innovation depends on the flow of knowledge between university
labs, start–up research firms and large firms, joint research projects and strategic
alliances facilitate this exchange of knowledge. Conversely, if the labour market does
not support extensive lateral career mobility between academia and firms, these
network externalities would be difficult to sustain (Soskice, 1997)
99.
In continental Europe, university–industry relationships have developed much more
slowly
100 and even now – despite considerable progress – the situation remains
unsatisfactory. Integration of research and teaching and collaboration with industry
has been more frequent in the case of engineering schools and in selected disciplines
in particular countries (chemistry in Germany). Unlike in the US, where universities
have gradually extended their functions (an integrated model centred on universities),
                                                
99 There is interesting evidence in this respect that mobility of researchers between different institutional
settings enhances both scientific research and commercial performance, not only in the US but also in
European countries (Gittelman, 2000).
100 More detailed information on the modalities and practices characterising industry-science relations in
Europe can be found in the forthcoming report “Benchmarking Industry-Science relations – the role of
framework conditions” cosponsored by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Economy and Labour and the
European Commission.165
continental Europe has leaned towards the development of various types of
specialised institutions for technology transfer which act as intermediaries between
research and industry (the institutional specialisation model).
Thus, there have been a large number of initiatives all across Europe aimed at
establishing stronger links between industry and universities and at encouraging a
more entrepreneurial attitude by universities. In practice, policies have been targeted
mainly towards the setting up of specific devices to manage technology transfer, like
science and technology parks or other such agencies, but their performance has so far
been mixed.
5.4.2.1. A European paradox?
Despite the presence of centres of absolute excellence, scientific research in Europe
seems to lag behind the US. If this were the case, it could have created a vicious
circle, with a significant drain of human and financial resources from Europe to the
US that contributes to further strengthen the American advantage.
There is now significant qualitative and quantitative evidence indicating that the
R&D productivity of large firms, as well as the rates of formation of new firms, are
highly correlated with the strength of universities and other research institutions in
the underlying sciences (Ward and Dranove, 1995; Cockburn and Henderson, 1996;
Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1997; Swann and Prevezer, 1996).
However, there is less agreement about the existence of a direct link between the
strength of the local science base and industrial and commercial performance. For
example, the UK has been a leading location for a disproportionate share of the main
research breakthroughs in biotechnology in the second half of 1900s, but much less
so in the industrial application of such discoveries (Cooke, 2001). More generally, it
is widely believed that scientific, but not industrial, research in Europe fares much
better compared to the US – the so-called European paradox. In this view,
competitive advantages cannot be explained by the strength of the local scientific
base, since academic science is rapidly published and thus rapidly available across
the world. Differential performance in industrial biotechnology is more likely
explained by different institutional mechanisms favouring the rapid translation of
scientific research into industrial R&D.
There is little empirical evidence in favour of or against the European paradox. There
is some evidence that the formation of university spin–offs and the emergence of
biotechnology clusters seems to depend less on the existence of academic research,
as such, than on the presence of “star scientists” and cutting-edge research (Zucker,
Darby and Brewer, 1997). Similarly, there is substantial – albeit largely anecdotal –
evidence suggesting that successful experiences in industry–university ties in Europe
take place in areas where concentration of world-class research in different fields of
biotechnology is available (and where the need for explicit supporting policies is, as
a consequence, less severe).
These observations support the notion that the absolute quality and “quantity” of
scientific research and the coupling of scientific and organisational capabilities are
essential pre–conditions for subsequent developments in industry–university
relations. Indeed, the development of an entrepreneurial function within universities
in the US has not substituted their traditional functions. Rather, the entrepreneurial166
function appears to be strongly complementary to and integrated with the other
functions, primarily teaching. The US experience would seem to suggest, in this
respect, that linkages with industry simply cannot develop without the constant
mediation of teaching, as a stimulator of demand for relationships and an important
source of absorptive capabilities within firms. In Europe, the presence of
intermediary institutions might in some cases have paradoxically increased the
distance between university and industry, introducing an additional layer in the
relationship instead of favouring the development of organisational and integrative
capabilities within firms and within academic institutions.
5.4.3. Financial markets and venture capital
The availability of venture capital is commonly invoked as a fundamental ingredient
of American leadership in biotechnology. Clearly, venture capital played an
enormous role in fuelling the growth of the new biotechnology firms. Venture capital
is a long–standing institution in the US financial and innovative system. It was
already active at the beginning of the 20th century and emerged as a vibrant industry
with the electronic revolution in the 1960s. By contrast, in many European countries,
the lack of developed capital markets for technology firms creates important barriers
for prospective venture capitalists. It is worth recalling how venture capital plays a
crucial role in bridging and complementing different constituents and roles within the
system of biotechnological innovation.
Venture capital provides first of all finance to prospective academic entrepreneurs.
Second, venture capital not only provides finance but also-and perhaps more
importantly-managerial advice, organisational capabilities and “signals” to
prospective investors about the potential of the new company. Contrary to the
conventional stereotype of American financial institutions, venture capitalists are
characterised by an extremely strong “hands-on” and “long-run” approach towards
the companies they are financing. A significant number of doctorate holders in
biology end up working in venture capital firms, and venture capitalists have to be
part of the same network of conferences, literature, scientists, etc. Thus, venture
capital mixes technology, academia and finance.
Lack of a developed venture capital market has restricted the start–up of
biotechnology firms outside the US. In Europe, and despite various forms of
intervention at the national and even local level aiming at fostering its formation,
venture capital has only very recently begun to develop.
Nevertheless, in Europe there have been many other sources of funds (usually
through government programmes) available to prospective start–ups. Moreover,
survey results suggest that financial constraints did not constitute the main obstacle
to establishing new biotechnology firms in Europe (Senker, 1998). Although venture
capital played a critical role in the founding of US biotechnology firms,
collaborations between the new firms and the larger established firms provided a
potentially even more important source of capital. This raises the question of why
prospective European start–ups could not turn to established pharmaceutical firms as
a source of capital. A speculative but plausible answer could be that European
companies tended to collaborate more with US biotechnology firms rather than167
European firms
101. Even in the absence of other institutional barriers to
entrepreneurial ventures, start–ups in Europe might have been crowded out by the
large number of US–based firms anxious to trade non–US marketing rights for
capital (Henderson, Orsenigo, Pisano, 1999). Given the number of American DBFs
in search of capital, European firms interested in commercialising biotechnology had
little incentive to invest in local biotechnology firms.
Finally, the slow development of European venture capital for biotechnology could
reflect less the inability or unwillingness of European financial institutions to fund
new ventures and more a scarcity of “good” projects on the part of the industry. In
partial support for this interpretation, it is worth recalling that several initiatives by
both domestic and foreign investors to launch venture capital funds were attempted
in Europe during the 1990s. Many of these funds, if anything, ended up investing in
new biotechnology companies outside Europe. Conversely, foreign venture capital
firms have funded some of the few experiences of successful European DBFs. Thus,
the delayed development of venture capital in Europe seems to depend less on the
lack of investors and funds than on the paucity of supply of promising start–ups
based on solid scientific research.
The role of venture capital markets in sustaining small, young high–tech firms that
do not meet strict creditworthiness institution criteria for funding new projects
remains crucial in Europe. Recent evidence suggests that European venture capital
markets are increasingly active in supporting small biotechnology companies in their
innovative efforts. Yet, some potential drawbacks still persist at the interface
between public and private financial markets and institutions, which need to be better
co-ordinated for defining coherent incentive schemes for risk–taking innovative
entrepreneurs.
Table V.13 shows that, during the period of unprecedented expansion in the
European biotechnology industry (1996-2000), venture capitalists did not change
their capital allocation from less research–intensive sectors toward biotechnology.
While total investment rose from about € 6900 million to € 35000 million, most of it
is devoted to traditional sectors (industrial machinery and equipment, fashion, leisure
products) and to expansion and leverage buyouts. The main recipient of higher early–
stage investment (seed and start–up financing, about 12 % more in 1996-2000) has
been the ICT sectors. US data (Science and Engineering Indicators, 2000) for 1996-
1998 show that the share of venture capital devoted to US biotechnology has been
more than double, ranging from 6.1 % to 8.1 % as has the share of seed investment,
which varied between 3.8  % (1996) and 4.6  % (1997)
102. Moreover, unlike in
Europe, the period 1996-98 was one of stability for the US biotechnology industry,
and the proportion of venture capital disbursements to DBFs was far from its
historical 1992 peak. As a result, despite recent growth, European DBFs have
continued to attract only ¼ of the global venture capital investments in biotechnology
during the last five years (Ernst & Young, 2001).
                                                
101 Indeed, most NBFs’ strategies emphasised licensing product rights outside the US to foreign partners.
Thus, to an even greater extent than many established US pharmaceutical firms, European firms were
well positioned as partners for US NBFs.
102 Original data provided by the Venture Economics Investor Service, Newark, NJ. Since data on US and
European venture capital come from different sources, they are not strictly comparable (for a tentative
comparison see National Science Foundation, 1998).168
Table V.13: European venture Capital disbursements,
by sector and financing stage, 1996–2000 (€1000)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
By ector
182.355 250.348 346.354 643.838 1.017.185 Biotech
2,70 % 2,60 % 2,40 % 2,60 % 2,90 %
1.347.926 2.306.820 4.026.917 6.418.215 10.976.494 Hi-Tech
19,60 % 23,90 % 27,80 % 25,60 % 31,40 %
Total 6.878.646 9.654.942 14.460.781 25.115.694 34.985.753
By stage
68.992 85.137 169.271 467.536 819.680 Seed
1,0 % 0,9 % 1,2 % 1,9 % 2,3 %
375.430 625.953 1.468.511 2.771.872 5.843.723 Start-up
5,5 % 6,5 % 10,2 % 11,0 % 16,7 %
2.712.015 3.375.956 4.334.539 7.432.678 12.986.306 Expansion
40,0 % 35,0 % 30,0 % 29,6 % 37,1 %
481.014 733.017 1.078.675 1.186.228 930.092 Replacement Capital
7,1 % 7,6 % 7,5 % 4,7 % 2,7 %
3.150.195 4.834.879 7.409.785 13.257.380 14.405.952 Buyout
46,4 % 50,1 % 51,2 % 52,8 % 41,2 %
Total 6.787.646 9.654.942 14.460.781 25.115.694 34.985.753
Source: EVCA (2001).
The unique exception to this general trend within the EU appears to be Germany
103.
Germany’s financial support has favoured biotechnology and start-up investments.
France ranks second both in terms of total investment in biotechnology and of its
share in early–stage financing, followed by the UK. French and German venture
capitalists are playing an important role in supporting the rapid growth of their
national systems of innovation in biotechnology. They are likely to start a phase of
selection and buyouts among the vast population of new European biotechnology
firms and to complement public start–up initiatives by providing financing to select
growing biotechnology companies. However, the unbalanced distribution of venture
                                                
103 For greater detail on the correspondence analysis used in this section see the background study
“Industrial Competitiveness in Biotechnology: a European Perspective”, op. cit.169
capital investments towards American early–stage biotechnology companies could
represent a structural weakness in Europe for a considerable length of time.
5.4.4. The regulation of intellectual property rights (IPR) in biotechnology
One important factor contributing to the growth of biotechnology in the US has been
the recognition and enforcement of strong intellectual property rights. The
establishment of clearly-defined property rights has played an important role in the
explosion of new firms since, by definition, few firms had complementary assets that
enabled them to appropriate returns from the new science in the absence of strong
patent rights. In the early years of biotechnology, considerable confusion surrounded
the conditions under which patents could be obtained. Research in genetic
engineering was on the borderline between basic and applied science, conducted
primarily in universities or otherwise publicly funded, and the degree to which it was
appropriate to patent results of such research became almost immediately the subject
of controversy
104.
5.4.4.1. IPRs in biotechnology in Europe
By adopting Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and Council on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnology Inventions
105, after intensive and lengthy
discussions, the EU equipped itself with a common set of principles regarding the
granting of biotechnology patents. However, in spite of this political commitment,
only four of the fifteen Member States have adopted the necessary legislation so far..
Most European national legislation did not explicitly address some of the most
controversial problems in the regulation of IPRs in biotech. The dominant situation
was one in which national legislation did not include, in general, legal principles that
prohibit the granting of patents on living matter, but at the same time it did not offer
definitions and general principles, much less specific guidelines, to manage the most
controversial problems. At the same time, biotechnological inventions were de facto
patented in most countries.
According to an OECD study on patenting practices in 22 Member States
106 all
reporting countries allowed patentability without exceptions for a large variety of
                                                
104 Millstein and Kohler's groundbreaking discovery -- hybridoma technology -- was never patented, while
Stanford University filed a patent for Boyer and Cohen's process in 1974. Boyer and Cohen renounced
their own rights to the patent but were nevertheless strongly criticised for having being instrumental in
patenting what was considered to be a basic technology. Similarly, growing tension emerged between
publishing research results versus patenting them. Whilst the norms of the scientific community and the
search for professional recognition had long stressed rapid publication, patent laws prohibited the
granting of a patent to an already published discovery. In the second place, the law surrounding the
possibility of patenting life-formats and procedures relating to the modification of life forms was not
defined. This issue involved a variety of problems (see OTAF, 1984), but essentially boiled down, first,
to whether living entities could be patented at all; and, second, to the scope of the claims that could be
granted
 to such a patent (Merges and Nelson, 1994). The Bayh–Dole act of 1980 greatly facilitated
university patenting and licensing, but the emergence of the industry–university connection depended
very greatly on the revolutionary developments in micro–electronics and biotechnology in the second
half of the 20
th century.
105 JO - L 213 of 30.7.98
106 These include Germany, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Korea, Denmark, Spain, the United
States, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the Czech
Republic, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.170
objects. National differences concern the patentability of plants per se, parts of plants
or vegetal varieties, and of animals per se, animal organs or animal varieties. All
countries excluded the patentability of human beings, human organs or derived
products of human origin, including cell lines, genes and sequences of nucleic acids
or amino-acids. However, an isolated element of the human body, or one obtained
through a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene,
might be patentable even though its structure may be identical to the naturally
occurring one.
It is clear that national legislation does not include, in general, legal principles that
prohibit the patentability of biotechnological inventions. At the same time, however,
the implementation of patentability is subject to a number of specific norms that
require explicit treatment by national legislators.
Directive 98/44 is based on the principle that biotechnological inventions can be
patented, but there may be specific exclusions depending on the nature of the
invention
107. These exclusions clearly address the ethical concern expressed in the
European Parliament and by the public about -the possibility of granting patents for
processes that may modify human genetic identity or utilise human genetic materials
in the organised form of embryos. However, the Directive is states clearly that an
invention cannot be excluded for the sole reason that it concerns living matter.
The debate about IPRs in biotechnology is still highly controversial and problematic.
The emergence of a regime where property rights can be precisely defined and
appropriated has been favourable to the development of the biotechnology industry
in the US, especially as an incentive for the creation of DBFs. At the same time,
however, there is growing concern that permissive attitudes have gone too far and
that the current US system might not be sustainable in the long run. In Europe, the
IPR situation is much less extreme, and there is opposition to the Directive as well as
problems of harmonisation across national legislation. The issues raised clearly go
far beyond biotechnology and will continue to be controversial over the next
decade(s). Within this environment, the key concerns raised at the frontier of science
and technology can only be resolved through informed discussion, careful economic
analysis, sound policy debate, and finally and most importantly, democratic
consensus.
5.4.5. European biotechnology policies: France and Germany
It was suggested earlier that the slow pace of development of biotechnology in
Europe has been due to lack of the basic preconditions for innovative activities in
this field. These concern the scientific and industrial base, the organisational
structures linking science to industry, venture capital and intellectual property rights.
                                                
107 The following inventions are excluded from patenting:
- the human body and its elements in their natural form;
- new plant varieties and animal races and the essentially biological processes for the production of
plants and animals;
- inventions that are contrary to public order and morality;
- processes for reproductive human cloning and for the utilisation of human embryos for industrial and
commercial purposes;
- processes for the modification of the genetic identity of animals without evident utility for human
health.171
However, in recent years European biotechnology appears to have found new
dynamism. One possible reason for this might be that policies have begun to exert
some impact. Many European countries began to initiate policies supporting
biotechnology in the 1980s. These included measures to introduce some typical US
institutional features that have been crucial to the development of new biotechnology
start–ups (such as fostering venture capital, developing financial markets tailored for
new high-risk companies, promoting the commercialisation of academic research and
mobility between academia and commercial activities), but primarily aimed at
strengthening technology transfer and the founding of new firms. Efforts were also
directed towards supporting basic research in universities and national research
laboratories and, in some countries, firms (France). Furthermore, in the UK and
France, the government has been instrumental in the foundation of some of the oldest
European biotechnology firms, namely Celltech in Britain and Transgene in France.
The effects of policies seem to have been widely different between countries and




Starting in the early 1980s with the “mobilisation (later “expansion”) programme”,
public support in France has been directed towards stimulating both private and
public sector research in biotechnology. A large part of basic research was actually
conducted by public structures such as the Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique (CNRS) and the Institut National de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM).
These institutes have also transferred funds to private institutions like the Institut
Pasteur. Beyond supporting start–ups through venture capital and stimulating the
creation of science and technology transfer centres within the major universities and
research institutes, public funding was used to revitalise large established groups
operating in the life sciences. In the 1990s, with the launch of the BioAvenir
programme, this latter form of intervention became more pronounced, as suggested
by the joint support to Rhône Poulenc and several public research centres, aimed at
creating public–private partnerships.
The improvement of some indicators of biotechnology activity in France, and
subsequently the creation of a more solid scientific and technological base, became
evident during the implementation of a “latent” national champion policy, in which a
large part of the public research system was made available to one private group.
Such an approach has been thought to have retarded the birth of new firms in the
early 1990s. However, this period was also one of little investor interest in
biotechnology in general. In recent years, French policy has been characterised by
new initiatives aimed at promoting knowledge transfer, the mobility of scientists, and
more generally, increasing co–ordination between different agents and at improving
the control of funded projects. Moreover, the opening of the “Nouveau Marché” is
showing itself to be a relevant channel for collecting financial resources.
                                                
108 The experience of the United Kingdom has been well documented in several reports, such as the
“Genome Valley” report of the Department of Trade and Industry and “Entrepreneurship in UK
biotechnology: the role of public policy”, by G. Owen with J. Lemme; Diebold Institute
Entrepreneurship and Public Policy Project. Consequently, it is not covered in a specific section in this
report.172
5.4.5.2. Germany
Publicly-funded research has been the primary source of biotechnology knowledge in
Germany as well. The “Applied Biology and Biotechnology Programme”, launched
in 1986 by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, was intended to
stimulate biotechnology research in universities (by the creation, for example, of
“Gene Centres” at the universities of Munich, Cologne, Heidelberg and Berlin) and
knowledge transfer to firms. Established chemical and pharmaceutical corporations
were, in this phase, the main subjects of such interventions.
Characteristics of recent public policies in Germany have been the support for an
environment encouraging new start–ups, and the “regional” focus in the development
of some high–tech industries. Local labour markets, specialised inputs and
knowledge spillovers are suggested as the main factors contributing to such
phenomena. The Ministry of Research launched the BioRegio programme in 1996 to
create a competition between 18 German regions, each of which was expected to
define research projects based on biotechnology networks. Three of them (Munich,
Rhineland and Rhine-Neckar) “won” the competition and received extra-funding,
and one, Jena, received a special vote by the jury. This type of intervention is seen as
one of the crucial factors contributing to growth in the number of new biotechnology
firms, after a decade during which Germany had been losing its leading European
position in life sciences.
It should be stressed, however, that such intervention has worked differently in
different regions. In most of them, firm and job creation has been limited, both in
terms of the number and size of new firms, and then of new jobs. A review of the
leading regions shows that the new start–ups have been able to rely on a pre–
existing, and quite diffused, knowledge base, as represented by universities, research
institutes, and even the chemical and pharmaceutical industry. The case of Rhine-
Neckar is characteristic. The majority of life science firms are located in the
Heidelberg Technology Park (i.e., very close to university clinics and the German
Cancer Research Centre), and, furthermore, chemical and pharmaceutical companies
have long been present in the area. One can only speculate how the future will unfold
once public support is over.
Clearly, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of different policy approaches and
arrive at one that might be preferable to others
109. What emerges clearly, however, is
that forward-oriented policies can have an impact, but that the presence of other
factors-principally an established and developed knowledge and competence base –
is necessary to attain a “critical mass” for the growth of the sector. Even if policies
have played an important role in the recent dynamism of European biotechnology, it
is not easy to isolate the contribution of any particular intervention. As already noted,
the simultaneous presence of various factors appears to have played a determinant
role. In many countries, indeed, policies have often been criticised for the lack of co–
ordination between different measures and for the lack of a “strategic” vision.
                                                
109 Another interesting case is Denmark, where the development of biotechnology firms is in different
ways linked, according to many observers, to their relationship with large and established companies
like Novo Nordisk and Heineken. On the other hand, creating a favorable framework for foreign
investment by providing fiscal incentives has been central to Ireland’s biotechnology policy. The birth
of new firms is mainly concentrated in areas such as Dublin where, again, a solid knowledge base and a
scientific community were already present.173
5.4.6. Other institutional factors: public perceptions and overall regulatory stance
Public perceptions and attitudes can affect the economic and regulatory conditions
under which an industry operates. Their impact can be felt through supply channels
(attraction to young graduates and scientists, perceived social utility of related
research, perceived risk factors with respect to financial conditions), the economics
of production or the demand for the products and techniques that the industry puts on
the market.
Regulation tends to be specific to the field of application and the technology.
Generally, there cannot be any unequivocal judgement over its role as its short-term
effects may differ from its longer term ones. However, there is little doubt that the
regulatory framework can have a major impact on the competitiveness of
biotechnology in Europe.
Available research (Gaskell et al., 2000) seems to suggest that the European public
discriminates quite clearly among the fields of application of biotechnology.
Europeans are neutral about agricultural biotechnology and opposed to both
genetically modified food and the cloning of animals. By contrast, perceptions of
medical and environmental biotechnology are very positive.
In the EU, no genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been placed on the
market for the past 3 years (since October 1998). Though the EU has one of the
strictest pre-market risk assessment systems in the form of Directive 90/220/EEC,
revised this year (see Directive 2001/18/EC), Member States have refused to
authorise GMOs. As a consequence, genetically modified food products have not
been authorised under the sector-based legislation and the entry of new genetically
modified plant varieties onto the Common Catalogues was not possible, despite
positive assessments from the EU's scientific bodies.
The above situation and the uncertainty as to when authorisation of GMOs and
derived products may restart, has led the biotechnology industry to focus most of its
investments – especially concerning R&D and the basis for new start-ups and SMEs,
– in non-plant related areas, where mechanisms for product approval are in place and
functioning.
This situation is in stark contrast with the one in the US where markets for all areas
of biotechnology are in place.
5.5. Adoption of biotechnology among large European firms
An important aspect of the development of European biotechnology is the
considerable lag, compared to American (and to some extent British) companies, in
the adoption of new techniques, notably molecular biology, by many large
established companies. The relevance of this factor is crucial. Given the low rate of
creation of new firms, the development of biotechnology in Europe has rested on the
activities of large companies. Moreover, in the absence of a vibrant research activity
by large firms, prospective start-ups lacked an essential source of survival and
growth through the establishment of collaborative agreements. As mentioned
previously, in the absence of such skills, large companies would turn to the American
scientific and technological base to tap and absorb the new requisite skills during
their catching-up process. Thus, in Europe, a vicious circle between the relative174
backwardness of large firms and the low rate of formation of new start-ups has been
created.
The rate of adoption of biotechnology by established companies varied widely across
the world and between firms. Within Europe, some large British and Swiss firms
were able to adopt the technology rather quickly. Other firms, with smaller research
functions, more local in scope or more orientated towards the exploitation of
established research, found the transition more difficult. Thus, almost all of the
established French, Italian, German and Japanese companies appear to have been
slow to adopt the new technologies. To be sure, some German companies (e.g.
Hoechst) were among the first to establish connections with the American research
base in biotechnology (as early as 1982 Hoechst signed a multimillion, ten-year
agreement with Massachusetts General Hospital). Nevertheless, the actual absorption
of the new technologies progresses on average more slowly in Europe than in the US.
What factors have possibly contributed to this?
•  The relative strength of the local science base appears again to be relevant.
American and UK science is arguably more advanced, leading to a slower
diffusion of the new techniques to continental European pharmaceutical firms.
However, many Swiss firms established strong connections with the US scientific
system, suggesting that geographic proximity as such played a much less
important role in the diffusion of molecular biology.
•  Second, it is possible that the size and structure of the various national
pharmaceutical industries determine diffusion. The existence of a strong national
pharmaceutical industry, with some large internationalised companies, may have
been a fundamental factor in the rapid adoption of biotechnology. In many
European countries, the industry was highly fragmented into small companies
engaged essentially in the marketing of licensed products and the development of
minor products for the domestic markets. However, while size or global reach
may have been a necessary condition, the delay of the largest German firms in
adopting these techniques suggests that it was not sufficient. The largest German
firms were undoubtedly among the most internationalised and largest companies
in the world.
•  Another important factor may be the degree of diversification. Most European
firms have been large chemical firms, largely diversified into different
technologies and markets, ranging from chemicals and pharmaceuticals to
agricultural applications. US firms have been more specialised into narrowly
defined areas. In other words, even if chemistry was the fundamental
technological base for all firms, the European corporations have been essentially
defined by their chemical culture, whereas US firms have been focused on more
specific products and markets and, as a consequence, perhaps, more ready to
explore new and alternative research. Moreover, in the early stage of
development, biotechnology was often perceived as an opportunity for synergies.
Over time, however, pharmaceutical, agri-food and chemical applications tended
gradually to diverge and to progress along distinct paths.
•  An additional factor is the stringency of the regulatory environment, especially as
concerns pharmaceuticals. There is now widespread recognition that the
introduction of the 1962 Kefauver - Harris Amendments had a significant impact175
in inducing a deep transformation of the US pharmaceutical industry. Similarly, it
has been suggested that the European country whose leading firms did move more
rapidly to adopt the new techniques - Britain – also appears to have actively
encouraged a "harsher" competitive environment. This induced British firms to
pursue strategies aimed less at fragmentation of innovative efforts into numerous
minor products than at concentrating on a few important products that could be
diffused widely into the global market. By the 1970s, the ensuing transformation
of British firms had led to their increasing expansion in world markets.
The diffusion of the new technologies has varied also between firms. Most of the
firms that rapidly adopted the new techniques have been large multinational or global
companies, with a strong research presence in the US and in international markets.
These firms had developed early a "taste" for science and were able to integrate the
new knowledge into the firms. This, in turn, was accomplished through
organisational changes directed towards building and sustaining close links with the
public research community through the successful adoption of academic-like forms
of organisation of research. Other institutional factors have also been necessary,
albeit not sufficient.
•  First, it is possible that the Anglo-Saxon forms of corporate governance made it
easier for firms to “hire and fire” personnel or cut non-performing assets;
continental companies seem to have hesitated to give long–term employment to
biologists before biology was proven to be successful over the long run.
•  Second, it is possible that the American advantage in the use of biotechnology
within large corporations, as well as in new biotechnology companies, relates to
the proximity and availability of first-rate scientific research in universities and in
the closer integration between industry and the academic community. One might
also speculate that this has been the result of the strong scientific base of the
American medical culture and of the adoption of strict scientific procedures in
clinical trials. Through this mechanism, American companies might have to
develop earlier and stronger relationships with the biomedical community, and
with molecular biologists in particular.
5.6. Concluding comments
European biotechnology is still lagging significantly behind the US. Despite
encouraging signals of dynamism – especially in the small Northern European
countries – and a wave of entries of new DBFs – especially in Germany – innovative
activities remain far below the American levels. European companies rely partially
on American research while, more worryingly, US firms do not seem to consider
European research equally attractive. The new European DBFs, furthermore, are
much smaller than their American counterparts, much less active in the global
network of collaborative relations and in the markets for technology, and are mainly
present in platform technologies.
To some extent, the European performance deficit in biotechnology is the result of its
late entry. Even in such a strongly science–based industry, innovative activities are
characterised by various forms of increasing returns, and early entrants acquire long-
lasting leadership. This is a crucial point, since it implies that catching–up is
inherently difficult. Yet, catching–up is possible, but it requires determined efforts to
generate the appropriate skills, market signals and incentives.176
Europe has had policies promoting biotechnology in place for several years, and
some important results have already been achieved. Recent developments suggest
that the policies might have begun to produce effects. Thus, it could be that European
biotechnology might take-off suddenly and sooner than expected.
However, the results of this chapter suggest that late entry is only part of the problem
and that the take–off of European biotechnology is still hindered by a variety of
structural factors. This leads to some general implications.
5.6.1. A systemic approach seems necessary
First, it is important to recognise that the lagging behind of European biotechnology
also has systemic causes, rather than being simply the result of specific market or
institutional failures. Successful innovative and commercial activities in this industry
depend on a delicate blend of skills and incentives and require the integration and co-
ordination of several differentiated agents, capabilities and functions. Focusing on
some specific aspects of the puzzle is not likely to yield the desired outcomes and a
co–ordinated strategy appears to be necessary.
Biotechnology involves the exploration of an enormous, imprecisely defined and
rapidly changing space of unknown opportunities. This requires both decentralisation
of efforts and a variety of approaches, as well as an ability to integrate and co-
ordinate them. Clearly, this is a challenge to which no unique, optimal solution may
exist but alternative strategies may in fact be appropriate. For example, in the de-
coding of the human genome the Human Genome Project was achieved by extreme
decentralisation of tasks and approaches among a large number of institutions, while
Celera Genomics approached it through strong centralisation of resources and efforts.
Both approaches have been partially successful and each benefited from the
existence of the other.
US leadership in biotechnology derives from a unique blend of capabilities and
institutional arrangements. These include a strong scientific, technological and
industrial base; mechanisms that favour communication and transfer of knowledge
between academia and industry; a financial system that promotes the start–up of new,
risky ventures; strong intellectual property protection; and a favourable climate in
terms of public perception and regulation that does not restrict genetic
experimentation. European biotechnology need - and probably should not -
necessarily take the US model as the one to follow. Some aspects of the development
of biotechnology in the US cause concern, especially as regards IPRs. Moreover,
Europe has different institutional set-ups, histories, traditions and skills. On them, it
might be possible to develop a different, but equally successful, road to
competitiveness. However, some basic lessons can be learned from the US case and
serve as a source of inspiration for European policy.
5.6.2. Strengthening basic scientific research and building a European research system
Second, it is clear that the availability of leading–edge scientific capabilities is the
fundamental precondition for successful development of biotechnology. Without a
strong and integrated scientific research base, no technological take–off is possible.
Nor can European industry simply tap the American scientific knowledge. At the
very least, acquiring knowledge implies the ability to produce knowledge. Access to
the scientific community requires direct and active participation in the networks of177
scientists. The dynamics (and the economics and sociology) of scientific research is
characterised by strong path–dependence and first–mover advantages.
Europe is lagging behind in this respect too. While centres of excellence exist,
Europe does not attract foreign resources, and European biotechnology in the large
companies relies significantly on American research. Increased funding is certainly
necessary, but it is only a part of the solution. An important finding is that the
European research system is weak in terms of organisational diversity, it is
specialised in rather narrow areas and is insufficiently interconnected across different
research areas, types of organisations and stages of the research process. Thus, higher
degrees of pluralism in funding sources, lower dependence on closed national
systems, higher integration of research with teaching, clinical research and medical
practice should become priorities of a European research policy in this area, allowing
more efficient exploitation of available resources.
Finally, the European research systems may still be too rigid and bureaucratic and
segregated. While important advances have been made in recent years, further
progress needs to be made in this respect
5.6.3. Integration of research and industry
The European research system may still be insufficiently integrated with industrial
research. This is most likely a reflection of several factors, possibly that that
European industry does not fully exploit the potential offered by European science,
as well as institutional and organisational obstacles, which could be more directly
relevant here, such as low mobility of researchers and bureaucratic obstacles to
collaboration .
Policies in this area have focused on introducing incentives for academic researchers
to become involved in industrial research and in building bridges between university
and industry, as well as developing financial and infrastructure facilities like venture
capital, science parks, etc. In practice, these measures, important as they are, appear
to reflect an understanding of the innovation process based on the transfer of
knowledge. However, because innovation is primarily an interactive process, more
emphasis is necessary instead on how to integrate more directly different agents and
fragments of knowledge. To a considerable extent, these difficulties derive from
some long–standing characteristics of the European academic systems, particularly
the integration of research and teaching and the structure of career paths in
universities. In fact, universities often lack the necessary organisational capabilities
to sustain intense interchange with industry. Again, considerable progress has been
achieved in this area in recent years, but science and industry continue to encounter
difficulties in their interactions. Thus, measures are necessary to favour the
development of more direct linkages between universities and industry, through the
integration of research and teaching and the development of markets for technology.
These observations apply both to the creation of university spin–offs and to the
relationships between universities and large corporations.
5.6.4. Sustaining the creation and development of dedicated biotechnology firms
The creation and development of a strong DBF sector is a crucial priority. DBFs
constitute an important organisational device allowing exploration of the new
opportunities. In Europe, this sector remains underdeveloped and too concentrated in178
a few areas. Moreover, the European DBFs are hardly comparable with the American
biotechnology firms. They are far too small and too specialised in specific niches.
Their ability to grow appears severely constrained.
Once again, interventions aiming at promoting the birth of DBFs have been at the
centre of European biotechnology policies for more than a decade. The emphasis is
still on strengthening industry–university relations, the creation of the
“entrepreneurial university”, the development of venture capital and, to a lesser
extent, on intellectual property rights. Although these are important, the main
problem is an inadequate supply of cutting–edge scientific research and the
difficulties that afflict the European research system. While venture capital remains
an essential instrument for supporting the process of formation and the early growth
of the new firms, it ought to be understood as one instrument within a wider array of
sources of funding (including public research funding) and managerial capabilities.
Finally, it is important to recognise that DBFs exist in a relationship of strong
complementarity with the large corporations. The latter are fundamental sources of
demand for products and services of DBFs and provide crucial integration
capabilities for transforming different fragments of knowledge into products. Large
firms constitute reservoirs of technological and managerial competence. Especially
in Europe, DBFs have been – and may increasingly become –spin–offs of large
incumbents rather than of universities. Supporting the creation of DBFs may raise the
competitiveness of “downstream” industries, mainly pharmaceuticals.
5.6.5. Intellectual property rights
Intellectual property rights constitute one of the most delicate and important issues
for biotechnology. While problems of clarification and harmonisation of the
legislation on these matters remain, the emerging European approach is on the whole
balanced and flexible enough to accommodate diverging requirements. The creation
of the Community Patent and the implementation of the Biotechnology Patent
Directive will provide a useful addition in this area, by making EU-wide protection
easier.
The problem concerning IPRs is also closely linked to issues pertaining to regulation
and public perception. This question goes beyond biotechnology into the wider issue
of the social and political control of scientific progress. This is a difficult and
important matter, where no clear solution can be proposed. In the end, the democratic
process must decide what is morally acceptable. However, misinformation and
emotional reaction might seriously hamper progress that provides enormous benefits
to society.
It is useful to recall that rigorous regulation is not always an impediment to scientific
and technological progress. On the contrary, it can be beneficial, both by providing
reassurance to society and by forcing industry to adopt higher quality standards
which, if combined with more streamlined administrative procedures, can lead it to
become more competitive and efficient. In this respect, the example of the regulatory
reforms concerning product approval in the pharmaceutical industry might be
instructive. However, onerous regulation can severely undermine competitiveness by
placing unnecessary constraints on innovation, thus encouraging individuals and
companies to relocate.179
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